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ABSTRACT
Standardized testing is a defining feature of contemporary American society. It not only
governs how people are channeled through their schooling; it amplifies existing social
disparities. Nonetheless, standardized testing endures, namely because it has served as a vital
tool for the post-1945 American state. The postwar state prioritized, on the one hand, the
cultivation of intellects resilient enough to sustain American geopolitical supremacy through
scientific discovery and technological innovation and, on the other hand, the maintenance of an
obedient population that would not disrupt existing social hierarchies. Standardized testing
helped the postwar state solve this mind-body dilemma. As a function for social order,
standardized testing provided the means for governing bodies to make sense of their citizens—
particularly to gauge the skills, knowledge, and ability youth could eventually bring into a labor
force. Standardized testing thus makes it clear not just who the so-called best and brightest are,
but how well a population of students has adjusted to a set of educational norms the state has
deemed necessary for future social success. Standardized testing is thus a way to monitor and
enforce educational compliance with projected state and social needs.
This dissertation examines how standardized testing became a vital instrument for the
postwar state—and, in turn, how this state dependence on standardized testing fueled several
larger postwar political cultures. This dissertation also focuses on the tension between the ways
the state made sense of its citizens and the ways citizens made sense of society through
standardized tests. Standardized testing acted as a massive social sorter in postwar America, but
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with time, many groups of Americans began to question the wisdom of educational reliance on
standardized testing, as well as challenge the foundational assumptions about what testing
actually measured. African-Americans, women, and working-class Americans pursued legal,
legislative, and academic methods to push back against unjust standardized testing practices.
This resistance also often provoked responses from those who had great stakes—whether
socioeconomic or corporate—in maintaining the use and meaning of standardized tests.
Politicians, parents, consumer advocates, academics, educational reformers, feminists, civil
rights activists, entrepreneurs, and white supremacists all interpreted standardized testing scores
and trends for larger political ends, often using similar information as their opponents to stake far
different positions about race, gender, class, and merit. Yet, as more Americans questioned the
legitimacy of standardized testing, they often reinforced standardized testing data’s use as a
rhetorical tool, ultimately entrenching testing data as a way to make sense of society, even as
more and more Americans find testing regimes purposeless.
This dissertation shows that, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, standardized
testing data had become a potent tool for contending who mattered and who did not for
America’s future. Because debates about standardized testing’s social utility often hinged on the
meaning of test data—whether it reflected objective truths about the natural distribution of
mental aptitudes or, instead, exposed the biases psychologists built into their devices as well as
the prejudicial baggage that informed laypeople’s interpretation of statistical information—
standardized testing itself continues to have value as a political weapon. Whether or not one has
a specific policy proposal for the future use of standardized testing, its rhetorical function as a
symbol for what is wrong with America will continue to fuel numerous, often oppositional,
debates.

iv

INTRODUCTION: THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF STANDARDIZED TESTING
Standardized testing governs American life. From the earliest stages of education,
American children face a steady stream of standardized tests.1 The results from standardized
tests shape how teachers, parents, guidance counselors, and administrators view students—and,
in turn, how students see themselves. These test scores form the path a student takes during their
schooling: whether they are placed in advanced or remedial courses; whether they pass from one
grade to the next; whether they are accepted into a more selective school; and whether they are
granted entry into a graduate program. Standardized test scores also determine whether schools
gain or lose funding and if teachers earn promotion. Standardized testing may carry high stakes
for all educational participants—but it also has widespread effects well beyond the classroom.
Realtors refer to the average SAT scores in a district when marketing property in affluent

1

Many researchers agree that strictly using standardized tests to assess learning in children under the age of
8 is an unethical practice that produces wildly unreliable results—and that educators should, at the very least,
incorporate additional methods of observation and tracking before third grade in order to identify and monitor
children who may have learning deficits or exceptional educational needs. Such professional reticence, however, did
not stop the G.W. Bush and Obama Administrations from trying to implement national standardized assessments for
preschool- and early-elementary-aged children. The ethical haziness in both cases resided in whether such
assessments would have relied on data-gathering methods unsuitable for small children—and what potential
consequences early-childhood educators would have faced if children entered elementary school without having
demonstrated proficiency in certain areas. See: Lorrie Shepard, Sharon Lynn Kagan, and Emily Wurtz, eds.,
“Principles and Recommendations for Early Childhood Assessments,” National Education Goals Panel, February
1999, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/negp/reports/prinrec.pdf; Ann S. Epstein et al, “Preschool Assessment: A Guide
to Developing a Balanced Approach,” Preschool Policy Matters 7 (July, 2004), http://www.doe.in.gov/
sites/default/files/earlylearning/preschool-assessment-guide-developing-balanced-approach.pdf; Marcy Guddemi
and Betsy Case, “Assessment Report: Assessing Young Children, Pearson, 2004, http://images.pearsonassessments.
com/images/tmrs/tmrs_rg/Assessing YoungChildren.pdf?WT.mc_id=TMRS _Assessing_ Young_Children; Valerie
Strauss, “Bush Plan to Assess 4-Year Olds’ Progress Stirs Criticism,” Washington Post, January 17, 2003; and
Michele McNell, “New Race to Top Stresses Pre-K Tests, Early Ed. Program Ratings,” Education Week, July 1,
2011, http://blogs.edweek.org/ edweek/campaign-k-12/2011/07/ to_compete_states_ must.html?_ga=2.128105100.
1239417728.1493166805-1254062810.1426548188 (all links last accessed April 25, 2017).
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neighborhoods.2 Massive corporations generate hundreds of millions in revenues selling
standardized tests to various school districts and state education boards, all while other massive
corporations generate hundreds of millions in revenues selling pricey standardized test
preparatory guides, courses, and private tutoring programs.3 Standardized testing has even
manifested its own unique version of anxiety, leading psychologists to consider the therapeutic
and pharmaceutical regimens students could use to weather potentially disabling scenarios.4 The
anxiety that many feel over standardized testing reflects the disproportionate role it plays in
everyday American life.
Many Americans have become so frustrated with the ubiquity of standardized testing that
they have developed an entire political culture in response. The contemporary anti-testing
movement has its anchorage in a broader politics of the family, which advocates that the rights of

2

Lauren Meade, “The Higher the SAT Scores, the More the House is Worth,” Christian Science Monitor,
April 28, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0428/p11s01-lihc.html. Observe as well the routine way in which
SAT scores are remarked in real estate profiles of tony areas; see: Elsa Brenner, “Chappaqua, N.Y.: A Hamlet in a
Woodsy Setting,” New York Times, September 3, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/ realestate/chappaquany-a-hamlet-in-a-woodsy-setting.html (all links last accessed April 25, 2017).
3

The British company Pearson VUE, one of the largest test providers for the United States, posted
revenues of over 4 billion pounds in 2016, while Graham Holdings posted over $280 million in revenues through its
test preparation holdings alone; see: Pearson, “Press Release: Pearson 2016 Preliminary Results (Unaudited),”
February 24, 2017, https://www.pearson.com/content/dam/one-dot-com/one-dot-com/global/Files/news/newsannoucements/2017/2016_Full_Year_Results_Press_Release.pdf; Graham Holdings, 1, 2016 Annual Report,
http://www.ghco.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=62487&p=irol-reportsannual (all links last accessed April 25, 2017).
4

Psychologically speaking, test anxiety is not a distinct diagnostic category in the most recent edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), and is usually located within a broader
umbrella of anxiety disorders. Absence in the DSM-5 aside, psychologists have spent decades determining the
existence of test anxiety, its physiological and cognitive effects, its relationship to learning disabilities and other
anxiety disorders, and its measureable effects on test performance. Test anxiety’s amorphous quality—a subject of
considerable psychological analysis, but not an official diagnostic category—ironically makes it easier to circulate
as a popular topic among nonprofessional circles. For recent examples of psychological research, see: Dubi Lufi and
Lina Darliuk, “The Interactive Effect of Test Anxiety and Learning Disabilities Among Adolescents,” Educational
Research 43 (2005): 236-249; Markus Sommer and Martin E. Arendasy, “Comparing Different Explanations of the
Effect of Test Anxiety on Respondents’ Test Scores,” Intelligence 42 (2014): 115-127; and Frank Herzer, Julia
Wendt, and Alfons O. Hamm, “Discriminating Clinical from Nonclinical Manifestations of Test Anxiety: A
Validation Study,” Behavior Therapy 45 (2014): 222-231.
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parents take precedent over the responsibilities of the state.5 A groundswell of parents,
concerned that educators are stuck doing little more than “teaching to the test, ” have staged
widespread protests of statewide testing programs.6 In New York State alone, parents pulled
over 200,000 children from statewide standardized tests in 2015—and in some districts, over
two-thirds of students refrained from that year’s exams.7 Even Massachusetts, which had been at
the vanguard of developing high-stakes testing programs that generated more ambitious curricula
as well as demonstrable growth in student learning, backed away from proposed multistate
testing schemes after considerable public antipathy.8 Fueled partially by social media networks,
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For some sense of the background of this contemporary political culture, see: Donald T. Critchlow,
Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005);
Robert O. Self, All in the Family: the Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s (New York: Hill and
Wang, 2012); and Georgina Denton, “Neither Guns Nor Bombs—Neither the State Nor God—Will Stop us From
Fighting For Our Children: Motherhood and Protest in 1960s and 1970s America,” The Sixties: A Journal of
History, Politics, and Culture 5, no. 2 (November, 2012): 205-228.
6

Teaching to the test, by contrast, is often advocated by thinktanks, and reflects a centrist consensus on
education in which educational assessment is pegged to social order in a fashion that presumes the deviance of
students and teachers who do not willingly submit to such a system. In one confounding example, printed in the
prestigious peer-reviewed Quarterly Journal of Economics, depicted as a necessary function similar to speed traps
or anti-terrorist measures. In this article, later used by The Brookings Institute as the premise for its support for
teaching to the test, the author remains unclear about why teachers should be related to speeding drivers or terrorists,
and what good comes from an educational apparatus premised on the presumed deviance of educators. (Or, for that
matter, why students would be cars or bombs in such economic analogies.) Dismissing such an argument as inane,
however, misses the role that criminality and obedience play in many high-stakes testing regimes—namely, that
teachers are presumed incapable of effectively guiding students toward learning objective unless threatened with
negative consequences based on poor test scores. The test—and more importantly, the threat of occupational
sanctions following low test scores—is thus rendered the only acceptable motivation for learning. See: Edward P.
Lazear, “Speeding, Terrorism, and Teaching to the Test,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 3 (August,
2006): 1029-1061; Michael Hansen, “ Teaching to the Test: Hype or Reality?” Brown Center Chalkboard blog,
Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2016/05/16/teaching-to-the-testhype-or-reality/ (last accessed April 24, 2017); and Roland G. Fryer, Jr., et al, “Enhancing the Efficacy of Teaching
Incentive Through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
18237 (Cambridge: NBER, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18237 (last accessed April 24, 2017).
7

Elizabeth A. Harris and Ford Fessenden, “’Opt Out’ Becomes Anti-Test Rallying Cry in New York
State,” New York Times May 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/nyregion/opt-out-movement-againstcommon-core-testing-grows-in-new-york-state.html?_r=0. For a look at parent-led grassroots opt-out efforts in
Florida, a state much more beholden to high-stakes standardized testing programs, see, Kristina Rizga, “Sorry, I’m
Not Taking This Test,” Mother Jones September/October, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/08/optout-standardized-testing-overload (links last accessed April 29, 2017).
8

Kate Zernike, “Massachusetts’s Rejection of Common Core Test Signals Shift in U.S.,” New York Times
November 21, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/us/rejecting-test-massachusetts-shifts-its-model.html?
_r=0. The anti-testing movement has also provided a way for teachers unions to dredge up support in otherwise
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this “opt out” movement reflects the distrust many Americans hold for the state (however
abstractly or imaginatively defined) and its data-gathering impulse.9 Within this capacious
political mindset, standardized testing regimes are, at once, an assault on childhood, an
imposition of anti-intuitive learning patterns, a devaluation of genuine inquiry and knowledge, an
abandonment of traditional educational basics, a form of social control, the triumph of neoliberal
educational corporatization, a waste of taxpayers’ dollars, and the reason the United States will
fall behind one of any number of countries that either, ironically, use tremendous high-stakes
testing mechanisms (China) or barely employ standardized educational testing at all (Finland).10

unpopular environments, using an issue that effects their livelihood (the punitive use of test scores in annual
evaluations) and parents’ fears (an unjust labeling of their child as abnormal or deficient, especially as studies
indicated teachers stuck in high-stakes testing environments spent more effort on marginally-proficient students than
low-performing pupils); see: Kate Taylor and Motoko Rich, “Teachers’ Unions Fight Standardized Testing, and
Find Diverse Allies,” New York Times April 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 04/21/education/teachersunions-reasserting-themselves-with-push-against-standardized-testing.html?_r=0; and Kathleen McGrory, “Gov.
Rick Scott Signs Bill That Scales Back Testing,” Tampa Bay Times April 14, 2015, http://www.tampabay.com/
news/politics/stateroundup/gov-rick-scott-signs-bill-that-scales-back-testing/2225436; Chicago Teachers Union,
“Debunking the Myths of Standardized Testing: A CTU Position Paper,” CTU website, http://www.ctunet.com/
quest-center/research/position-papers/text/CTU_Testing_Position_Brief_web-1.pdf (all links last accessed April 24,
2017); and Derek Neal and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, “Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and TestBased Accountability), Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no. 2 (May, 2010): 263-283.
9

Observe, for example, the relative popularity of anti-Common Core Facebook Groups. One can join
“CHOOSE TO REFUSE COMMON CORE” (38,178 as of late April, 2017), “AMERICANS AGAINST
COMMON CORE” (2,177 members), “Don’t Be Cattle! Fight Common Core!” (7,430)—or, based on state and
local allegiances, one can join similar groups united against Common Core in Utah, Rhode Island, Ohio, and East
Islip, New York (4,448, 1,606, 2,817, and 485 members, respectively.) In these groups, Common Core is linked to
evils of progressive politics, Islam, socialism, charter schooling, big government, and transgenderism under the
matrix of “indoctrination.” In turn, anti-Common Core activists—whether or not they oppose actual standardized
testing based on Common Core standards or just a shapeless “Common Core” bogeyman—pose themselves as the
defenders of the purity of children’s minds and spirits. While state- and local-focused groups seem more opposed to
the ideas of needless educational bureaucracy and corporatism, national groups seem overtly aligned with far-right
politics; Facebook’s algorithms suggest Trump-fawning pages based on the network-joining patterns for these
general anti-Common Core groups.
10

For brief considerations of whether teaching to the test actually dilutes learning through teachers’
disproportionate focus on content most likely to appear on a high-stakes exam—thus creating test inflation, or the
false impression that students have learned more overall rather than select discrete points of content—see: Henry
Braun, “Taming Inflation is Never Easy,” Measurement 13 (2015): 31-34; and Jennifer L. Jennings and Jonathan
Marc Bereak, “’Teaching to the Test’ in the NCLB Era: How Test Predictability Affects Our Understanding of
Student Performance,” Educational Researcher 43, no. 8: 381-389.
For widespread pubic commentary against teaching to the test, see: Kelly Gallagher, Commentary: Why I
Will Not Teach to the Test,” Education Week, November 12, 2010, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/11/17/
12gallagher_ep.h30.html; Times Editorial Board, “No Child Left Behind: How to End ‘Teaching to the Test,” Los
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These parents’ anti-testing politics are steeped in the fears and fantasies about the direction of
American society, the United States’ standing in relation to other countries, and most
importantly, the future their own children will face. Opting out is not seen primarily as a retreat
from society but a means of self-preservation.
Nonetheless, standardized testing endures, namely because it has served as a vital tool for
the post-1945 American state. The postwar state prioritized, on the one hand, the cultivation of
intellects resilient enough to sustain American geopolitical supremacy through scientific
discovery and technological innovation and, on the other hand, the maintenance of an obedient
population that would not disrupt existing social hierarchies. Standardized testing helped the
postwar state solve this mind-body dilemma. As a function for social order, standardized testing
provided the means for governing bodies to make sense of their citizens—particularly to gauge
the skills, knowledge, and ability youth could eventually bring into a labor force. Standardized
testing thus makes it clear not just who the so-called best and brightest are, but how well a
population of students has adjusted to a set of educational norms the state has deemed necessary
for future social success. Standardized testing is thus a way to monitor and enforce educational
compliance with projected state and social needs.

Angeles Times, February 23, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-testing-no-child-left-behind20150223-story.html; and Vince Bertram, “Standardized Testing Review: Let’s Make ‘Teaching to the Test’ a
Thing of the Past,” Fox New Opinion, November 16, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/11/16/
standardized-testing-review-lets-make-teaching-to-test-thing-past.html; (links last accessed April 24, 2017).
For a sense of American education writers’ fascination with Finland and its nearly-complete lack of
standardized testing, see: Anu Partanen “What Americans Keep Ignoring About Finland’s School Success,” The
Atlantic, December 29, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/12/what-americans-keep-ignoringabout-finlands-school-success/250564/; Pasi Sahlberg, Finnish Lessons 2.0: What Can the World Learn from
Educational Change in Finland? (New York: Teachers College Press, 2014); and William Doyle, “Op-Ed: Why
Finland Has the Best School,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe0318-doyle-finnish-schools-20160318-story.html (links last accessed April 26, 2017).
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This dissertation examines how standardized testing became a vital instrument for the
postwar state—and, in turn, how this state dependence on standardized testing fueled several
larger postwar political cultures. Beginning with World War Two, the American state began
engaging with widespread standardized testing in a sustained fashion, with an eye toward
broader geopolitical needs.11 The state’s ability to continue large-scale testing depended on its
use of independent test manufacturers, which developed standardized exam programs for the
military, corporations, and institutions of higher education alike. Testing programs provided a
convenient way to harmonize geopolitical, business, and educational interests without breaching
commonly agreed-upon tenets of liberalism, capitalism, or decentralization.
This dissertation also focuses on the tension between the ways the state made sense of its
citizens and the ways citizens made sense of society through standardized tests. Standardized
testing acted as a massive social sorter in postwar America, but with time, many groups of
Americans began to question the wisdom of educational reliance on standardized testing, as well
as challenge the foundational assumptions about what testing actually measured. African-

11

By “state,” I mean the institutions and actors that give the federal government its shape, scope, and
power. This not only includes the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, but also the
military, governmental bureaucracy, federal agencies, and their employees. The state also includes the policies,
rituals, and laws that compel social order among a certain people in a specified territory. What I aim to convey
through this dissertation is that the state is buttressed by non-state actors that provide vital technologies for the
state—namely, technologies that facilitate social order—but which are not themselves officially part of the state.
Hence, standardized testing is used by the state to make meaning of its citizens in a way that the state, by its own
devices, cannot. See: Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in
Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3-37; Patrick J. Akard, “Bringing the Economy Back in (Again): Conceptions of
the Capitalist State and Their Relevance for Public Policy,” Mid-American Review of Sociology 11, no. 2 (Winter,
1986): 75-100; Theda Skocpol, “A Society Without a ‘State’? Political Organization, Social Conflict, and Welfare
Provision in the United States,” Journal of Public Policy 7, no. 4 (October-December, 1987): 349-371; Desmond
King and Robert C. Lieberman, “Finding the American State: Transcending the ‘Statelessness’ Account,” Polity 40,
no. 3 (July, 2008): 368-378; Eric M. Patashnik and Julian E. Zelizer,” The Struggle to Remake Politics: Liberal
Reform and the Limits of Policy Feedback in the Contemporary American State, Persepctives on Politics 11, no . 4
(December, 2013): 1071-1087; Daniel Béland, François Vergnoille de Chantal, and Sarah-Louise Raillard, “The
American State: Between Political Invisibility and Institutional Fragmentation,” Revue Française de Science
Politique 64, no. 2 (2014): 1-14; and Gillian E. Metzger, “Agencies, Polarization, and the States,” Columbia Law
Review 115, no. 7 (November, 2015): 1739-1787.
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Americans, women, and working-class Americans increasingly resisted the way standardized
testing was used as both proof of their diminished capabilities and justification for their social
disparity. These groups pursued legal, legislative, and academic methods to push back against
unjust standardized testing practices. This resistance also often provoked responses from those
who had great stakes—whether socioeconomic or corporate—in maintaining the use and
meaning of standardized tests. Politicians, parents, consumer advocates, academics, educational
reformers, feminists, civil rights activists, entrepreneurs, and white supremacists all interpreted
standardized testing scores and trends for larger political ends, often using similar information as
their opponents to stake far different positions about race, gender, class, and merit. Yet, as more
Americans questioned the legitimacy of standardized testing, they often reinforced standardized
testing data’s use as a rhetorical tool, ultimately entrenching testing data as a way to make sense
of society, even as more and more Americans find testing regimes purposeless.
Finally, this dissertation shows that, by the beginning of the twenty-first century,
standardized testing data had become a potent tool for contending who mattered and who did not
for America’s future. Because debates about standardized testing’s social utility often hinged on
the meaning of test data—whether it reflected objective truths about the natural distribution of
mental aptitudes or, instead, exposed the biases psychologists built into their devices as well as
the prejudicial baggage that informed laypeople’s interpretation of statistical information—
standardized testing itself continues to have value as a political weapon. Whether or not one has
a specific policy proposal for the future use of standardized testing, its rhetorical function as a
symbol for what is wrong with America will continue to fuel numerous, often oppositional,
debates. Until we get rid of standardized testing, we are stuck with political cultures fueled by
standardized testing.
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Ironically, as much writing exists on the perils and promises of standardized testing, there
remains relatively little historical research on the topic. The touchstone for the history of
standardized testing remains Nicholas Lemann’s The Big Test, which not only critically
examined the development of American higher education’s dependence on the SAT, but also the
test’s role in fueling the myth of meritocracy—that is, the ideological belief that the most
qualified and talented earn a space at the top of society through natural talent and hard work and
not profound structural advantages. Meritocracy let prestigious institutions offer the semblance
of a path to social comfort without ever acknowledging the broader social forces that kept
minorities outside of elite educational environments and, by extension, outside social privilege.
The SAT added a technocratic sheen to meritocracy’s bootstrapping rhetoric. Those who did well
on the SAT—namely, middle-to-upper-class white men in well-funded schools—could attribute
their place in prestigious colleges to the fuzzy idea of merit rather than ever question if the SAT
was a device better suited for maintaining the existing composition of the social elite. Lemann’s
work spurred considerable scrutiny and reform among American admissions counselors, and
added weight to public displeasure with the college application process, but his work lets the
SAT stand in for a far broader system of standardized assessment. By focusing on the attitudes
and backgrounds of the men who ran Educational Testing Service, however, Lemann forecloses
on the primary role the postwar state played in making standardized testing so commonplace a
social sorting device. Standardized testing was not just a tool for technocrats to replicate the
Northeastern elite among the masses, but also a way for the state to use new technology for
reproducing existing racial and economic power dynamics.12
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Although other useful works exist on the history of standardized testing—in particular,
William Reese’s investigation of the origins of testing in mid-nineteenth-century Boston
schools—most research on the topic either has a decidedly journalistic bent or is the product of
internal corporate histories. While this allows some authors to give compelling portrayals of testpreparation entrepreneurs (as David Owen did with the founders of The Princeton Review in
None of the Above), or to depict the actual children harmed by harebrained state testing policies
(as Anya Kamenetz did in The Test), such work is usually pegged to immediate public concerns
with standardized testing. Such work often has a deeply foreshortened sense of testing’s history,
as well as a clear aim to castigate standardized testing wholesale. By contrast, histories created
by standardized testing companies are flush with bureaucratic detail, but devoid of any genuine
critical examination of standardized testing’s impact on postwar American society. In these
corporate histories, standardized testing is always portrayed as a social good that contributes to
an undefined but ever-present idea of Progress. Standardized testing does not contribute to
socioeconomic disparities, these corporate histories maintain, but merely reflects the unequal
educational experiences that create test score differences between different socioeconomic
groups: don’t shoot the messenger. Both journalistic and corporate approaches to this topic avoid
a thorough examination of the role standardized testing played in expanding the reach of the
postwar state, as well as the intergenerational effect standardized testing data has had on various
groups’ socioeconomic mobility.13

ED502721.pdf; Andrew S. Belasco, Kelly O. Rosinger, and James C. Hearn, “The Test-Optional Movement at
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The history of standardized testing makes more sense when placed in a broader history of
numeracy, quantification, and social science research. Over the course of four centuries,
scientists have engaged in the process of relating humans to abstract quantities, whether by
surveying communities, forecasting voters’ choices, imagining the behavioral patterns of rational
actors, or constructing ideal physical shapes. Quantified abstractions mark the division between
the pre-modern and modern worlds: they signify when people became populations, when the
value of a life became an actuarial sum, when enslaved humans became units for insurance
adjustment, and when legal systems encoded fractional bases for race and nativity. The modern
state could hold better control over its subjects by treating them as economic figures—and, in
turn, could accustom populations to discipline themselves in line with statistical norms.
Modernity, then, has involved the confluence of governmental control, economic constraints, and
corporeal self-regulation through methods that render humans into numerical data.14
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Standardization has been one crucial facet of quantification—and the early history of
standardized testing, as discussed below, involved the incremental development of tools that
allowed the American state to make sense of its citizens and, in turn, for Americans to make
sense of themselves in numerical terms.
The history of standardized testing also benefits from sociological examinations of the
mechanics of class formation—both the actual creation of student bodies and the reinforcement
of socioeconomic strata—through postsecondary institutions, particularly the research of Jerome
Karabel and Mitchell Stevens. Whereas Karabel illustrates the historical dimensions of elite
replication at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, Stevens examines the contemporary admissions
process at a small liberal arts college. Karabel and Stevens show that elite colleges are not just
producers of the social elite, but respondents to broader economic forces. Moreover, Karabel and
Stevens illustrate how both prestigious and less-prestigious educational institutions appeal to
select groups of students based on a sense of their own place in the academic pecking order: an
small private college or large public research university, cannot market itself in the same way as
Ivy League schools do, quite simply because they lack the same clout—a clout increasingly
based on quantified guidelines.15
What, Exactly, Is a Standardized Test?
One irony of the widespread use and criticism of standardized tests is that relatively few
people are clear with what, exactly, standardized tests are. In this sense, standardized testing
hacking/making-up-people (last accessed April 28, 2017); Sarah E. Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens,
and the Making of a Mass Public (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Martha Lampland, “False Numbers
as Formalizing Practices,” Social Studies of Science 40, no. 3 (June, 2010): 377-404; Andrea Mennicken and Peter
Miller, “Accounting, Territorialization and Power,” Foucault Studies 13 (May, 2012): 4-24; and Caroline Lambert
and Eric Pezet, “Accounting and the Making of Homo Liberalis,” Foucault Studies 13 (May, 2012): 67-81.
15
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Princeton (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005); and Mitchell L. Stevens, Creating a Class: College Admissions and
the Education of Elites (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
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becomes pornographic: we can’t exactly define it, but we know it when we see it. A standardized
test is, quite simply, an assessment that is designed and administered in a uniform fashion, from
how much time test-takers are given, the questions they receive, the tools they may use, and even
the instructions they are provided.16 Although standardized testing may carry high stakes—such
as students’ promotion from one grade to the next, teachers’ pay rates and employment, or
schools’ funding and operations—not all standardized tests carry such severe consequences. Nor
do all standardized tests have the same primary purpose: some gauge the degree to which testtakers have acquired skills up to a certain point, while others assess test-takers’ learning
strengths or predict readiness for further education. Nonetheless, a standardized assessment’s
shape and questions first depend upon its stakeholders agreeing upon what its main objectives
should be.17 Based on these objectives, test designers—usually private corporations—create a
considerable number of test items, far more than is needed for the actual final exam, and give
them a trial run on sample populations. These experimental sample groups are ideally
representative of who will be taking the final exam—e.g., a test designed to measure high-school
seniors’ math skills should not use sixth-grade students for a trial sample. Given how well or
poorly these sample groups fared, test designers cull the best-constructed questions and assemble
them in a final experimental version. The data from this final experimental version often forms
the foundation for the published test’s scoring standards.18 Standardized exams thus go through
an elaborate multi-stage process to hone how they will assess test-takers’ skills and knowledge.
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Contemporary standardized tests fall into two broad categories, which each offer
considerably different models for adequate and extraordinary behavior. In a norm-referenced
test, test-takers’ performances are compared to those of a pre-constructed sample group. Such
sample groups are created during a test’s experimental period, although larger-scale standardized
testing programs (such as the SAT) may develop ongoing experimental design to ensure a cohort
of test-takers is never disproportionately abnormal compared to the original sample group. Testtakers’ scores on norm-referenced tests do not directly reflect how well or poorly they did on
questions but, instead, their performance compared to the experimental sample group. A testtaker may answer only half of all questions correctly and still score in the 70th percentile on a
norm-referenced test if they performed better than 70 percent of all students in the sample group.
In a criterion-referenced test, by contrast, students are measured by how much they know about a
specified domain of knowledge. The reference point for test-takers’ scores is not an original
sample group but, instead, predetermined objectives—what a high-school junior ought to know
in English by the end of the school year, or fundamental nursing procedures. These test-takers
are not in competition with a sample population, but against an imagined ideal test-taker who
knows all of the content.19 Whatever the basis for reference, standardized test scores do two
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things at once: they render individual students into quantities suitable for comparison and, more
potently, they personalize quantifiable data. Standardized test scores become a stand-in for
capability, and the ineffable aspects of skill and achievement are replaced with numbers referent
only to a test’s measurement system.
Test standardization also involves the elimination of subjective—that is, human—
judgment whenever possible, which allows proponents to more easily frame the argument that
standardized tests are fair and reasonable devices. More specifically, standardization involves
reducing the number of questions that require considerable time to assess, as fatigued graders are
prone to making scoring variations or inserting their own biases. Most Americans commonly
associate standardized tests with No. 2 pencils, pastel bubble sheets, and scanning machines.
This technology, developed by Reynold Johnson in the early 1930s and honed by IBM soon
after, allowed for hundreds of tests to be scored in an hour—making national annual
standardized tests feasible in subsequent decades.20 Some test manufacturers have reduced the
need for human graders by building computer-based standardized exams. People who take a
computer-adaptive test (CAT) are first presented a set of medium-difficulty questions. Based on
how well they perform with this initial batch, test-takers are then presented with questions that
the testing program has calculated to be moderately difficulty for that particular test-taker. As
test-takers progress through a CAT, the weight for each cluster of questions typically decreases;
how well or poorly one does on the last five questions often has much less impact on their final
score than how well or poorly one does on the first five. CAT designers maintain the results on
such exams provide a more accurate depiction of test-takers’ range of ability than other versions
of standardized testing can provide: high-ability test-takers are not drained of energy answering
20

“Automated Test Scoring: Overview,” IBM 100 website, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/
ibm100/us/en/icons/testscore/ (last accessed April 29. 2017).
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easy questions, and low-ability test-takers did not gain cheap points with lucky guesses on hard
questions.21 In both paper-based and computer-based formats, however, human adjudication is
pared to its requisite minimum.22
A Brief History of Standardized Testing to the late 1930s
Although standardized testing is often seen as an educational practice, its origins extend
well beyond the classroom. The early history of standardized testing is ensnarled in the histories
of bureaucracy, intelligence, industrialization, urbanization, immigration, progressivism, and
warfare. Each of these historical phenomena generated concepts and practices fundamental to
contemporary standardized testing. Briefly considering how standardized testing developed
before the Second World War illuminates how, above all, early test developers sought to manage
social change. The initial uses for standardized testing reflect an underlying aim to maintain the
structural integrity of social institutions all while shaping the direction in which different
populations flowed into social systems. Whatever the anchoring ideology, standardized testing
has been from its earliest versions a mechanism for social control and order.
From a bureaucratic perspective, standardized testing is nothing new. Indeed,
standardized examinations were central to maintaining imperial China’s vast civil service.23 As
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an American educational practice, however, standardized testing began in earnest during the
mid-nineteenth century, as several northern states began to enact mandatory minimum schooling
laws. The most notable early case of U.S. standardized testing took place in Boston, where
Massachusetts Board of Education Secretary Horace Mann ended the practice of recitation-based
examinations administered by visiting committees. Influenced by Whig politics, Prussian
pedagogical practices, and phrenology, Mann enacted citywide written examinations in 1845.
Rather than have cherry-picked students reply to individualized prompts, such tests required all
pupils to answer identical series of questions in the same subjects within a set timeframe at a
specific point in the year: standardization meant uniformity. Mann and his reformist allies used
the results from these standardized exams to usher in structural reforms for Boston’s schools,
including the transition from one-room schoolhouses to graded classrooms segregated by
students’ age. Although written standardized exams would gain widespread use throughout many
populous American school districts during the late-nineteenth century, debates over whether to
use standardized exams would continue to fuel broader educational arguments over the
relationship between states’ power and local control.24
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Mann and other early proponents of standardized testing built their arguments on the
foundational tenets of nineteenth-century social science, particularly the idea that humanity could
be measured, generalized, and discussed in quantified terms. Belgian statistician Adolphe
Quetelet’s work with normal curves provided a foundation for quantified knowledge about
human characteristics. Quetelet observed that people’s physical dimensions fell along a normal
curve: some had rather small features, other rather large, but most clustered around an average
equally distant from both extremes. From these observations, Quetelet devised the ideal “average
man”--l’homme moyen-- and posited that any individual’s deviation from that imagined average
could be represented as a probability.25 Quetelet’s homme moyen not only naturalized abstract
ideas about the body, but also served as a potent metaphor for the social body. Quantifiable
information about individual bodies, human capacity, and the larger social body served states’
political, moral, and economic needs. Such information fueled state power systems that exacted
social and corporeal discipline through knowledge production, a process Michel Foucault would
later deem biopolitics.26 Standardized testing’s scoring systems—often built to fit normal curves
and designed to quantify abstract information about human capability—are one legacy of these
earlier biopolitical developments.
25
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17

During the second half of the nineteenth century, many social scientists became
enchanted by developments in biological sciences, and shifted their focus from measuring social
bodies to improving them. What emerged from this shift was eugenics, a scientific ideology
premised on the belief that humanity could be qualitatively improved by encouraging certain
groups to reproduce more and preventing other groups from reproducing at all. British polymath
Francis Galton was at the forefront of nineteenth-century eugenics. Inspired by Quetelet’s work
with normal curves, Galton developed tests to gauge mental faculties relative to an imagined
norm. Galton was also inspired by the research of biologist (and cousin) Charles Darwin, but
feared that natural selection, if left to its own devices, would not create lasting evolution.
Observing the seed size pattern for several generations of pea plants, Galton discovered a
phenomenon he deemed “regression to the mean”: pea plants that developed from large seeds
tended to produce seeds closer to the average seed size of the progenitor plant. Galton presumed
that humanity, like pea plants, could lose superlative qualities just as easily—and that the social
elite would bear middling sorts without any intervention.27
The mental test was one eugenicist tool psychologists designed to correct this observed
course of nature. Researchers honed mental testing practices during the early twentieth century,
standardizing numerous methods for assessment and diagnosis. By studying the faculties of
French youth, Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon developed the concept of mental age. Binet and
Simon grouped children by how well they performed relative to the average performance of
children at specific ages on a series of increasingly difficult cognitive tests. A twelve-year old,
27
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for example, could have a mental age of seven if her performance on these tests was equivalent
to the degree to which most seven-year olds would successfully complete them.28 The
intelligence scale that developed from these studies—conveniently named the Binet-Simon
scale—became the foundation for American psychologists’ sense of intelligence measurement.
The Binet-Simon Scale did not gain its cultural heft, however, until Stanford psychologist
Lewis Terman made several alterations. Most substantially, Terman retooled the way the BinetSimon scale expressed intelligence levels, changing the expression to a ratio between an
individual’s mental age and their chronological age. Terman deemed this expression the
intelligence quotient, or IQ. Terman’s IQ soon became the psychological and cultural standard
for making sense of intelligence.29 The appeal of IQ, as Paula Fass argues, resides in its ability
to personalize an abstract concept. Because IQ expresses intelligence as a ratio, it hides the
abstract qualities that form the concept of mental age. The relational aspect of IQ rests on the
specious premise that physical age has as some direct, linear relationship to normal mental
development. 30
Because Terman devised norms for IQ by measuring the capabilities of native-born
middle-class white children, the intelligence quotient also masked the standards against which
ethnic minorities were measured. Through psychological slight-of-hand, IQ recast the economic
28

Corwin Boake, “From the Binet-Simon to the Wechsler-Bellvue: Tracing the History of Intelligence
Testing,” Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 24, no. 3 (2002): 385-6; John Carson, “Mental
Testing in the Early Twentieth Century: Internationalizing the Mental Testing Story,” History of Psychology 17, no.
3 (2014): 249-255; For a sense of how Binet’s testing developed to curb the influence of psychiatry, as well as
concurrent developments in assessing developmental disabilities, see: Serge Nicolas et. al., “Sick? Or Slow? On the
origins of intelligence as a Psychological Object,” Intelligence 41 (2013): 699-711; Annette Mülberger, “The Need
for Contextual Approaches to the History of Mental Testing,” History of Psychology 17, no. 3 (2014): 177-186; and
Elisabetta Cicciola, Renato Foschi, and Giovanni Pietro Lombardo, “Making Up Intelligence Scales: De Sanctis’s
and Binet’s Tests, 1905 and After,” History of Psychology 17, no. 3 (2014): 223-236..
29

Boake, 388.

30

Paula S. Fass, “The IQ: A Cultural and Historical Framework,” American Journal of Education 88, no. 4
(August, 1980): 431-458.

19

and social advantages of whiteness as the conditions for normal intelligence. The logic of IQ
positioned poverty and race-based disparities as social abnormalities—and IQ became, in turn,
evidence for the inherent inferiority of African-Americans, immigrant communities, and poor
whites. Although intelligence scales would sustain substantial revisions and criticisms
throughout the twentieth century, IQ retained cultural power because it posed abstract concepts
as natural skill, and anchored relational measurements in individuals’ abilities.31
As Terman developed a new scale for expressing intelligence, Robert Yerkes invented a
method now synonymous with popular depictions of standardized testing: multiple-choice
questions. The psychologist built multiple choice apparatuses, partitioned wooden devices with
brass keys wired to lamps and buzzers. Yerkes and his assistants had subjects determine which
key was connected to a buzzer, rotating switches to ensure each experimental trial used a
different key. After a person successfully determined which key had been wired, the researchers
asked the subject to articulate how they figured out which key to press, scoring for both the
speed at which they came to the right answer and the way in which they described their choices.
Yerkes used these contraptions on numerous species in order to measure ideational behavior, or
the “series of reactive tendencies that a person displays when confronted with solving a
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problem.”32 To Yerkes, ideational behavior was a measurable action rooted in intelligence—and
although intelligence itself could not be directly measured, the behaviors that reflect intelligent
decisions could. While multiple-choice devices fell out of favor after World War One, the
multiple choice method held experimental currency among researchers for quite some time.
Psychologists’ fondness for standardized testing and assessment mirrored late-nineteenthand early-twentieth-century shifts in American capitalism. As the United States industrialized,
businesses began to standardize all aspects of operations: manufacturing, resources, and
distribution all began to coalesce around agreed-upon terms. Standardization of rail track gauges,
screw sizes, brick dimensions, and thousands of other materials not only lubricated
infrastructural development, but also encouraged marketplace cohesion. Yet, as with the tensions
that developed through the growth of standardized education testing, industrial capital’s
standardization processes revealed a tension between local political power and national
economic forces. What set the United States’ industrial growth apart from contemporaneous
developments elsewhere, as D. Linda Garcia notes, was the private sector’s preponderant role in
establishing bodies for standards development.33 During the industrial era, standardization was
never solely within the purview of the state.
This is not to say the era of industrial capitalism was devoid of any state influence.
Rather, the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-centuries marked substantial growth in the size
and scope of U.S. federal governmental bureaucracy—as well as its increasing encroachment on
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everyday life. The Progressive Era makes most sense, however, when viewed as a loosely
bundled series of political movements emanating from the American middle class. White
middle-class Progressives feared the drag both the elite and destitute alike placed on societal
wellbeing. Through this fear, these Progressives elided being middle class with being righteous
and normal—making the very wealthy and the poor statistically, politically, and morally deviant.
This slippage between moral virtue, white supremacy, political soundness, and statistical
preponderance guided Progressive reformers as they entered politics, seeking to reformat the
relationship between society and state.34
The Progressive mission was fueled by the fear that the white middle class—and, by
extension, the American state—was at risk of corruption and devolution. Progressives grafted
this fear of degeneration onto the language of intelligence, which allowed reformers to express
nativist and white supremacist logic in scientific terms. Intelligence was one of many ways
progressive reformers anchored the fantasy that American civilization was at risk from blacks,
poor whites, and the foreign-born. For many Progressives, however, the most insidious social
menaces were those whose intelligence was just below average. Idiots and imbeciles, as
intelligence researchers and eugenicists deemed those with mental ages below eight years of age,
posed less risk for white Americans’ degeneracy than morons: those whose mental ages were
deficient compared to the standard adult population, but who were able enough to operate in
society undetected. Henry Herbert Goddard, who invented the condition of moronia in the early34
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twentieth century, insisted that morons were multigenerational threats to the white race. Because
morons could not expand their mental capacity, the state wasted valuable resources on their
education—and because feeblemindedness was a heritable trait, normal whites risked diluting
their own family’s stock by mating with morons. Further, Goddard and other eugenicists used
genetic logic to link feeblemindedness with criminality, thereby turning moral shortcomings into
medical symptoms. Any outward deviation of public social norms became proof of poor
genetics, and poor genetics were diagnosable by observed by the lewd and licentious behavior of
ancestors. Identifying and curbing feeblemindedness—by legally sanctioning intelligence testing,
institutionalization, and sterilization—was not just sound state policy but racial duty. Progressive
logic turned standardization and intelligence testing into moral social obligations: white
American vitality depended upon vigilantly monitoring for statistical abnormalities.35
World War One profoundly expanded the scale of standardized mental testing as well as
the stakes the American state placed in psychological testing results. Robert Yerkes, Lewis
Terman, and dozens of other psychologists collaborated to devise the Army Alpha exam (for
those literate in English) and Army Beta exam (for illiterate recruits). The United States Army
administered these standardized tests to over 1.7 million recruits over the course of American
involvement in World War One. The number of recruits who were discharged or sorted on the
basis of these tests was quite small compared to the overall number of recruits. Despite the
limited direct application of test scores, the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests showed that
massive testing projects could be undertaken, and that test-takers could be categorically sorted on
the basis of their results. Further, the state-orchestrated test-design project that created the Army
35
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Alpha and Army Beta exams united dozens of previously detached researchers, sparked a sense
of national community among psychologists, and familiarized many Americans to psychology
and psychological testing.36
Although the results of the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests had limited immediate
application, psychologists and politicians alike used data from recruits’ exam scores to reinforce
white supremacist logic. Black and white recruits who took the Army Alpha Test had, on
average, a significant gap between results—a difference used by both researchers and laypersons
as evidence of black mental inferiority. Yet, on closer examination, several factors clearly
contradicted the white supremacist explanation for white recruits’ superior test performance.
Although white recruits had higher average performances on the Army Alpha Test, the median
scores for recruits from northern states, whatever their race, were higher than their counterparts
in southern states. Northern black recruits frequently performed better on the Army Alpha Test
than southern whites. The relationship black and white recruits’ scores also correlated strongly
with the average amount of time blacks had in school relative to white students: the more time
blacks spent in school, the narrower the gap. Rather than consider socioeconomic educational
disparities as the root causes for the gap between blacks’ and whites’ Army Alpha test scores,
leading psychologists and laypeople leaned on published intelligence test data to further
naturalize racial difference.37
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During the interwar period, standardized testing became part of the grammar of U.S.
education.38 Following the perceived success of the Army Alpha and Beta projects, IQ tests and
other psychological assessments became increasingly popular instruments for measuring and
sorting students. These standardized tests became instruments for managing the massive
demographic changes in public schooling that had begun during the late-nineteenth century.
Although immigration quotas essentially ended immigration from Southern Europe, Eastern
Europe, and Asia by the mid-1920s, these multigenerational immigrant communities still placed
tremendous stress on school districts—not only by the amount of resources required to teach
millions of children, but also by the political and ideological battles over how to best incorporate
these youth into American society. Meanwhile, child labor laws and minimum education
provisions ensured that youth typically stayed in school longer than their counterparts from
previous generations. The demands of industrial capital clashed with Progressive educational
theory: How could schools provide equal education for all students, while also preparing certain
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segments of students for different types of labor? Standardized testing helped educational
bureaucrats broker this paradox by making it easier for schools to sort students into different
paths—typically, vocational, normal, and college preparatory tracks. Standardized intelligence
testing did not create educational tracking, just as it did not create nativism. But, these
standardized psychological and intelligence tests provided a seemingly objective scientific logic
that allowed many school districts to reinforce nativist sentiments and eugenic beliefs, all while
satisfying industrial demands. If poor whites and the foreign-born scored poorly on standardized
exams, it was a sign of natural shortcomings and not socioeconomic conditions, and so it was in
national best interest to channel these youth into vocational educational tracks.39
During the early-twentieth century, institutions of higher education also began turning
toward standardized testing to address demographic pressures without democratizing the entire
system. At the end of the nineteenth century, elite American colleges and universities each had
their own particular set of admissions requirements. The materials students composed to apply
for admission to Harvard, for example, had little overlap with the materials used to apply to
Yale. Several of these prestigious schools formed the College Entrance Examination Board at the
turn of the twentieth century to standardize their admissions process—including using a common
admissions exam. For this exam, students composed essays in several subjects, which were then
read and scored by College Board graders. These standardized essay exams were not originally
intended to democratize access to higher education, however. Instead, this early version of
collegiate standardized testing provided College Board member institutions a clearer standard to
gauge students from different elite preparatory schools, to better ensure that college student
bodies were not overrepresented by select feeder academies on the basis of tradition alone. This
39
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insularity continued when the College Board developed the Scholastic Aptitude Test—or SAT—
in the late 1920s. Even though the original SAT more closely resembled contemporary
standardized tests forms, many of the original 8,000 test takers were East Coast students from
top-level preparatory schools applying for entrance into the most prestigious colleges. Not until
the 1930s would elite colleges explicitly use the to draw in talented youth from distant
Midwestern and Western locations. These early College Board exams broadened educational
opportunity only for those who already had a great deal of it.40
Although standardized testing became a far more popular educational practice after
World War One, some public figures challenged the intelligence testing rhetoric espoused by
Lewis Terman and other prominent psychologists. Most famously, the journalist Walter
Lippmann questioned the tenets of intelligence testing in a series of essays for The New Republic
in late 1922. Over six installments, Lippmann argued that intelligence testing, already a flawed
instrument, was “in danger of gross perversion by muddleheaded and prejudiced men.”41
Lippmann accused psychologists of failing to clearly define intelligence, and for designing
unjust, unreliable tests that were primarily devices for social sorting. The journalist worried
dogmatic educations would “treat people with low intelligence quotients as congenitally and
hopelessly inferior.”42 Indeed, Lipmann concluded his series by wishing the belief in hereditary
intelligence would go “into that limbo where phrenology and characterology and the other Babu
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sciences are to be found.”43 Lewis Terman did not hold Lippmann’s criticisms in high esteem,
and rattled off several dismissive, sarcastic replies to The New Republic—dragging the public
debate well into the following year. This friction, between what psychologists intended to
measure with standardized tests and how nonspecialists understood standardized tests, would
become the main force for public discourse on standardized testing in the United States in the
century following World War One.
American psychologists continued to refine and reconstruct standardized psychological
assessments throughout the interwar period. Most notably, the psychologist David Wechsler
developed his namesake intelligence scales in 1939 while leading New York’s Bellevue
Psychiatric Hospital. The Wechsler-Bellevue scale attempted to clarify adult intelligence
measurement by reworking the formula for IQ. Rather than frame IQ as a ratio between mental
age and chronological age—a model that, when misinterpreted, suggests either that people
become less intelligent as they age, or that people’s intellectual capacity stops somewhere early
in adolescence—Wechsler calculated IQ by using standard deviations. Using the WechslerBellevue rubric, a psychologist could calculate a person’s IQ by measuring the distance between
their cumulative test scores and the average score for people the same age. Because the
Wechsler-Bellevue test measured for both verbal IQ and performance IQ, the exam also
drastically altered psychological perceptions of intelligence.44 Just as Lippmann’s essays set a
foundation for decades of public criticism for intelligence testing, Wechsler’s scale provided a
wedge for future psychologists to offer—and fight over—competing models for intelligence.
43

Walter Lippmann, “A Future for the Tests,” The New Republic November 29, 1922: 10. Lippmann later
tempered this fervor in a profile of British psychologist Cyril Burt, whose “common sense” approach to intelligence
testing showed “there can be little or no doubt [that] the I.Q. is a composite measure of native and acquired
abilities”; see: Lippmann, “Mr. Burt and the Intelligence Tests,” The New Republic May 2, 1923: 264.
44

Richard W. Woodcock, “New Looks in the Assessment of Cognitive Ability,” Peabody Journal of
Education 77, no. 2 (2002): 8; Boake, 396-398.

28

The early history of standardized testing cannot entirely fit within the history of
education because standardized testing has some basis in social measurement and management.
Contemporary versions of standardized testing grew out of nineteenth-century social scientists’
methods for quantifying human characteristics, early psychologists’ quest to measure
intelligence, Progressive Era reformers’ fear of racial degeneration and moral depravity,
industrial capital’s tendency to turn human labor into an abstract resource, and American armed
forces’ aim to sort recruits by their potential usefulness in combat. These branches all had a
common biopolitical root: modern states have sustained themselves in part by generating
knowledge about individual bodies and the social body. Standardization, including methods of
educational assessment, was one of many biopolitical methods. Although the American federal
government had relatively weak authority over the course of education, standardized testing
allowed greater district, state, and national encroachment into practices traditionally deemed
community affairs.
Testing and the Postwar World
My dissertation picks up where this short history leaves off, by unpacking the profound
changes standardized testing made to the relationship between state and society during and after
World War Two. What changed was not the use of testing itself—after all, standardized testing
had been part of the American educational landscape for decades by the time the United States
entered conflict—but the scale and stakes of testing data. War created an opportunity to use
standardized tests to gather an unprecedented amount of data about the American populace’s
capabilities. This data, already reflective of a very specific and narrow understanding of aptitude,
became a tool for defining the American state’s postwar brainpower needs. Standardized testing
validated postwar visions that premised democratic vitality on efficient social sorting. The
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postwar state, in turn, validated the widespread use of standardized testing by using test data as a
key metric for spotting and harnessing brainpower. What developed, however, was a gap
between the limited technical applications for standardized testing data and what many
Americans, both non-specialists and experts alike, asserted the data truly meant. Standardized
testing data thus became a tool in broader arguments over who truly contributed to—and thus
who deserved to benefit from—the postwar American state.
This dissertation also depicts how standardized testing served a vital function for the
postwar American state without being internal to the American state. Until the late 1970s, the
American state lacked a separate cabinet-level entity for education. Yet, as much as education
was traditionally a responsibility of state and local governance, it was also entangled with
scientific discovery, technological prestige, and military innovation—all issues central to the
postwar state. The American state needed a way to harness brainpower without disrupting, at
least on the surface, the traditional divisions of power for education. Standardized testing, in its
various forms, filled that need. Standardized testing helped channel students into certain
educational and vocational paths—steering to some degree their life course—without creating
bureaucratic heft. The American state instead relied on outside manufacturers to research and
produce standardized tests, thus allowing for vital state functions without warping the shape of
the state. Even when the Department of Education eventually took on a broader mandate decades
after its creation through No Chil Left Behind, it acted as the supervisor for statewide test-based
accountability programs. Standardized testing—and especially its creators—allowed the postwar
American state to be strong where it was structurally weak.
Over the following five chapters, this dissertation tracks the way the American state came
to rely on standardized testing for its wartime and postwar needs—and, eventually, how various
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groups of Americans reacted against the use of standardized testing as a social sorting device. In
Chapter One, “Manpower from the Masses,” I examine the vital role standardized testing served
in the developing logic of the postwar national security state. The American state’s dependence
on standardized testing began in earnest as it drafted millions of men during World War II. This
dependence grew as the state reintegrated servicemen back into civilian life, and solidified as
new test-development organizations undertook enormous projects for the federal government.
Standardized testing provided the American state the mechanism for making manpower a
measurable national resource. Both during and after the war, manpower served as a key unit of
measurement for American military, business, and scientific needs. The rhetoric of manpower
allowed policymakers to create measures—most notably, the GI Bill—that rewarded servicemen
with social benefits without setting them apart as a privileged class of citizens. Manpower
instead designated all members of the war effort, soldier and civilian alike, as citizen-workers,
whose labor was both a civic duty and an abstract quantity serving various state needs. By
prioritizing manpower, policymakers could endorse postwar plans that expanded the scale of the
state’s educational responsibilities without changing its fundamental federal shape. Standardized
testing, refined and massively employed during the war, provided the state a tool to continue
quickly sorting millions of Americans by their abilities, aptitudes, and interests, all in the effort
to extract the greatest possible manpower for postwar projects.
The second chapter, “American Talent Show,” examines how the state used standardized
testing as a geopolitical tool. Well before the Eisenhower Administration responded to Sputnik,
the federal government, extragovernmental educational organizations, and corporations began
building a network dedicated to catching the United States’ brightest youth and steering them
toward scientific and engineering careers that would secure American geopolitical supremacy.
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Sputnik did not spark a commitment to science and mathematics so much as solidify the direction
multiple stakeholders, both private and public, took in harnessing brainpower for geopolitical
means. Test-based scholarship programs allowed corporations to use standardized tests to cull
talent while promoting the merits of American capitalism. Standardized testing also allowed the
federal government to dodge accusations of centralization at a moment when many alleged it had
superseded traditional local control over education. Rather than restructure U.S. education,
standardized testing became the netting that bound all vested parties together. Standardized
testing provided heft and fuel for geopolitical ambitions that the rhetoric of American democratic
brainpower could not alone.
Chapter Three, “Managing Marginal Men,” unpacks the way the federal government used
standardized testing as a way to maintain oversight and control over black Americans’ social
mobility. Over a several-year period following the Second World War, the United States Armed
Forces integrated its troops—and in the process, replaced its “racial quota” with one based on the
Armed Forces’ standardized aptitude entrance exam: the General Classification Test (GCT). In
swapping the racial quota for a GCT quota, policymakers used standardized testing to forge a
postwar social order that, on the surface, prioritized ability over race, but in effect used testing as
a means to avoid disrupting too much of the existing white supremacist social order. By allowing
some viable channel for deeper black participation in the armed forces, however limited, the
Truman Administration could satisfy its aim to integrate and modify the military without
creating too much discontent within military leadership at a vital moment in American statecraft.
This pattern of the state disproportionately marginalizing black men through standardized testing
continued through the advent of minimum competency testing and test-based special education
tracking. Conversely, quota systems designed to increase the presence of minorities in graduate
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programs came under legal fire during the 1970s, as white students alleged the looser test score
requirements for minority candidates created a double standard that discriminated against
qualified whites. Standardized testing thus not only reinforced the postwar racial order, but
attempts to create racially equitable educational environments were met with resistance from
whites who felt their test scores genuinely reflected why they merited a space in an increasingly
competitive postgraduate environment.
This dissertation’s fourth chapter, “Bad at Math,” analyzes the emergence and
development of dueling arguments about the root cause of American women’s lack of presence
in science and mathematics during the late-twentieth century. Although American girls tended to
do better than boys in math classes, far more men wound up in engineering and laboratory
positions than women. This anomaly persisted even as women entered higher education and the
American labor force at unprecedented levels. Standardized testing data fueled two opposing
arguments for this phenomenon. One group, influenced by second-wave feminist politics,
maintained that girls were negatively socialized into women who avoided scientific careers. The
other group, building off of sociobiological models, maintained that as a matter of biological
capacity, females typically lacked the exceptional quantitative and scientific skills found among
top male researchers. Both groups nonetheless relied on standardized testing data to build
contrasting arguments about sex, gender, and women’s role in the state. By the time the federal
government formally launched its own investigation of the “gender gap,” the debate had already
begun to become the topic of mainstream debate, in which identity politics clashed with media
depictions of “pink” and “blue” brains.
In the final chapter, “Birth of the Student-Consumer,” I examine how parents, students,
and pundits voiced their discontent with standardized testing during the 1970s and 1980s—and,
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by securing reforms, unintentionally wed standardized testing to marketplace practices. Spurred
by Ralph Nader’s Public Interest Research Groups, students and parents voiced their frustrations
with standardized testing from the position of consumers entitled rights—and accused certain
testing companies of widespread consumer fraud. In securing transparency legislation, consumer
advocates and student-consumers stripped Educational Testing Service and other test
manufacturer of their longstanding protections as nonprofit organizations. To remain financially
solvent—in light of not only laws that mandated the publication of test answers, but also a
growing and federally legitimized test preparation industry—test manufacturers embraced a new
business model. Test producers packaged old tests for commercial release and sued test-prep
companies for copyright infringement. Ultimately these companies staged public battles with
test-prep providers over who genuinely had the American middle class’s best interests in mind.
By framing their grievances as dissatisfied customers, student-consumers helped reinforce the
broader marketplace aspects of standardized testing—and indeed, of higher education at large.
This dissertation concludes with a brief consideration of the political culture borne from
No Child Left Behind and sustained through Common Core. The No Child Left Behind Act of
2001 (NCLB) established a profound shift in the federal government’s relationship to education,
one rooted in widespread standardized testing. Under the watchword of “accountability,” NCLB
mandated schools show quantifiable improvement in students’ reading and mathematical abilities
or face drastic consequences. Voucher programs and the threatening rhetoric of “school choice”
compelled many public schools to overhaul their curricula and impose strict test preparation
regimens. But what factors influenced the way American ultimately responded to these testing
regimes? What broader forces shaped the ways they framed their discontent? And why does
standardized testing seem to be more embedded that ever as an educational practice and a mass
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tool for staking social identity, even as a growing number of Americans find the practice
detrimental to genuine learning or social success? Ultimately, the fear of what could replace
standardized testing—and the social and economic investment it would take to develop
something more worthwhile—may be what will keep it a widespread educational practice.
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CHAPTER ONE: MANPOWER FROM THE MASSES:
STANDARDIZED TESTING, STATE LEGITIMACY, AND POSTWAR ORDER
As the Second World War revved the American economy into overdrive, many
policymakers worried about postwar stability. War had relocated millions of men to defense
positions, placed white women in the workforce at unprecedented levels, sparked a second wave
of black internal migration, transformed manufacturers into materiel suppliers, and rerouted
domestic spending patterns.45 Yet the war could not go on indefinitely, nor could the men and
women aiding the war effort. Whether or not the Second World War genuinely wrested the
United States out of the Great Depression, the end of war threatened a calamitous economic
transition. The peacetime national economy had to accommodate millions of returning service
personnel and displaced defense workers or risk fermenting social distress and deep political
unrest.
Policymakers made manpower—and in effect, standardized testing of all sorts—central
to postwar socioeconomic plans. Both during and after the war, manpower served as the unit of
45
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measurement for military, business, and scientific needs. Manpower, as a national resource,
could be harnessed and refined, ensuring the state used Americans effectively for broader
geopolitical goals.46 The logic of manpower allowed policymakers to create measures—in
particular, the GI Bill—that rewarded servicemen with social benefits without setting them apart
as a privileged class of citizens. Manpower instead placed all members of the war effort, soldier
and civilian alike, as citizen-workers, whose labor was a both a civic duty and an abstract
quantity serving various state needs. By prioritizing manpower, policymakers could endorse
postwar plans that expanded the scale of the state’s educational responsibilities without changing
its fundamental federal shape. Standardized testing, battle-tested during the world war, provided
the state the tools to continue quickly sorting millions of Americans by their abilities, aptitudes,
and interests, all in an effort to extract the greatest possible manpower for postwar projects.
Through wartime military entrance testing, the American state solidified its use of
standardization as a method for social order. Although standardization had been a feature of the
American economy and society since the mid-19th century, the state adopted standardization in
the 20th century as a way to regulate social attitudes, behaviors, and practices. This governmental
approach to standardization typically took judicial, legislative, and regulatory forms. The
General Classification Test (GCT) allowed the armed forces—and by extension, the American
state—to incorporate standardization as a matter of protocol. Millions of men experienced the
46

I use the term “national resource” here and throughout the chapter, not only in reference to the National
Resources Planning Board—a federal resource-management agency which spanned the late 1930s and early 1940s
and thus set the stage for wartime approaches to citizen manpower management—but also to signify that human
resources (manpower, brainpower, man-hours, etc.) are vital to the state in a way distinct from natural resources
(e.g., oil, bauxite, cotton, etc.). Human resources do double duty: they are found within the territory of the state
while being a distinct creation of the nation. Human resources are thus not territorial goods—people aren’t harvested
as one does oranges or almonds—but social goods. Manpower thus reflects the structures, institutions, policies, and
mores that generate quantifiable goods that allow favorable comparisons to other nation-states. See: National
Research Council, Research—A National Resource, vol. II—Industrial Research (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1941); National Resources Planning Board, Our National Resources: Facts and
Problems (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941).

37

GCT as part of the routine for military induction—and, in turn, saw their lives in the armed
forces shaped in their performance on this exam. The high stakes the GCT carried, then,
established a social precedent that standardized testing was a serious practice that merited
genuine effort. The personal consequences for not taking this standardized test seriously were too
steep not to comply.47
Wartime standardized testing also set a foundation for the postwar expansion of guidance
counseling, which led Americans to use testing data as a means for constructing their sense of
self and relationship to society. Federal postwar planning emphasized the role higher education
had to play in sustaining American vitality—and through the GI Bill, the state facilitated the
veterans’ postsecondary training. The state’s reliance on advanced training enabled a massive
expansion of American higher education during the immediate postwar period. Colleges and
universities needed personnel who could not only help veterans adjust to their new role as
students, but help these veteran-students select a path of study that would, at once, satisfy their
interests, tap into their intellectual strengths, fulfill the state’s geopolitical needs, and not drain
school resources. Standardized testing—here in the form of guidance inventories and personality
assessments—allowed guidance counselors to efficiently determine the path of best fit for their
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charges. This type of diagnostic standardized testing produced a self-reflexive process by which
people made sense of sense of their intellect, talents, and personality in uniform categorical
fashions. For such testing to be successful in the postwar period, test developers and
administrators developed methods for communicating about testing in ways that allowed
individuals to personalize and personify certain psychometric principles.
Harnessing Manpower: Resource Planning, Vocational Guidance, and Wartime Education
Well before officially entering conflict, the Roosevelt Administration began sketching its
ideal postwar condition. The vision that emerged among policymakers acknowledged the United
States’ irreversible role influencing international affairs, but refused to accept historic precedent
for peacetime economic busts. Were the federal government to shy away from direct
involvement in the postwar economy, as it did immediately after the First World War, a deep,
sharp recession seemed inevitable. Private enterprise, left to its own devices, could not maintain
wartime-level demand in peacetime conditions. Yet, for the sake of democracy and capitalism, a
peacetime government could not control specific facets of the economy the way a wartime
government could. To combat potential economic calamity, the Roosevelt Administration used
the idea of manpower to mobilize American business, labor, military, and education in line with
both its wartime demands and postwar visions.
In late 1940, President Roosevelt assigned the National Resources Planning Board
(NRPB) the hefty task for harnessing manpower: consider “all constructive plans for significant
public and private action in the post-defense period […using] the natural and human resources of
the Nation.”48 The key for postwar vitality, NRPB determined, was government-sustained
demand. As NRPB forecasted, war would create full employment and unprecedented gross
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national product. By shifting massive governmental investment into public works projects,
industrial partnerships and security programs, the American state could ensure peacetime private
enterprise had incentive to absorb the estimated 20 million Americans left unemployed by
demobilization—all while cushioning the American economy from periodic boom-bust cycles.
In this vision, the federal government would not engage in central economic planning. Instead,
the NRPB would serve as a coordinating agency that ensured public and private entities
cooperated in the shared goal of sustained American postwar vitality. In its post-defense plans,
NRPB established cooperation and coordination as actions that would protect federal,
democratic, capitalist traditions against socialist and totalitarian threats.49
The Roosevelt Administration enabled these plans by shifting American economic policy
toward personnel management tactics that treated human effort as a national resource. As the
United States began mobilizing for conflict, Roosevelt increasingly embraced Keynesian
economic theory, which advocated large-scale public investment and deficit spending to
maintain national economic stability. Keynesian theory cast the state as a manager whose
involvement served as a multiplier for economic growth. Keynesian formulas treated national
income as a dependent variable through which policymakers could gauge the effectiveness of
certain economic policies.50 By extension, embracing Keynesian methods required the state to
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treat human labor as a quantifiable unit—manpower—that could be measured and centrally
managed. If national income was the way to measure sound economic policy, Keynesian
approaches to manpower became the means to ensure national income remained high, both in the
short and long term. Personnel management shifted the priority in labor away from the rights of
workers and toward the needs of managers, whether the workplace was a shop floor or the U.S.
Armed Forces.51
As a national and natural resource, manpower did not limit itself to a certain type of
American. Every worker, whatever their vocation, possessed manpower. Manpower had some
internal limits, namely a person’s intellectual and physical capabilities. But the state could
encourage measures that ensured individuals refined their manpower through training and
received employment in areas that made the most of their capabilities. Using Keynesian logic,
large-scale public investment in manpower cultivation would not only help protect the national
economy from future economic instability—it would also give the state multiplied benefits when
it reinvested refined manpower into public works projects. What mattered to the state, by
extension, were the ways Americans could strengthen their manpower through training. Higher
education, vocational institutions, and the military all provided convenient venues for boosting
manpower. Distinctions between wartime educational, labor, and military needs, then, resided in
the methods the state could employ for harnessing and distributing manpower.52
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The Roosevelt Administration created federal means for managing manpower, thus
addressing military and economic demands through the same unit of measurement. By executive
order, President Roosevelt established the War Manpower Committee in April 1942 in order to
coordinate “the recruitment, vocational training, and placement of workers to meet the needs of
industry and agriculture.”53 Chaired by Federal Security Agency Administrator Paul V. McNutt,
the War Manpower Commission also gauged shifting military and civil service manpower needs,
and recommended policies to ensure the American labor force did not gravitate toward more
alluring lines of work. The War Manpower Commission aimed to ensure government agencies
and industries alike adhered to geographic and numerical hiring restrictions. Although limited in
power by partisan pushback, the War Manpower Commission reinforced the idea that, as a
matter of self-preservation, the state had the right to measure and manage human resources as it
would natural resources.54 Good citizens—human or corporate—did not take jobs that ran
against the state’s immediate needs, because such jobs robbed the state of manpower.
Some industries concerned with personnel management turned to standardized testing to
maximize manpower. One such company, Wichita’s Coleman Lamp and Stove Company,
employed the personnel guidance company Search-Service, Incorporated to develop a battery of
standardized vocational tests to determine who among their workers would make worthwhile
shop foremen. To do so, Search-Service first gathered managers’ composite ratings for current
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foremen’s employee relations and budgetary efficiency. Search-Service then subjected these
same foremen to a series of standardized vocational aptitude tests to determine which exams
produced the clearest and most distinct relationships between test-takers’ responses and those
two qualities. The psychologists Search-Service used these correlation coefficients to devise a
master rating system—a T-score—that provided the Coleman Stove and Lamp Company a
standardized, efficient way to select future leaders. Workers whose combined vocational
guidance test results cleared a certain T-score threshold could be placed in “a ‘pool’ for future
replacement and upgrading.”55 As mathematically complex as this setup was, companies that
hired psychological consultants such as Search-Service believed the net result would be an
efficiently-managed workforce: no manpower would be wasted training men with insufficient
skills for leadership positions, nor would manpower be squandered holding workers with
“natural” skills down in lower positions. Psychologists portrayed efficient corporate personnel
management as a matter of national security, too. As search-Service representatives asserted,
“the problem of selecting personnel for industry on the home front [was] second only to the
efficient utilization of human resources in the armed forces.” 56 Victory hinged on the testing,
training, and enriching, American manpower, for the shop floor as well as the battlefield.
During wartime, the federal government implemented programs that steered both workers
and employers toward embracing the idea of harnessing manpower through education. In this
approach, education was not postsecondary training, but job-specific instruction designed to
55
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facilitate personnel management. Overseen by the War Manpower Commission, the Training
Within Industry program reoriented labor toward viewing personnel management as a matter of
resource refinement. To better refine the manpower needed for wartime industrial jobs—skilled
manufacturing jobs that many millions of men had little prior experience given the previous
decade of economic crisis—Training Within Industry packaged short job instruction training
programs that shop foremen used to provide workers intensive supervised guidance. In time,
Training Within Industry also developed and refined job relations training programs for foremen
and supervisors. By instructing workers and supervisors how to interrogate the methods of
production in a way that increased efficiency without inflaming workplace antagonisms,
Training Within Industry reinforced the idea that manpower, as a unit of both liberal democracy
and capitalism, depended upon subsuming personal needs to those of the state.57
The National Resources Planning Board likewise set education as a cornerstone of its
“post-defense” plans for democratic and capitalist vitality.58 Asserting education of all types
“would greatly assist the manpower readjustment process,” the NRPB sketched a dozen general
provisions for postwar education in its 1943 plans for demobilization and readjustment.59 At the
base level, education would serve as a general counterbalance for employment levels: the fewer
available jobs, the more the federal government would promote education as an opportunity to
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refine manpower for skills useful to the postwar state. Men who returned from military service
would be allowed to resume interrupted vocational training—and, once fully demobilized,
industries would be encouraged to admit “an appropriate quota of ex-service men” for peacetime
apprenticeships.60 Beyond vocational and secondary education, the NRPB also proposed
coordination between the federal government and higher education institutions to devise plans
that incorporated veterans more fully into American colleges and universities. In this vision,
education was an important for demobilization, and the means by which military manpower
could be reconverted to peacetime manpower in ways that created social good as well as
generated profit.
As the National Resources Planning Board and War Manpower Commission tethered
manpower to specific kinds of workplace training, the U.S. Office of Education (USOE)
coordinated vocational training efforts among the nation’s disparate educational systems. Under
the auspices of the Federal Security Agency (FSA), USOE oversaw a nationwide vocational
development program for various industrial, mechanical, engineering, and managerial defense
positions, training 1.75 million Americans between mid-1940 and Pearl Harbor.61 FSA
Administrator Paul McNutt and USOE Commissioner John W. Studebaker insisted that the
United States’ decentralized approach to educational oversight did not hinder vocational training
efforts but instead allowed for a rapid rate of defensive vocational training. The officials
portrayed shared federal, state, and local oversight on vocational education as the most
democratic approach to defensive training—but this shared investment also created a complex
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network of responsibilities. The chain of authority over defensive vocational education
connected various departments and intersected several levels of governance: the president, a
state-level bureaucrat, and a local school board member all had a share in the direction of
vocation education. Plans to preserve democracy by cultivating manpower also had to defer to
traditional decentralized divisions of educational governance.62
USOE created a wartime educational agenda that stressed manpower development over
military drill in secondary schools. Maintaining that defense was not strictly a combat issue—nor
was military preparedness simply a matter of marching exercises—the office urged secondary
schools to pivot coursework toward equipping students with broad defensive readiness. Schools
could develop “robust toughened bodies” by boosting inexpensive contact sports and exhausting
activities.63 Beyond preparing future combat troops, schools could aid the war effort by helping
students develop technical skills with uses beyond the battlefield: youth with auto maintenance
experience or radio repair skills would be valuable national resources both during and after the
war. The Office proposed that even courses with no direct connection to defense—such as
English and social studies—could be reoriented toward developing communication and
contextual skills vital for a fully equipped citizenry. As USOE policymakers insisted, these
courses were “military training in as real a sense as is military drill.”64 By focusing on defense
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rather than specific combat need, USOE made clear all youth could contribute to the war effort,
so long as schools fully developed all aspects of their manpower.
The federal government collaborated with colleges differently, carving out overt military
programs for post-secondary study. As USOE urged secondary schools to prepare students for
well-rounded defense needs, the War Department rolled out Enlisted Reserve Corps programs
for institutions of higher education. These programs, as well as their Air Force equivalents,
sought to transform “a certain number of college students possessing superior qualification” into
reservists prepared for sudden combat demands.65 Yet, the War Department was less interested
in making sure intellectually capable men found their way to college and more interested in
ensuring their college training happened speedily. If men’s status as reservists depended upon
completing their college education—and, in turn, their ability to lead proven by having earned a
degree—then the armed forces needed speedier ways for college-goers to earn their credentials.
Simply getting a man into educational channels appropriate for his intellectual capacity would
not do: he also had to be trained as quickly as possible. As the Army and Navy jointly stressed,
“[t]he country can no longer afford to have young men proceed with their education at a
moderato tempo.”66 Manpower was a time-sensitive resource, and educational institutions put
the nation at risk if they refined it too slowly.
The Federal Security Agency also devised plans to improve American teachers’
manpower so they could better serve the state’s wartime needs. Although the American Armed
Forces had developed the Engineering, Science, and Management Defense Training program
(EMSDT) to equip young Americans with the skills needed for advanced air-based warfare, it
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also realized too few teachers had substantial training in mathematics, physics, aviation, or
physical education. With no projected end to war in sight, officials projected the strain on
educators would only worsen. Hence, in late spring 1942, USOE Commissioner John Studebaker
solicited college and university academic directors to indicate the amount of summer sessions
their respective institutions planned to offer in crucial subject areas. As Studebaker stressed,
summer study programs would not only equip college teachers with the scientific know-how, but
also deepen the bench of who could prepare reservists and defense personnel. With adequate
summer intensives, high school and retired teachers could also do their share.67 As the state
made unprecedented manpower demands, it also had to devise new programs to ensure enough
people could actually harness and refine young adults’ potential skills.
By the end of the United States’ first year of combat, officials in the Roosevelt
Administration pursued two seemingly contradictory paths: lowering the draft age to the edge of
adulthood, all while preparing for a postwar society in which youth delayed their independence.
Although the Selective Service Act of 1940 required all men between 18 and 65 to register for
the draft, men under the age of 20 were not conscripted when the United States first entered
combat. By mid-1942, however, the War Department changed tack, and began publicly
petitioning the president to lower the draft floor. Selective Service Director General Lewis
Hershey argued that existing age restrictions could not keep pace with forecasted manpower
demands: the army and navy needed millions more young men unencumbered by spouses or
families. The Selective Service had already deferred millions of available men from the draft
67
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because they had dependents—and men under 20 who voluntarily enlisted in the armed forces
neither made up for that shortage nor consistently offered “A-1”-level capabilities. Following
some congressional debate, including a failed Senate amendment requiring teenage draftees to
spend a year in military training before facing overseas combat, President Roosevelt signed draft
revisions into effect in November, 1942. Over two million men suddenly became eligible for
conscription. Buoyed by public support, the federal government emphasized that the most
valuable manpower came from young American men unburdened by any other obligations
except those to the state.68
Before the draft age officially dropped, however, policymakers and educational experts
began formalizing practices that ensured youth would have more fully-developed manpower
whether they stopped schooling after high school or continued onto college. As one War
Department official explained in a fall, 1942 letter to USOE Commissioner John Studebaker, the
armed forces needed more men with “preliminary preparation of a fundamental scientific and
technical character,” who could more easily acclimate to specific combat positions.69 Given
these manpower needs, the department enacted a Pre-Induction Training Section within the
68

Between exclusive coverage and Associated Press wire services, the New York Times provides a
thorough timeline of governmental measures to lower the draft age floor. See: “Draft Registration June 30 for
Youths from 18 to 20,” New York Times May 23, 1942: 1; “Roosevelt to Sift 18-19 Draft Plan,” New York Times
May 27, 1942: 8; “3,000,000 Youths Register Today; Most, 18 and 19, Not Callable Yet,” New York Times June 30,
1942: 1, 6; “Wadsworth Seeks Permanent Draft,” New York Times July 20, 1942; “Senators Split on 18 to 19 Draft,”
New York Times September 4, 1942: 15; George Gallup, “Draft of Youths Backed by Public,” New York Times,
September 6, 1942: 19; “No 18-19 Draft Call Before Jan. 1, In the Opinion of the President,” New York Times
September 12, 1942: 1, 11; Frederick R. Barkley, “House by 345 to 16 Lowers Draft Age to Take Boys of 18,” New
York Times October 18, 1942: 1; “Youth Draft Delay Hits Married Men,” New York Times, November 8, 1942: 31;
“Text of 18-19 Draft Bill,” New York Times November 11, 1942: 18; “Senators Abandon 18-19 Draft Fight,” New
York Times November 12-1942: 16; “President Signs 18-19 Draft Bill,” New York Times November 14, 1942;
“22,453 in ‘Teen Age Added to Draft,” New York Times, January 1, 1943: 12; Louis Stark, “New Draft Order Puts
All 18 to 38 in Service in ’43,” New York Times April 13, 1943: 1; and “Draft Age to Stay at 18,” New York Times
April 16, 1943: 11.
69

James P. Mitchell, letter to John W. Studebaker, September 5, 1942, pg. 1; housed in RG 12: Records of
the Office of Education—Federal Security Agency: Office of the Commissioner: Office File on Wartime
Educational Programs, 1940-1945, Box no. 1, Entry 8 (Advisory to Defense) National Archives, II, College Park
MD.

49

Manpower Branch of its Services of Supply Civilian Personnel Division. Yet, consistent with its
earlier dismissal of demands for military drill in high schools, the War Department stressed that
pre-induction training programs would not take a narrow focus. For high schools with fewer than
300 pupils—by far the greatest proportion of institutions at the time—the Pre-Induction Training
Section recommended offering courses in physics and mathematics, shop, physical fitness, and
“pre-flight aeronautics,” and encouraged larger high schools to provide classes in radio,
typewriting, anatomy, and first aid.70 Because defensive needs would change as the war
continued, the US Armed Forced needed men and women who could be pressed into a variety of
tasks. The war effort also required participation beyond combat, and universities designed
programs of study to ensure women as well as men deemed unfit for service also met wartime
agricultural, educational, scientific, and industrial demands. Some, such as the Ohio State
University, offered a variety of study tracks—from accounting clerk, to cartography, to farm
management—that could be completed within two years.71 Wartime educational policy ensured
that American youth had enriched their manpower in ways applicable to shifting defensive
needs.
Yet educators also took the early war period to speculate about the future of youth. While
considering postwar education, the Washington-based Educational Policies Commission
forecasted postwar economic demands would encourage “expanded conceptions of youth” that
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would keep many youth in educational institutions and public agencies through the age of 20.72
The commission also predicted the end of general and vocational educational tracks. Following
the trends of wartime educational demands, postwar students would be expected to develop a
wide array of practical and scientific skills that could be applied to numerous peacetime
challenges. By drawing 18- and 19-year olds into combat, the American state may have also
created conditions that encouraged prolonged transitions into adulthood in postwar society. If the
concept of manpower bound educational, military, and workplace trajectories—and if the state
favored the cultivation of manpower for its wartime needs over simply gathering bodies for
combat—then postwar planners may have envisioned a social structure where the transition to
adulthood was marked by thorough cultivation of an individual’s own manpower. Before it could
fully figure out what to do with men in postwar society, however, the American state had to first
figure out how to sort men already poised for military service.
Measuring the Masses: The General Classification Test and Preparatory Guides
The concept of manpower made it easier for the American state to unify its wartime
needs, but the military had particular time constraints that required a quicker way to sort men by
their potential capabilities. Men and women who took accelerated college programs or on-thejob vocational training had time to develop their manpower before giving it to the American
defense effort. The tradeoff in these cases was straightforward: development now for services
rendered later—and, theoretically, for well-paying jobs afterward that could serve the postwar
state. The Army and Navy, by contrast, needed to locate men for particular roles without
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extending the time it took to create soldiers and sailors. The military needed a snapshot of
servicemen’s existing manpower capabilities before training even began.
The solution ultimately embraced by the state—mass standardized testing as part of the
induction process—would find widespread postwar use outside of the military, and helped
legitimize the field of psychology to many who encountered military entrance exams. War
brought psychologists and their objective tests an unprecedented audience: over ten million men
encountered the Army General Classification Test (AGCT).73 Through its widespread use of
general classification tests, the armed forces instilled a high social value in standardized testing.
AGCT test scores were meaningful because they carried such high stakes. Not only did
psychologists assert that the test indicated a recruit’s overall aptitude, but AGCT scores also set
the foundation for servicemen’s military careers, influencing the potential positions men could
earn and the perils they might face. The AGCT exam set a precedent for American social value
in standardized testing as a mechanism that could profoundly alter an individual’s life course—
and as such, ushered in a wave of commercial preparatory material. These preparatory materials
reinforced the state’s manpower needs: men who understood the AGCT could provide a better
sense of their manpower capabilities and would thus be of better to the nation, in war and
beyond. Using the AGCT to link recruits’ aptitude to military order and the preservation of
democracy, military psychologists set rhetorical connections between individuals’ mental skills,
institutional efficiency, and the needs of the American state which endured well beyond war’s
end.
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In order to create a military entrance exam, the U.S. War Department had to forge
bureaucratic space for psychological personnel well before the United States’ formal entry into
World War II. By spring 1940, the department made several organizational adjustments to ensure
a psychological system for classifying recruits and inductees would be in place before any
massive military escalation—in particular, creating a Personnel Testing Section within the
department’s Adjutant General’s Office the year prior. (The division would later be called the
Personnel Research Section.) The department also tapped into existing scientific institutions
created during the First World War, requesting that the National Research Council form a
Committee on Classification of Military Personnel. To counterbalance this bureaucratic
hodgepodge, the war department appointed Walter Bingham as both head of the new National
Research Council committee and Chief Psychologist of the Army. Under Bingham’s watch, the
Personnel Testing Section and the Committee on Classification of Military Personnel had leeway
to plan various standardized objective tests.74 This leeway, however, came with the tradeoff of
psychology having a disjointed space within the state.
Once assembled, the psychologists under Bingham’s supervision had to create a test for
incoming recruits that measured complex thinking skills without unfairly rewarding educational
advantages.75 An entrance exam that relied too heavily on specific subjects would only reflect
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the coursework a soldier had taken, neglecting more fundamental verbal and mathematical
reasoning skills—the difference, for example, between questions about geometry properties and
questions about spatial reasoning. Yet psychologists also couldn’t make test questions too
abstract. An exam that didn’t “appeal to the average officer and soldier as sensible” would also
elicit inaccurate results.76 Researchers spent the spring and summer of 1940 creating thousands
of questions and designing experimental versions of the test, cutting out overly verbal items and
revising the test form to expand its range of difficulty. By August, Army psychologists
completed version 1A of the Army General Classification Test. In its final form, the AGCT was
a 40-minute, 150-question exam that alternated between clusters of multiple-choice vocabulary,
arithmetic, and block-counting questions, becoming more difficult the further test-takers
advanced.77 Although researchers would create several other versions of the AGCT during the
war, each test form sought to strike a balance between measuring how quickly recruits could
answer general knowledge questions and how deep their verbal and quantitative aptitudes ran.78
In order for the AGCT to have any meaningful use for the army, however, psychologists
actually had to standardize the exam. Test standardization is a multi-step process, and its
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fundamentals illustrate how the AGCT would set a profound precedent for widespread American
social constructs of normalness, intelligence, and national worth:
. Standardized tests measure individual performances in relation to a larger group. After
taking a standardized test, a person’s performance is translated to a raw score, and that raw score
is then compared to other test-takers’ performances. This comparative performance is typically
represented as a percentile—e.g., “So-and-so performed better on this exam than 73% of testtakers.” Finally, this percentage is translated to a scaled score. Scaled scores—almost always the
number that people refer to when discussing standardized test scores—represent the raw score’s
location on a statistical model. This model is typically a normal distribution. In a normal
distribution, about two-thirds of all values are within one standard deviation from the mean, 95%
fall within two standard deviations, and virtually all values fall within 3 standard deviations.79
This normal distribution is set to an arbitrary score range—for the AGCT, practically all scores
fell between 40 and 160, with a median score of 100—and divided into evenly spaced
increments. Because standardized tests are often given multiple times over many years, these
score scales are often based on a representative sample originally gathered during a test’s
experimental phases. Although these master scales are often adjusted and recalibrated, especially
if a test becomes very popular or if the original sample group no longer reflects the current group
of test-takers, they remain the backbone for how test-takers understand their performance and
how institutions assess test-takers’ worth. The statistics behind the final score ultimately mean
that it usually takes far more effort for a person to raise their score from slightly below-average
to slightly above-average than it would to raise their score from above-average to well above-
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average. Whether a speed or power test, standardized assessments groups a wide range of
performances under the idea of “average”—and in turn, standardized test scores become
shorthand for social usefulness.80
While standardizing the AGCT, army psychologists had to reduce the friction between
the state’s needs and the exam’s limitations. Namely, researchers had to standardize an exam
designed for armed force recruits when no such population existed. Researchers developed the
earliest version of the AGCT months in advance of the Selective Service Act of 1940, which
mandated all male citizens and resident aliens between the ages of 21 and 36 to register for the
draft.81 Lacking an available pool of draftees, the test’s designers essentially invented a sample
population, administering the AGCT to over 4000 men already serving in the Army and Civilian
Conservation Core.82 Using these results, army psychologists built a score scale using a 5-grade
system: the higher the scaled score a test-taker received, the higher their classification. Yet army
officials remained unsatisfied with the number of recruits who received the AGCT’s lowest
possible classification—causing the test’s designers to make its lowest grade much narrower and
the next-lowest grade much wider. Readjusting the boundary between Grade IV and Grade V
classification may not have made hundreds of thousands of incoming recruits any more or less
capable for duties in the armed forces—but it reduced the stigma these men would have faced
during their service, opened opportunities that would have otherwise been closed, and allowed
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the armed forces a new rationale for their use. By inventing a representative sample where none
existed, psychologists gave the armed forces the ability to quickly compare millions of men
against an imagined average—and with a couple basic adjustments, established the boundaries
for which men were more of less useful for the state.
Psychologists for the Adjutant General’s Office made repeated efforts to show the AGCT
was a valid examination, revealing in the process the complicated logic needed to demonstrate
standardized tests’ effectiveness.83 Some studies focused on the relationship between test-takers’
scores and their civilian occupations. Researchers concluded that the greater degree of training a
man needed for his job, the higher his AGCT score. Accountants, chemists, personnel clerks, and
engineering students typically earned far higher scores than miners, farmers, and lumberjacks.
Yet, these results only validated the AGCT by suggestion: surely the test measured men’s
intellectual capacities accurately, because the men who scored highest typically had highly
skilled, training-intensive occupations.84
Researchers also studied AGCT results to see if the test helped or hurt the military’s
policies on illiteracy. Widespread illiteracy complicated American wartime manpower needs.
Illiteracy was not proof in itself of a man’s mental faculties—but the military could not afford to
refine all illiterate draftees’ manpower when time and money could instead be spent on men with
basic reading skills. Yet the state also could not turn away too many illiterate men, especially as
83
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the American war effort continued to escalate: combat required bodies. 85 This dilemma created
wildly shifting recruitment policies for illiterate men during the war, and placed pressure on
army psychologists to determine the actual benefit of special training units geared toward
streamlining illiterate recruits into the general draftee population after intensive reading training.
Analyzing the test-taking patterns of illiterate recruits in special training units, researchers at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas discovered a pattern: many boosted their AGCT scores by focusing on test
question with little written content. In particular, such recruits gravitated toward block-counting
questions, which made test-takers determine how many blocks a three-dimensional form would
contain based off of a two-dimensional representation. By favoring text-less questions, many
men reached the Grade IV AGCT classification needed to graduate from their special training
units and enter general basic training.86 These findings revealed a tension between standardized
testing and manpower needs. Men who gamed the AGCT by avoiding verbal question may have
cost the state specific types of skills—but by excelling at block-counting questions, they
demonstrated other kinds of aptitude that could have been harnessed to benefit wartime needs.
Standardized tests revealed recruits’ capabilities whether or not men took them as intended.
Army psychologists also analyzed the relationship between AGCT scores and race,
repudiating certain racist logic in order to build legitimacy for their own field. Decades after the
United States employed psychologists to design entrance exams for the First World War,
differences between blacks’ and native-born whites’ scores on Army Alpha and Beta Tests
continued to fuel racialized theories of intelligence. The AGCT’s designers sought to avoid racial
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differences in test scores becoming additional evidence for prevailing arguments about “native
capacity.”87 As one 1942 Army report stressed, black and white recruits’ AGCT scores were not
fully comparable because no existing samples could account “[for] economic, social, and cultural
factors [and] with respect to educational opportunities and background.”88 No adequately sized
sample for similarly equipped men existed. Even college-educated black men—who scored
similarly to white recruits with some high school education—lacked economic resources and
social safeguards enjoyed by white inductees. Yet the Army’s repudiation of racist intelligence
theories was, above all, an aim to distance itself from inappropriate uses of statistical data. The
report’s emphasis on incomparable subgroups—namely, the implausible conditions under which
white and black recruits’ AGCT scores could be soundly judged against each other—was
primarily a lesson in statistical logic. Psychologists, working on a project of unprecedented scale,
wanted to ensure their newly-gained legitimacy was not just as quickly lost, particularly as they
aimed to pave over the enduring cultural memory of the Army Alpha and Beta Tests. Their
concern was less about social inequities themselves (the armed forces, after all, remained
segregated throughout the war) and more about the misuse of statistical psychological data to
maintain racialized theories of difference.
Psychologists’ difficulty attributing meaning to score differences may have also been
complicated by imbalanced access to AGCT preparatory material. Although the armed forces
maintained secure testing conditions at its induction centers, recruits with even a little financial
leeway could acclimate to the Army and Navy entrance exams by purchasing a guidebook.
Guidebooks not only prepared men for the general classification tests, but also enforced the
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notion that testing was central to efficient personnel management. Recruits may not have known
every occupation the army and navy needed to fill, but guidebooks offered the promise that, with
some practice, men could find a role among thousands of job classifications that made the most
of their education, skills, and potential.89 These guidebooks used the idea of aptitude to connect
personal responsibility to military victory. As one guidebook published by Arco asserted, “the
most pronounced aptitude may be 2 ½ and [sic] 3 times as strong as the least pronounced” within
any particular individual—and recruits needed to spend time determining what was the best they
had to offer the state.90 Guidebook publishers thus justified their products as a service rather than
a strictly commercial item by providing the means for potential recruits to make the best display
of their manpower capabilities on military entrance exams.
To encourage sales, guidebook authors repeatedly stressed to readers that the AGCT was
not an intelligence test. Intelligence tests, these authors noted, measured relatively fixed mental
capacities, and if an individual’s general native intelligence could not change, then there would
be no need to purchase a guidebook to improve one’s AGCT score. Guidebook authors also had
to delicately balance the relationship between AGCT scores and education. Prep guide writers
routinely emphasized that training for the AGCT should not be confused for formal education—
but, to remain enticing to readers, guidebooks also emphasized that military entrance exams
assessed a wide range of aptitudes, most of which could be strengthened with diligent short-term
training. Some prep books, such as one printed by Pergande, used anecdotal data to suggest that
the most educated men did not always do best on the AGCT:
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"In a Milwaukee examination for the air corps, a young man who
had completed only the eighth grade made a rating of 120 points.
For this test 80 was the passing grade and three hours were
allowed. On average 50% of those who applied here failed to pass.
In one group four out of five college students failed. The highest
score ever made in Milwaukee was 142 and the lowest 23.”91
Without confirming whether the man with an eighth-grade education or the highest-scoring
Milwaukee recruit had ever used a prep guide, Pergande severed the relationship between
schooling and test scores. The state needed men of many different talents—including those
ignored by schools.
The surefooted, precise way prep guides familiarized their audiences with the military
induction process contrasted sharply with their motley assortment of AGCT practice material.
Prep guides walked readers through the initial steps of the induction process. These guides
familiarized potential recruits with soldier qualification cards, stressing that men should prepare
for the biographical information required on the 8 ½ -by-11 cardstock form. One guide went so
far as to tell readers the types of clothing recruits would receive upon induction.92 But specific
AGCT material was often harder to come by. Some guides, such as one printed by Arco,
bombarded students with nearly thirty pages of vocabulary practice, asserting that “[i]t may be
stated on sound, psychometric authority that the vocabulary test is one of the most important
single means of testing intelligence”93—without ever indicating whether the words printed in the
prep guide would ever appear on the AGCT. Mathematics practice often took the form of
elementary arithmetic and algebraic review. Readers were assured that the inductions tests
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“measure ability and intelligence with a very high degree of accuracy”94. One company even
included additional testing material that had little to do with preparing recruits for the AGCT,
such as general intelligence tests for civil service licensures; within a span of three questions,
test-takers were asked what the definition for “versatile,” Bizet’s most famous work, and the
primary use for a trombone.95 In the absence of reliable information about actual AGCT
questions, prep guides replaced quantity for quality.
Neither the gravity of war nor imprecise preparatory material stopped some publishers
from reminding readers they were, in fact, businesses with other goods for sale. Pergande
encouraged men with lackluster vocabularies to purchase its vocabulary and spelling guidebook,
“which contain[ed] 4000 specifically selected words” suitable for review.96 Arco reminded
readers that the AGCT was likely not the only standardized test they would face in their
lifetime—“After the War—You’ll Want a Good Position!”—and listed the printing and pricing
information for dozens of other licensing exam prep guides. 97 Publishers also built off of their
wartime prep guide consumer base when the United States maintained a peacetime draft. Some
postwar guides, such as one written by former chief of the Adjutant General Office’s Manpower
Analysis Section Reuben Horchow, aimed to capitalize on the author’s wartime experience and
expertise. Horchow’s guide, How to Get Ahead in the Armed Forces, posed military service as a
near-certainty—and whether a man enlisted or received a draft notice, he had plenty of
opportunities to make the most of his required service. Horchow stressed that a soldier’s test
records existed far beyond the superiors with whom he had direct contact: a man’s
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“Qualifications Record (tests and all) stands for you and furnishes the chief basis on which
action is taken [or] selection is made.”98 By this logic, purchasing and using a prep guide was
the only way for a soldier to ensure that any official who came in contact with his permanent
record would know his true potential.
By the time Horchow’s guide was published in the early 1950s, the link between
standardized test scores, military efficiency, and the state’s needs had already been set, even as
the armed forced transitioned from the GCT to the Armed Forces Qualification Tests (AFQT).
Incoming soldiers who resisted their role in this system by intentionally botching their
standardized entrance exam faced grave consequences. Horchow asserted that the “personnel
people at induction stations have a pretty good idea about who should pass the test, and they also
have ways of finding out is a man is ‘faking.’”99 Even a nervous man who unintentionally
thwarted a reliable measurement of his aptitudes could undermine his entire military career;
personnel who selected soldiers for promotions and advanced training preferred candidates with
consistent score records to men with “tests that are ‘out of line’ with each other.’”100 Horchow’s
warnings were not just vague threats; psychologists had conducted several studies to see if
“malingering” men displayed any generalizable test-taking patterns.101 Regardless of whether
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Horchow’s words of caution had any truth behind them, such prep guides reinforced the notion
that the only thing worse than a man with little aptitude to give the state is a man unwilling to
give their skills to the state. This sentiment would be sustained by the federally backed push to
readjust veterans to the state’s postwar educational and occupational demands.
Postwar Readjustment: The GI Bill, Guidance Counseling, and Personality Inventories
Well before World War II ended, American policymakers began developing legislative
measures that would ensure returning soldiers readjusted to peacetime society, all while
continuing to contribute their manpower to the postwar state. However, the main congressional
provision for veteran readjustment—the GI Bill—revealed the limits to which the federal
government could use education as a means for postwar social planning. For veteran
readjustment to truly succeed, educational and corporate institutions also had to embrace
psychological developments in guidance counseling and personality inventories. This burgeoning
psychological field added new dimensions to standardized assessments, and further encouraged
Americans see themselves as measurable categorical types. Through standardized guidance
inventories, veterans and civilians alike facilitated postwar manpower planning by internalizing
the ways various institutions made sense of student bodies and labor pools.
Many policymakers realized midway through the war that hodgepodge federal provisions
for returning servicemen would provide insufficient support, but momentum for comprehensive
veteran benefits ultimately came from outside efforts. The National Resource Planning Board
had drafted initial plans for veterans’ postwar reintegration, but politicized disdain for the NRPB
and Rooseveltian governance in general had weakened the board’s ability to push forward
policy. (Congress made the issue moot by eliminating the board’s funding in 1943.) The
American Legion, a relatively conservative veterans organization, ultimately did what the NRPB
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could not: draft legislation and organize a massive public relations campaign to ensure Congress
would address the issue of veterans’ readjustment in a timely manner. The Legion drew upon
existing state-level provisions for veterans to craft legislation for an expansive set of
entitlements, including unemployment benefits, home and farm loan benefits, and educational
aid. For the Legion, an all-encompassing package seemed more likely to withstand congressional
bandying than the existing piecemeal bills languishing in Congress. Boosted by sympathetic
press coverage from publishing magnate William Randolph Hearst’s network of newspapers—as
well as the evocative title “The GI Bill of Rights”—the ambitious legislation made its way to the
78th Congress carrying popular support, particularly for having been developed by former
military men rather than government bureaucrats.102
As much clout as the GI Bill of Rights carried when it entered Congress, the legislation
faced several key detractors who opposed the way the bill would recalibrate the relationship
between the government, citizens, and soldiers. As the legislation worked through the Senate
Finance Committee in early 1944, lawmakers gathered testimony from leaders of several rival
veterans’ interest organizations, who believed that expansive federal benefits for all veterans
would harm disabled veterans already underserved by the government. Several state school
board chancellors also offered the subcommittee their concerns that broad federal provisions
would create bureaucratic duplication that undermined the traditional subfederal control of
education. Even the bill’s chief sponsor, Mississippi Senator John Rankin, turned against the
legislation after realizing the wide array of benefits available to returning soldiers could disrupt
the white supremacist system that kept black citizens at the bottom of the socioeconomic order
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bereft of political power. These detractors all expressed a concern that the postwar order would
weaken the very power networks kept the existing social structure afloat.103
Despite its many discontents, the GI Bill became law on June 22, 1944, retaining the
delicate balance of power between federal and state governments while striking a new
relationship between education and citizenship. Title II of Public Law 346 granted veterans,
whatever their physical condition upon discharge, numerous educational opportunities. The bill
defined educational or training institutions to include:
“all public or private elementary, secondary, and other schools
furnishing education for adults, business schools and colleges,
scientific and technical institutions, colleges, vocational schools,
junior colleges, teachers colleges, normal schools, professional
schools, universities, and other educational institutions, [and]
business or other establishments providing apprenticeship or other
training on the job”104
By staking such an expansive concept of education, the GI Bill ensured that veteran education
remained valuable insofar as it enabled former servicemen to expand their manpower capabilities
in ways that best suited both the individual and the state. The law entitled soldiers with at least
ninety days’ service and “discharged or released […] under conditions other than dishonorable”
to at least one year of education, with up to four years available depending on a veteran’s length
of service.105 The GI Bill allowed veterans to continue their education at any institution
“whether or not located in the State in which he resides,” but insisted that the federal government
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would not “exercise any supervision or control, whatsoever, over any State educational agency,
or State apprenticeship agency.”106 By placing education alongside home loans and
unemployment payments that veterans could—but by no means were required—to take, Public
Law 346 kept federal expansion in check by deferring to existing bodies of governance and using
the language of choice.
Not all veterans benefitted equally from the new educational provisions. The men who
gained the most were those who already did well on the general classification tests: younger
white men who had completed their schooling. This cohort was considerably more likely to
complete high school and at least some college than nonveterans in the decade following their
service. Black veterans, by contrast, were largely written out of the GI Bill’s educational
benefits—and by extension, out of the promises of the postwar state. By deferring educational
appropriations to the states, Congress ensured the GI bill wouldn’t disrupt traditional racist
educational power structures. Although black veterans in the north had limited positive
educational experiences, southern black veterans were offered little. Lackluster administrations
for southern black vets—many of whom were disqualified from the GI Bill’s generous
unemployment provisions for refusing to accept white VA officer’s job placement offers for
menial labor—encouraged many to relocate to northern urban areas. While the GI Bill may not
have explicitly excluded benefits to veterans on grounds of race, the execution of the bill’s
provisions ensured that black veterans would not be able to use their benefits to upend America’s
racial social order, nor that the bill’s benefits would contradict existing race-based policies in
education, housing, or employment.107

106

Ibid.

107

The debate over who did—and more pointedly, who didn’t—benefit from the GI Bill has gone on for
decades. Underneath this debate is a broader question over whether educational demographics would have continued

67

As part of its educational benefits, the GI Bill also authorized the Veterans’ Affairs
Administrator to “arrange for educational and vocational guidance to persons eligible for
education and training.”108 Such guidance would not only include informing veterans about “the
need for general education,” but also encouraging returning servicemen to pursue job-specific
training “in the various crafts, trades, and professions.”109 Though slight, this provision
established the idea that guidance was a necessary component of readjustment. Veterans, left to
their own devices, may not make occupational or educational choices that would maximize what
manpower they had to offer the state. Guidance offered a conduit between individual vocational
needs and state manpower demands.
To accommodate the postwar wave of veteran-students, universities created guidance
programs that both situated servicemen to college life and adjusted their institutions to postwar
demands. Through new guidance policies and procedures, higher education institutions sought to
changing as they had in the late 1930s in the absence of war: Was the GI Bill deeply restructure educational access,
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comply with federal mandates without diluting their existing prestige. The University of
Wisconsin system steered veteran-students toward guidance services; in the absence of recent
educational measurements, a battery of guidance test could more accurately capture a veteran’s
set of aptitudes and abilities. Universities such as Princeton felt a responsibility to their graduates
as well as potential freshmen, pledging to help alumni with job guidance. Psychologists, like
veterans, also had to readjust, and City College of New York launched a four-week program to
acclimate psychologists to the guidance needs of veteran-students. Although over sixty percent
of those who served in the Army and Navy during the Second World War had not completed
high school, the number of veterans who did have a high school education could have placed
unbearable strain on American colleges and universities had institutions not made adjustments to
most of them used GI Bill benefits to pursue higher education 110
Worried about the maintenance of their own internal standards, some universities
conducted internal studies to determine whether veteran-students maintained the same academic
rigor as their civilian counterparts. In the absence of standards, the University of Michigan
worried “government assistance might induce a good many veterans to try college work,” using
resources at the expense of otherwise qualified civilians.111 Without any previous bases for
comparison, Michigan turned to measurements they could control and measure: grade point
averages. Yet researchers at the university could not discern a consistent, let alone statistically
significant, difference between the grade of veterans and non-veterans. (A noticeably positive
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difference in grade point averages existed for veterans who returned to school after leaving for
combat.) When confronted with a new legal basis for educational access—one that did not allow
for much prediction—colleges and universities turned to internal standards to ensure their own
educational prestige remained undiluted.
Psychologists also used wartime conditions and postwar planning to lay the foundation
for guidance counseling. Guidance, as understood by experts, involved adjusting an individual’s
personal appraisal and aspirations to fit with broader social needs through objective
measurements—in other words, getting people to make sound life plans after some selfreflection and a few standardized tests.112 Guidance counseling, by extension, helped individuals
personalize broader social norms and values. Schools had long been institutions for cultural
alignment—replicating hierarchies and mores found outside the classroom—but wartime defense
planning introduced a new dimension to social adjustment. War had turned labor into manpower,
and postwar economic stability depended in part upon Americans’ ability to view their efforts
and ambitions through this abstract sense of work. Vocational guidance experts, in turn, devised
mechanisms that would personalize postwar planning, particularly for those Americans most
crucial for sustained successful economic adjustment: returning soldiers, college students, and
adolescents. Although vocational counseling and personality inventories existed before the
Second World War, defense planning ushered in an approach to guidance counseling that
married the language of self-discovery and theory behind standardized objective testing with the
logic of manpower.
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Before vocational guidance experts could steer Americans into postwar jobs, they first
had to convince the public well in advance that there would be a worthwhile economy to
participate in after the war. This burden of proof was especially high for enlisted men, whose
defense jobs were largely redundant once war ended. One pamphlet, printed in 1943 by the
nonprofit Public Affairs Committee, assured soldiers the federal government would not shrug off
its obligations as it had after the last war with “a $60 bonus and a ticket home.”113 Temporary
unemployment—on the government’s dime as a paid furlough—would be the best way to ensure
that the transition to a peacetime economy would occur in a graduated manner. As experts
suggested, if the federal government could be trusted to reposition millions of Americans into
wartime defense positions, it could be trusted with ensuring postwar economic success.
Clear as their message may have been, there simply weren’t enough vocational guidance
experts during or after the war to provide direct counseling to Americans in non-combat
positions. As much as psychologists asserted the public good of their field by publicizing their
wartime efforts, they were still a relatively small group—many of whom directly involved in the
war effort. Most vocational counselors, particularly those working outside of a military
environment, also lacked professional training. In 1944, the War Manpower Commission
estimated that the United States had only 6,000 vocational counselors, nearly half of whom “only
partially trained in the professional sense.”114 Comparatively few high school guidance
counselors worked in the Southeast, Pacific Northwest, or New England—and those schools with
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guidance systems often assigned hundreds of students per counselor.115 While dozens of
colleges and universities scrambled to develop vocational guidance training programs, the
federal government leaned on existing community pillars to steer youth into making sound
workforce decisions. Even if the government could curb some vocational pathways, as it did by
ending voluntary military enlistment midway through the Second World War, community
institutions had to shoulder primary responsibility for how well youth grappled with their
choices. As the war drew a growing number of employable minors into the workplace, the
federal government needed to address a growing dilemma: how to provide guidance to millions
of teenagers and young adults without having widely-dispersed trained personnel.116
Psychologists tried to solve this problem by encouraging readers to understand
themselves in standardized terms through self-appraisal and self-assessment. Guidebooks
provided tests, charts, and questionnaires to help readers understand their own skills and
aptitudes categorically. As authors often stressed, most people could succeed in several
vocations—but individuals had a personal responsibility to determine what objective criteria
those jobs held in common, as well as what capabilities made them a better fit for certain lines of
work. Some guides used the language of accounting to help readers standardize their sense of
self, advising youth to create a “Personal Balance Sheet,” in which job seekers soberly assessed
their physical, mental, sartorial, vocational, and psychological “assets” and “liabilities.”117 Other
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guides standardized the dimensions of personality, asking veterans to assess their level of
friendliness, initiative, dependability, and “pep and enthusiasm” on a five-point scale.118
Vocational guides that avoided tests still encouraged readers to categorize themselves in broad
occupational archetypes: mechanically-inclined people should stay away from jobs best suited
for those inherently gifted at communications and sales.119 By familiarizing readers to selfassessment, guidance experts sought to convince Americans that vocational planning was “a
process, not an event,” and that process began with understanding one’s strengths and limits in
standardized ways.120
Through vocational guidebooks, student readers learned they held primary responsibility
in maintaining postwar economic health. Adolescents who failed to develop skills and habits
would lack the mental dexterity needed to make informed choices about how they entered the
workforce. In this framework, people possessed different levels of intelligence—and while
environmental factors could enhance skills, good training and a supportive environment would
do little to help an individual who was naturally poor at a skill. As these guides suggested,
accepting natural variations in aptitude, whether in reference to general intelligence or broad skill
sets, was the necessary first step in lining individuals with jobs that best suited their
predispositions. To this end, these guidebooks suggested that adulthood came when a person
faced the choice of how to develop and expend their manpower. As one wartime vocational
guide suggested, “freedom from fear” was not only one of the Atlantic Charter’s core tenets, but
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a learned response to the uncertain. Those who neglected to overcome their fears through wellreasoned conditioning risked a future of uncertainty—not only for themselves, but also the
nation.121 Regardless the future job market’s strength, young Americans had a civic—and
moral—responsibility to understand how they could best serve the postwar economy.
Realizing adolescents often weren’t their own best guidance counselors, psychologists
and school boards also developed materials that allowed teachers to guide students through the
process of test-based personality assessment. For the psychologists who designed personality
inventories, vocational aptitude test results became meaningless when educators neglected to
learn fundamental test mechanics. Many assessments had complex scoring systems—such as the
Strong Vocational Interest, which allowed for over 40,000 possible weighted responses in 36
career fields. Educators risked wasting their students’ potential manpower with sloppy,
halfhearted calculations.122 Some school boards, meanwhile, went beyond single assessments
and developed semester-long courses in vocational guidance. Developed in 1941, the School
Board of Chicago’s Self-Appraisal and Careers course devoted several weeks toward honing
students’ understanding of psychological tests, statistical concepts, and test interpretation. By
helping students assess test data without feeling “that some mysterious finality is inherent in a
result because it is expressed numerically,” teachers could help youth understand their role in the
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post-defense order by attuning to think of their capabilities as improvable abstract qualities.123
Becoming a even-keeled adult not only meant finding a career, then, but using psychological
tests to understand how one would fit in best in a rapidly changing world.
Some researchers devoted their time to developing standardized examinations for
personality types that were not only easily internalized, but would in time prove highly
profitable. During the war, Katharine Briggs and her daughter Isabel Briggs Myers constructed
the earliest form of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, namely as an alternative method for
measuring potential workplace strengths for women who lacked job experience. Inspired by
Jungian archetypical models, Briggs and Myers argued that personalities could be categorized
along four oppositional spectrums. The two researchers theorized that individuals favored either
extraverted or introverted behavior, sensing versus intuitive perception, thinking versus feeling
judgment, and general judgment versus perception. Briggs and Myers devised a forced-choice
questionnaire that compelled test-takers to indicate their preferences along these spectrums. The
duo categorized results into sixteen distinct personality types, stressing that none was inherently
better than the other. Introverted, sensitive, thinking, judging individuals were as useful to the
workforce as extraverted, intuitive, feeling, perceptive people—so long as they knew their
personality dynamics and had an awareness of which jobs suited what personality types best.
This archetypical approach to workplace personalities would become far more popular decades
as corporations and organizations purchased the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator from Educational
Testing Service (and later Consulting Psychological Press) beginning in the 1960s.124
123

Grace E. Munson and Lester J. Schloerb, High School Course in Self-Appraisal and Careers: Teacher’s
Manual (Chicago: Chicago Board of Education Bureau of Child Study, 1941), 52.
124

Following the sale of MBTI’s exclusive publishing rights to Consulting Psychologists Press in the mid1970s, the test gained global corporate and popular attention. A great deal of this allure lay not only in its
memorable classification system—ENTJs and ISFPs can easily carry their designation as a mark of how they fit best
in different types of workplaces and careers—but also the tightly controlled, highly profitable method of discovering

75

Nonetheless, its widespread use and familiarity by the end of the twentieth century illustrates the
culmination of what emerged during and immediately after World War II: the corporate embrace
of vocational guidance testing as a way to make the American labor force personalize and absorb
the responsibility of workplace adjustment.
As professionalized guidance counseling and vocational assessments became more
widespread practices, psychologists attuned Americans to a worldview in which it was their civic
responsibility to find a job that fulfilled the nation’s manpower needs. Self-assessments
ingrained in Americans new patterns for relating to the workplace: quantifying your personality
type made it easier to figure out the line of work that would best serve you and your workplace.
A poorly adjusted workforce could not provide the state robust manpower, even if jobs were
fully available. Human resources, then, not only involved extracting and refining manpower, but
also guiding individuals toward educational and vocational choices that would create the highest
quality manpower for the state. Participatory democracy meant embracing a system in which
citizens determined their capacity as workers for the good of the state. Standardized guidance
tests, vocational batteries, and personality assessments allowed psychologists to continue
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justifying the importance of their methods in the postwar order while adjusting millions of
Americans to their upcoming responsibilities.
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CHAPTER TWO: AMERICAN TALENT SHOW:
STANDARIDZED TESTING AND THE COLD WAR SCRAMBLE FOR BRAINPOWER

As the Cold War developed, American lawmakers and educationists obsessed over the
development of brainpower. If the United States did not harness and refine this national resource,
experts warned, the country would squander its ability to maintain geopolitical supremacy. The
nation needed a way to determine which youth had the greatest potential, guide them toward
rigorous high school coursework, and encourage them to pursue science and engineering tracks
in college—all while ensuring youth who weren’t naturally gifted were also steered toward paths
that fulfilled the nation’s needs and fostered personal satisfaction. There was, however, one
catch. Despite the fear the United States would slide behind the Soviet Union in scientific and
technological innovation (and despite the burgeoning administrative state), the federal
government remained reluctant to overextend its role in the shape of American education, a
system historically built on decentralized authority and populated by non-state administrative
actors.125 Together, these various nodes of oversight created a complex postwar educational
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administrative network and political culture: American education had numerous governors, often
at cross-purposes and with intersecting zones of control. If the federal government no longer had
vested authority or reason to massively test tens of millions of citizens, as it had during the
Second World War, and if massive swaths of white Americans actively resisted any federal
interference in the form or pace of education, how could the state find and train the brains it so
desperately needed?
Standardized testing companies solved this dilemma by providing products for
identifying brainpower that validated both traditional divisions of educational oversight and
served the geopolitical needs of the Cold War administrative state. Although standardized testing
companies existed earlier in the twentieth century, they were often small-scale affairs typically
devoted to the intelligence and personality inventories. After the Second World War,
psychologists, emboldened by their wartime contributions to the state, collaborated with
educational leaders to consider how standardized assessments could continue to be useful to
American society. Philanthropic organizations collaborated with psychologists and leaders of
elite universities to form Educational Testing Service (ETS), the largest of several postwar
standardized test manufacturers. A private not-for-profit enterprise, ETS could provide testing
material to the armed forces without bloating federal bureaucracy—and federal contracts
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provided ETS financial solvency and legitimacy beyond its initial philanthropic funding. As
American higher education expanded, and as the federal government grew more concerned with
the quality of American scientific expertise, psychometric standardized examinations became
more valuable for national goals. Because school districts and colleges remained clients rather
than legally mandated users, early postwar test manufacturers nationalized educational
assessments and admissions policies while maintaining the spirit of voluntary association. In
effect, ETS and other early postwar test companies standardized the type of information various
state- and non-state actors wanted to know about young American citizens. By the time both
sputniks entered the atmosphere, American education had already begun to transition toward a
nationwide talent hunt, in which standardized tests helped determine which brains were most
geopolitically useful—and which Americans held the greatest marketplace value.126
Harnessing Brainpower: Educational Testing Service, the Korean War, and the SSCQT
The United States enabled its Cold War pursuit of science and technology through a
power-sharing arrangement of private and public funding. Prior to the Second World War, the
largest funders for scientific research had been private philanthropic organizations—namely the
Rockefeller Foundation. War compelled the American state, and in particular the military, to
invest in scientific research in order to accelerate technological development. After the Second
World War, the military and Rockefeller Foundation joined other federal, philanthropic, and
academic organizations to jointly sustain funding for scientific endeavors. This shared custody of
scientific and technological funding—neither fully separate from nor entirely bound to the
state—meant that the American scientific Cold War effort took on several seemingly-
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contradictory characteristics: a commitment to applied research while continuing to fund science
for its own sake; visions of a global democratic future while producing tools for an American
hegemonic agenda; and researchers who debated the ethics of their creations while agency heads
committed to destructive anticommunist agendas. To satisfy the numerous interests of their
federal, business, philanthropic, academic, and military funders, postwar scientists (especially
postwar social scientists) wedded knowledge work to the promotion of industry and democracy,
all while glossing over the difference between experimental approaches to knowledge and the
notion of objective truth. The truth, in this approach, was clearly demonstrable—and what was
true would also be good for democracy because it was also good for business. Not beholden to a
single source or type of funding, American Cold War science glossed over any tensions between
the promotion of democracy and a belief in free market values.127
Scientists, business leaders, educational experts, and policymakers all cultivated the idea
of brainpower, gradually building a case for how the United States could best use its human
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resources to secure geopolitical advantage.128 Early postwar definitions of brainpower
established it as a national resource—the innate “ability of the human brain to process raw facts
and impressions into creative thought,” as the educationist J. W. Brouillette put it—that could be
refined and used in the workforce for the benefit of both state and society.129 As industrial
leaders inserted themselves into discussions of postwar power sharing, however, brainpower also
became defined in terms of profit. Speakers at the 1947 National Electronics Conference, for
example, made the case that public funding alone for scientific research would never lead the
United States to greatness: only free market incentives could spur the best brains into action.130
A decade later, participants at the same conference would frame the national brainpower pool as
more than human output alone, but “the eventual vastly grater part contributed by synthetic
intelligence devices and systems.”131 Industrial scientists, meanwhile, expanded the idea of
brainpower throughout the early Cold War to include not only the trained brains that made
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machines, but also the trained machines that freed up time and energy for trained brains.
Brainpower, as a national security resource, came to be portrayed as a profitable creative force
with technological byproducts that could exist independent of human action.
Bureaucrats within the Office of Education shared the belief that, if monitored carefully,
education could play a key role in preserving postwar democracy. In an address to the National
Council for the Social Studies, Office of Education Commissioner John Studebaker asserted that
education served as a “trustee for posterity,” helping “preserve, protect, develop, and transmit to
each succeeding generation the glorious heritage of freedom and democracy that is ours as a
people.”132 Communism, as democracy’s polar opposite, threatened to undermine American
stability and prosperity. The key to democratic vitality, as Studebaker maintained, was through
education system that, among other benefits, gave youth “a true appreciation […] of their
glorious American heritage of freedom wrung from the bitter struggle of centuries” and “an
understanding and appreciation of the ethical and spiritual values, as well as the material
benefits, of the American Way of Life.”133 Tapping into progressive educational sentiment from
the early twentieth century, Studebaker declared that revitalized civics education would “inspire
[youth] with the resolve and with the zeal to do their full part in helping to improve the working
of democracy”134
Yet some within the Office of Education also worried that the very hallmark of
democratic American education—local control—could also be its greatest threat.
Superintendents often ran school districts with little mind for democratic process, and
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researchers within the office worried that students who encounter autocratic governance in
schools would favor autocratic rule as adults. Dismayed that decentralized education could
generate citizens unable to “withstand any form or type of insidious foreign ideology,” the office
created a report in 1949 outlining seven principles that defined democratically run school
districts.135 These principles reinforced a functionalist view of society: A democratic society
depended upon school districts in which roles for every member, from the superintendent to
teachers to the community to grade school students, were clearly delineated and each member
used their role to promote democratic principles. To ensure readers understood the importance of
democratic process, the report included a checklist that school officials could self-administer to
determine if their district lay prone to autocratic rule. Because the Office of Education could not
directly enforce administrative procedure—and such centralized dictates would be in themselves
anti-democratic—the subdepartment could only provide behavioral guidance for school boards
and superintendents that would ideally reverberate in the classroom.
Because the federal government lacked the capability or authority to identify brainpower
by itself, it had to rely heavily on external standardized testing research and development. The
state found its greatest supplier in Educational Testing Service (ETS), which would soon design
a wide array of standardized tests for the government, military, higher education institutions,
secondary schools, and occupational licensing boards, among others. ETS spawned from the
merger of three key testing and educational organizations—by the American Council on
Education, the College Entrance Examination Board and the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching—and was granted an absolute charter by the New York State Board
of Regents in December 1947. ETS was not an educational institution in itself, but the Board of
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Regents had the ability to grant such charters to not-for-profit corporations.136 Although the
corporation held its main office in midtown Manhattan, ETS also quickly opened offices in
Princeton, New Jersey, and Berkeley, California, establishing a cross-country presence even in
its infancy. More than any other testing organization, ETS provided the federal government and
defense industries the testing tools required to harness Cold War brainpower, making
standardized testing much more than a pedagogical practice: it was a Cold War ideological
tactic. ETS, in turn, operated less like a nonprofit and more like a state quasi-apparatus.
ETS absorbed a complicated network of new responsibilities from its parent companies.
While the American Council on Education relinquished control over its Cooperative Test
Service, National Teacher Examination, and American Council Psychological Examination, the
Carnegie Foundation gave ETS oversight of the Graduate Record Office. The College Entrance
Examination Board, meanwhile, made ETS responsible for all of its testing services.137 (ETS
devoted a great deal of its early time and materials to the tests it inherited from the College
Entrance Examination Board; by 1950, 75,000 students sat for at least one College Board
exam.138) Bolstered by a $750,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, these
parent companies also provided financial backing for the newborn corporation.139 Although ETS
took over testing research and development from its parent organizations, they still held
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considerable sway over the new organization’s early leadership and mission. The chairmen of
each parent organization not only served as ex oficio members of ETS’s twelve-member Board
of trustees, but also appointed the remaining nine board members. Each parent organization also
mandated that ETS not encroach upon their non-testing activities, such as the College Board’s
mandate to set higher education policy guidelines.140 Beyond improving certain functions of
existing testing organizations, ETS would have to develop its own distinct mission to the postwar
state.
Through its earliest annual reports to its board of trustees, Educational Testing Service
developed the rhetoric it would use to describe its mission to the both the public and the state. In
the corporation’s first report, published in 1949, ETS President Henry Chauncey stressed how
misguided the general American public was about the costs of test manufacture. Although early
developers had historically provided psychological tests for nominal costs, the days of smallscale test-craft were over. Americans, by Chauncey’s judgment, were shortsighted in their view
of modern testing, assuming that test developers could still eat the costs of development and
operations while providing an increasing number of services. Charging more for tests was not
only a matter of recouping expenses for the extensive time and effort put into test development,
but also a reflection of necessary expenses in postwar society.141 The company may not have
been publicly traded, “but ETS, though non-profit, is not eleemosynary. Tests cannot be
provided at a nominal cost. Fair and reasonable prices must be charged.”142 This proclamation,
stentorian and graceless, would define the relationship between ETS and the postwar public:
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because ETS defined test users as the organizations who collaborated with the corporation and
purchased its tests, its primary role was in increasing institutional efficiency. ETS served the
public to the extent that it provided services to organizations in instances where the state could
not (or lacked the means) to step in. Their primary responsibility was thus to the American state
and not its public.
By the following annual report, Chauncey seemed even more surefooted about his
nonprofit’s sense of mission. Likening the preceding year to a naval “’shakedown cruise,’”
Chauncey asserted that ETS had weathered the turmoil of consolidation and was geared to
engage in long-range planning—most notably, creating “an articulated series of test batteries,”
standardizing a useful system of scores and norms, and developing new types of aptitude and
personality tests.143 The nonprofit’s ambitions, the president declared, were crucial for American
vitality. To retain its strength, the United States had to “devise ways of utilizing the nation’s
human resources skillfully and with a minimum of wastage.”144 For this effort, Educational
Testing Service sought to develop a “census of human abilities.”145 Such a census would serve
as “an inventory of the characteristics required for the performance of important tasks,” and
“bring to light the aptitude areas in which our talent shortages are most critical and would
provide a basis for realistic planning on a nationwide scale, in peace or war.”146 By building off
of preexisting test batteries, Educational Testing Service could thus harness American
brainpower into the most effective pathways, regardless of geopolitical climate. This census of

143

Educational Testing Service, 1949-1950 Annual Report, 7,8.

144

Educational Testing Service, 1949-1950 Annual Report 11.

145

Ibid,

146

Ibid.

87

abilities—much like other national censuses—was not an instrument for Americans to
understand themselves, but for the American state to extract resources.
Sensing the frightening potential implications for a census of human abilities, Chauncey
softened this imagery by discussing the ideal uses for standardized testing. Chauncey assured
readers that standardized tests should not be “considered the end-all and be-all” for any course,
and that teachers should “not feel under compulsion to adapt their courses to the content of the
test.”147 Indeed, Chauncey asserted that “by providing teachers with folios of test items,” ETS
could provide teachers the choice (or at least, the semblance of choice) in testing material while
ensuring students would be assessed on a breadth of skills.148 Finding “the field of testing […]
exceedingly broad and the opportunities for ETS almost limitless,” Chauncey posed ETS’s
mission in urgent, optimistic, terms.149 Giving ETS the widest possible mandate—asserting “it is
appropriate for ETS to use its facilities in any situation where tests and related techniques can be
of assistance”—Chauncey staked the nonprofit’s mission as both educational and
governmental.150 This mission held faith that testing could “aid in the guidance of students and
in their self-understanding.”151 Students were not given tests in order to foster self-actualization,
but instead, to demonstrate their worth to the state: testing broadly and frequently, could help
channel youth into educational tracks, from elementary to post-secondary testing.
Educational Testing Service asserted its mission included measuring abstract skills useful
for both the classroom and the workplace, and by its second year, the organization began
147

Educational Testing Service, 1949-1950 Annual Report 12

148

Educational Testing Service, 1949-1950 Annual Report 13.

149

Educational Testing Service, 1949-1950 Annual Report, 14.

150

Ibid.

151

Ibid.

88

developing a battery of guidance tests for high school and college students that blurred the lines
between measuring academic and non-academic qualities. Building off existing standardized
tests, ETS aimed to create a battery for gauging “permanent aptitude and achievement factors,”
including typical examinations for “verbal, quantitative, spatial, mechanical, visualization, and
induction reasoning skills,” as well as tests for carefulness, “perceptual speed, finger dexterity,
eye-hand coordination, numerical computation, fluency of expression, [and] speed of
judgment.”152 ETS supplemented this quest for an omnibus guidance battery with plans to
design individual tests for aspiration, overstatement, and persistence. For these single-topic
exams, ETS detached concepts from strictly educational parameters, instead defining aspiration
as “the way an individual adjusts his goals following success and failure on various tasks,” and
persistence as the “tendency to continue a task despite monotony, fatigue, or discouragement.”153
As with the guidance battery, these exams focused less on students’ self-actualization than with
assessing their readiness for the labor market—for determining how well a young adult would
function within a workplace.
The Korean War heightened the relationship between federal defense objectives and
higher education institutions—and also confirmed ETS’s function as a broker for essential state
needs. Weeks after the war began, U.S. Commissioner of Education Earl J. McGrath sent letters
to higher education administrative officers, assuring them that, while the National Security
Resources Board had no set plans at the moment, advisory committees had already been
assembled to consider “the part education is to play in the present emergency.”154 By early
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August, Selective Service System Director Lewis Hershey drafted working guidelines for student
draft deferrals: men with at least sophomore standing who had planned to enroll for subsequent
coursework in a timely fashion, and whose “scholastic standing placed him among the upper half
of his class” qualified to have their enlistment in the armed forces postponed.155 But the
parameters for collegiate draft deferment, disseminated to higher education administrators in the
Defense Information Bulletin, continued to change throughout the early part of war, as the state
continued to recalculate which human resources were too vital to the American brainpower
needs to send into conflict.156 By September, 1950, the Selective Service expanded educational
deferment quotas to include “male optometry, premedical, preosteopathic, preveterinary,
preoptometry and predental students.”157 McGrath stressed such deferments were “an effort to
carry out the desire of the Congress to provide the fullest possible utilization of the Nation’s
technological, scientific, and other critical manpower resources.”158 Men in college—
particularly those on scientific fields of study—were a privileged class, as their trained skills
turned them into a valuable human resource necessary for American Cold War military efforts.
Standardized tests were central to how the state sought to preserve brainpower through
draft deferments. Psychologists argued that the Army General Classification Tests (AGCT),
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which had been designed to sort millions of men by intellectual capabilities during the Second
World War, could be used a template for determining which segments of the population would
be most useful to the nation as trained brains. As researchers maintained, those with the most
socially valuable careers—and presumably the greatest amount of brainpower—tended to score
in the uppermost level on the AGCT. Why not, then, administer a similar scholastic aptitude
exam to collegiate men to determine who should have their military induction postponed?159
This line of reasoning gained official state support after President Truman issued an executive
order in late March, 1951 authorizing the Director of Selective Service “to prescribe such
qualification test or tests as he may deem necessary” to ensure that a “registrant's activity in
study may be considered to be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or
interest.”160 Citing insufficient manpower reserves in comparison to Soviet capabilities, the
Selective Service believed it had to make the most of “our superiority in scientific and technical
know how” by using the “approximately 1,000,000 male, nonveteran students in colleges at
present” in the most efficient manner.161
The Selective Service entrusted Educational Testing Service with creating a flexible
sorting device that would maximize both military manpower and American brainpower. The
Selective Service asserted ETS was a trustworthy gatekeeper because it was a “nonprofit,
nonstick organization […which gave] more than 1,100,000 tests during a typical year,” many to
governmental agencies—in other words, it was already too big and too entwined in the workings
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of the state to avoid.162 On April 2, 1951, the Selective Service System announced ETS’s test for
determining which college men would receive deferments: the Selective Service College
Qualification Test (SSCQT). Rather than thin out college enrollments, ETS created the SSCQT
under the premise that most college men would possess a level of scholastic aptitude consistent
with average scores for college men on earlier standardized tests.163 By standardizing the
SSCQT for a general population, most draft-eligible college men would conceivably clear the
minimum threshold for academic deferment. What would fluctuate, then, was not the quality of
men in college but the degree to which the American state needed to trade off brainpower
development for military manpower demands. Although the considerable majority of collegiate
men were already ineligible for the draft—having served in the Second World War, disqualified
by their 4F qualification, or already bound to service through their enrollment in the Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps—the SSCQT standardized the level of brainpower the state deemed
worthy for postponing military service.164 Responding to criticism that this deferment system
undemocratically privileged a select few, U.S. Commissioner of Education Earl J. McGrath
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insisted the fairest treatment involved using “the services of each man at his own highest level of
competence.”165 By administering an exam with a threshold that could be raised or lowered
depending on military demands, the armed forces devised a method for the state to manage
brainpower as it did other vital national resources.
ETS familiarized college students and administrators with the logic of the SSCQT by
releasing an explanatory bulletin in advance of the first series of test dates. The bulletin
instructed men who hoped to qualify for deferment to detach and send a postcard application
(postage not included) to Princeton, New Jersey, complete with Selective Service Number and
preferred examination locations. ETS would then sent applicants an admission ticket, for which
men would sit for one of three test tests in May or June, 1951. ETS assured hopefuls that the
SSCQT examined their “ability to read with understanding and to solve new problems by using
[their] general knowledge,” foundational skills that were “necessary for success in fields which
require advanced training.”166 Because the company designed the SSCQT to measure scholastic
aptitude rather than any specific field of college-level learning, sample questions focused on the
ability to make inferences, draw comparisons, and summarize data. Because the textual content
in SSCQT questions was arbitrary to the actual skills tested, test candidates would find little
success mining reading passages and charts for later recall; the Armed Forces did not care
whether a man knew about ancient philosophers or earthquakes, but they did care whether he
could make sense of a short passage or grammar question involving some random topic. This
type of official preparatory material had to fulfill two seemingly contradictory roles: reduce
anxiety by assuring test-takers the exam measured overall thinking skills while, at the same time,
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suggesting that there was no way to cram for such a test. Such an approach to SSCQT test
familiarization, in which the test’s designers gave potential test-takers just enough practice for a
test one could not specifically practice for, would become the standard approach for test
designers over the following several decades.
The armed forces tempered their use of the SSCQT as the means for determining draft
deferments by also considering class rank. Collegiate men who tested poorly on the SSCQT but
ranked high enough in their class could qualify for a deferment. How well a man needed to rank
or test depended on his year in college. Because military officials presumed that graduate school
required considerably higher scholastic aptitude than undergraduate training, graduating college
seniors had to produce the highest SSCQT minimums for deferment. Freshmen, meanwhile,
needed better class standings for deferments, as most men who successfully completed their first
year of college tended to complete their degree: a deferment in this case would ensure a man had
a chance to develop and hone his brainpower uninterrupted. But since the correlation between
men’s class rankings and their SSCQT scores were not exact—many displayed higher scholastic
aptitude than their grades suggested, and others performed stronger in school that their test
scores predicted—this dual provision allowed far more draft-eligible collegiate men to qualify
for deferments. Except for the East South Central United States, at least 60 percent of drafteligible men qualified for deferments either by their class standing or SSCQT score; for men
majoring in engineering, physical sciences, mathematics, or biological sciences, the deferment
qualification rate was greater than 70 percent.167 Using class rank alongside SSCQT scores gave
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the armed forces greater latitude in preserving brainpower without discrediting the traditional
and more straightforward method of assessing academic achievement.
By providing a uniform measure for determining merit, the SSCQT helped the American
state reorient the relationship between education and civic duty. Because the number of men
suitable for military service was always much smaller than the millions of men legally required
to register for the draft, the armed forces had to reconsider the grounds upon which a man could
legitimately seek deferment. The underlying logic of educational deferments—that a man’s
education belonged to the nation before it belonged to him—made it easier for the state to back
away from paternity deferments, which placed a man’s family duties before his civic
responsibility. By allowing higher education deferments, the military could guarantee men with
demonstrable brainpower would not be squandered on the battlefield, all while avoiding
responsibility for the factors that prevented many black men and white southern men from
attaining such deferments. Advocates of educational deferments conceded that, of course, the
SSCQT or any other scholastic aptitude test would fail to detect all of the nation’s best
brainpower: American society had already shuttered many young men’s educational
opportunities.168 The solution to this broader brainpower problem, psychologists and
psychometrists maintained, was to design and administer many more tests.
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Test Early, Test Often: Guidance Counseling, Gifted Youth, and Scholarship Contests
Standardized testing gained traction at a moment when certain types of smartness came
under suspicion. Although intellectualism had long existed in friction with mainstream white
American society—which often extolled genius and ingenuity while maintaining an anti-elitist
political culture and evangelical popular culture—Cold War politics added additional rationale
for distrusting trained experts. Academics became objects of suspicion, and critics used the
image of the egghead as shorthand for intellectual fecklessness: too smart for his own good, too
caught up fussy theoretical details to see reality as it was, too fragile to get the work done
himself. In the fervid torrent of McCarthyist anticommunist rhetoric, expertise became linked to
femininity, homosexuality, blackness—and, above all, disloyalty. Brainpower, left unbridled,
could be used to disastrous ends. Standardized test developers insisted that their products could
be used to steer youth toward meaningful and productive lives in service to state and society. In
effect, standardized tests could create loyal experts. The trick, these developers maintained, was
ensuring school systems employed a robust testing program, so that guidance counselors
received steady objective information about their charges. By testing early and often, school
systems could cultivate a great deal of brainpower with enough built-in surveillance to allay the
fear talented students would turn into eggheads.169.
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Educationists encouraged guidance counselors to treat standardized testing as part of a
holistic approach for steering youth toward fulfilling careers and productive citizenship. Aiming
to quickly professionalize the growing national pool of school counselors, specialists created
guidebooks to counsel practitioners on testing methods. These books often advised guidance
counselors to learn foundational statistical concepts, as well as actually take the tests they
administered to students; without a working knowledge of aptitude tests or test design,
counselors could misuse aptitude test results to disastrous ends. Some guides even provided
readers case studies. One 1950 guide led readers through the extensive casework of two fictional
counselors. Using a combination of standardized tests and psychological insight, Miss Brandon
and Mr. Erlandson helped dozens of maladjusted young adults overcome their dysfunctions.
Whether guiding Charles to consider switching his engineering major to a pre-law track, or
referring Jane to a reading specialist to improve her poor grades, Miss Brandon and Mr.
Erlandson always incorporated results from standardized aptitude tests and vocational batteries
into their diagnoses. As such guidebooks suggested, standardized test batteries and
assessments—whether the Strong Vocational Interest Blank, Minnesota Vocational Test for
Clerical Workers, Bell Adjustment Inventory, Bennett Test of Mechanical Comprehension, or
Ruder Preference Record—provided insights that student’s grades or stated aspirations could not.
Through these guidebooks, specialists established the idea that millions of Chucks and Janes
were far more likely to find success and happiness when guidance counselors tempered their
professional opinions with the wisdom of test scores.170
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Gifted students, who had the most potential brainpower to give to the state but were most
prone to squander it, proved a particular obsession for guidance counselors, psychometric
researchers, and standardized test designers. The College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB),
one of the leading developers of academic standardized tests, collaborated with the National
Science Foundation (NSF) in 1955 to analyze how the American education system could reduce
the number of gifted and talented youth who avoided higher education. The resulting report,
Encouraging Scientific Talent, distanced intelligence from intellectualism: smart youth did not
have to grow up to become eggheads. Indeed, intellectual strength did not come at the cost of
other abilities. CEEB noted uncommonly bright individuals—whether speaking about, in their
terms, the categorically superior, intellectually gifted, or true geniuses—also typically possessed
greater emotional poise and physical strength than their average-minded peers. But, the board
warned, the talents of society’s most intelligent members also faded with age. Leaning on
previous studies that examined when people in mentally-demanding careers made their greatest
discoveries, CEEB suggested the American educational system kept scientifically-gifted
individuals in school too long to contribute to society as much as they could have if left to
progress through courses at their own pace. To CEEB, the gifted were precious social assets who
“contribute[d] more than their share to the welfare of society”—but only if allowed to
academically achieve.171 Whereas gifted youth with high levels of academic achievement
became “industrious, patient, honest, and conscientious” adults, those who did not reach college
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turned “autocratic, blustery, stubborn, and conceited.172” For CEEB, the bigger danger was not a
man with his nose in a book, but a legion of intelligent Americans soured by wasted potential.
To illustrate how many intelligent youth remained unmotivated and underserved by the
American educational system, CEEB built its findings on standardized models of intelligence.
Asserting “high intelligence is one of the most important requisites for a scientific career,”
CEEB employed several IQ models to calculate how few qualified Americans fulfilled their full
intellectual potential.173 Using the most generous existing estimates for academic giftedness—an
IQ of 125, with a model that estimated 6 percent of all young adults met or passed that
threshold—CEEB determined that about 130,000 people born in any given year had the mental
capability to attain a PhD. Yet just short of 9000 people had earned a doctorate in the 1953-1954
academic year. Unless those with stakes in the state of education made efforts to understand why
relatively few highly intelligent American youth achieved as much as they could, the United
States would continue to squander scientific brainpower.
To address these concerns, CEEB authorized a national standardized test and
questionnaire to determine American high school students’ level of scientific aptitude and
educational motivation. On behalf of CEEB, Educational Testing Service developed and
disseminated the National Study of High School Students and Their Plane to over 32,000
twelfth-grade students at nearly 500 American high schools in early 1955. The survey contained
two parts: a fifteen-minute, twenty question aptitude test, followed by a thirty-minute
questionnaire about college plans. The aptitude test contained statistically reliable math and
verbal questions from earlier Educational Testing Service examinations—and how well a student
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did on the first test determined whether Educational Testing Service would analyze the second.
Out of the entire pool of survey respondents, Educational Testing Service focused on roughly
9,700 who had answered at least twelve of the aptitude questions correctly, assessing these
students’ college plans to see what factors currently discouraged them from higher education.
For most high-scoring students, the cost of college remained a potential dissuading factor; over
half of all seniors reported that school expenses could keep them from pursuing higher
education. What the questionnaire also revealed, however, is that a great deal of high-performing
students, particularly boys, could be swayed toward pursuing a degree in science or engineering
if offered a scholarship. Based on this questionnaire, CEEB estimated that, among that year’s
1,265,000 public high school seniors, somewhere between 55,000 and 90,000 highly intelligent
youth would have attended college had scholarships been available.174 More damning was
CEEB’s calculation that an additional 100,000 capable high school seniors “with similar ability
lack the interest or motivation of college,” regardless of any potential award program.175 By
pegging its nationwide survey to a standardized test, however brief, CEEB standardized not only
the methods for diagnosing the cause of America’s brainpower shortage but also the prescribed
cure.
CEEB placed scholarships at the center of its final recommendations for boosting
American scientific brainpower—and, in doing so, redoubled its case for more wide-scale
standardized testing programs. For any national scholarship program to have any heft, CEEB
stressed, it must first be supported by “more widespread early identification and encouragement
of gifted students,” particularly if such monitoring would allow individuals to complete their
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education at an accelerated clip.176 Although the board did not provide a specific timetable for
tests, it noted that existing studies suggested aptitude and achievement tests could be successfully
used to scout scientific talent as early as the eighth or ninth grade.177 When paired with a
network of well-trained guidance counselors, standardized tests could ensure that the
scientifically and mathematical inclined are guided toward challenging classes.
Scholarships provided an ideal vehicle for promoting the complex joint partnership that
emerged in the early Cold War hunt for brainpower. Scholarships represented the idea that an
alliance between the public good and private interests was not just attainable, but ideal for
American education. Any widespread scholarship program would require schools supported by
federal and state funds, corporations willing to sponsor awards, and colleges and universities
eager to have their talent search brokered. Above all, a widespread scholarship program would
require all parties to accept the idea that the best minds could be scouted and sorted through a
system of standardized tests—that the students who received scholarships had already been
guided through their education by a series of standardized assessments and vetted for their award
by a series of standardized tests.
The entities that would run postwar standardized test-based scholarship programs thus
had to represent the interests of all stakeholders—public and private, corporate and academic—
without fully belonging to any. The most notable example of these efforts, the National Merit
Scholarship Corporation (NMSC), marked a shift in corporate educational philanthropy. By
sponsoring scholarship programs, corporations could indirectly invest in higher education while
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also promoting business interests. Scholarship competitions’ dependence on standardized tests
allowed corporate philanthropists to skirt around core economic and racial factors plaguing the
cultivation of American brainpower. These programs, in turn, influenced the meaning of
democracy in discussions of postwar American higher education. Meritocratic language and
logic—in which standardized test scores represented a student’s investment risk rather than
reflected systemic shortcomings—helped reinforce the idea of educational attainment as an
individual effort. Within the logic of corporate scholarship programs, some students may have
needed a leg up to attend college, but their test scores proved they already had the brainpower
required for success.
Corporate scholarship programs did exist before the Cold War, including contests geared
to promote collegiate scientific study among talented youth. These programs typically involved a
single corporation having a direct role in the funding and selection of award recipients. One
notable example, the Westinghouse Science Talent Search, was a large-scale production
involving a giant corporation (Westinghouse Electric), its philanthropic wing (the Westinghouse
Educational Foundation), and a nonprofit that carried out testing operations (Science Search).
Westinghouse and Science Search launched the talent hunt in 1942, awarding scholarships to 40
high school students who displayed uncommon ingenuity, innovation, and workmanship—
characteristics that could be made profitable through advanced scientific training. Before
winning these scholarships, however, students first took a science aptitude test, conducted by
Science Service and administered to participants through officially sanctioned extracurricular
science clubs. This two and one-half hour aptitude test included questions on engineering,
anatomy, biology, chemistry (“Which of the following is not a use of the mineral quartz?”),
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science history, spatial visualization, and reading comprehension.178 Science Service encouraged
students to work through sample test questions printed in its publication Science News-Letter,
even including an address to request the most recent Science Talent Search exam. Because the
aptitude test had been designed to never elicit a perfect score, even by actual scientists, the
organization felt no risk letting high school students toying with sample questions. Through the
Science Talent Search, which it continued to sponsor throughout and beyond the Cold War,
Westinghouse set a template for corporate scholarship funding. By relying on third-party
aptitude test designers, companies could promote the shared interests of business and science
while keeping the upfront cost of promoting talented youth to a relative minimum.179 The public
relations boon these annual searches generated for Westinghouse (and for advanced scientific
training in general) greatly outweighed the cost of the actual scholarship, all while establishing
standardized testing as a key method for quickly determining the very best in the talent pool.
Large-scale scholarship programs truly took off, however, when third-party developers
promised to coordinate talent hunts on behalf of multiple corporations for the general promotion
of higher education. Created in September 1955, the National Merit Scholarship Corporation
(NMSC) provided the means for corporations to centralize their educational philanthropy.
NMSC emerged from the joint efforts of the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation, which
together contributed millions of dollars for scholarship funds and administrative costs. Upon its
creation, NMSC immediately became “the largest independent scholarship program in the
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history of American education.”180 NMSC’s initial Board of Directors reflected an aim to
portray the interests of higher education as those of big business, with presidents of Dartmouth,
NYU, and the University of Colorado sitting alongside those of Goldman Sash, Standard Oil,
and Detroit Edison Company. To incentivize businesses participation, NMSC appropriated 8 of
its initial $20.5 million in seed money toward corporate and individual donation-matching funds.
Corporations who contributed to NMSC’s funds could retain naming rights for their scholarships
while benefitting from an outsourced “professionally conducted national annual talent search.”181
Sears, Roebuck & Company became an early corporate sponsor, offering over a half-million
dollars for 100 Sears Foundation Merit Scholarships designed to cover a complete undergraduate
education; Time, Inc. and other corporate entities soon followed suit.182 Some companies, such
as the Stewart-Warner Corporation and General Foods Corporation, teamed with National Merit
to provide scholarships for specific paths of study—mechanical and electrical engineering in the
case of the former and physical sciences in the latter.183
The two organizations that initially funded NMSC shared a belief that business could
help solve the problems plaguing American education, particularly where state and society fell
short. Despite venturing into education-related projects only at the beginning of the decade, the
Ford Foundation found its sense of mission in what it perceived as inadequate federal
educational support. The Foundation asserted the federal budget—which apportioned just 2.4%
of the gross national product to education—was wholly inadequate, especially at a moment when
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the number of children in American schools continued to grow with no projected end in sight.
Even the most conservative demographic estimates indicated twice as many Americans would be
enrolled in college between 1966 and 1971 than were enrolled in 1954—leaping from 2.5 to at
least 5 million people—yet no long-term nationwide plans existed to expand the pool of
American teachers and professors. Those who attended college would likely encounter
professors whose wages, when adjusted for inflation, were lower in the mid-1950s than just
before World War II.184 To the Ford Foundation, a decentralized educational system could not
operate without some form of guardianship.
To the Carnegie Corporation, far too many discussions about postwar education started
from the misguided assumption that anyone who could go to college, should go to college. The
organization maintained that this problem stemmed from a widespread superficial understanding
of the relationship between intelligence and college readiness. College administrators and
educational specialists had debated over the IQ needed for likely college success—108? 110?
120?—without giving much attention to the actual logic of probability. A young woman with an
IQ of 115 may have been in the upper fifth of intelligence among the general population, but her
heightened capabilities did not necessarily guarantee that she would eagerly complete her
studies, or know exactly what field she wanted to pursue, or even want to go to college in the
first place. Likewise, a man with an IQ of 80 was far less likely than the average college-goer to
complete his studies, but intelligence test scores alone did not account for the multiple traits
needed to successfully earn a degree. In either case, focusing too much on the likelihood
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someone with a certain IQ would complete college got in the way of actually “selecting those
who can profit most from college.”185
The Carnegie Corporation maintained that most criticism of contemporary education fell
into a logical trap of confusing growing social expectations with genuine social good. Those who
espoused equal educational opportunity often carried “the tendency arbitrarily to define college
as a valuable experience”; insisting most people could use extended training, particularly
vocational instruction, siphoned resources away from bright youth who would benefit from the
type of liberal arts education that once served as the foundation of all higher ed.186 Unless
experts and advocates carefully balanced the need to train more young adults with the need to
provide a rich and challenging education, other social forces and stakeholders would strip
American higher education of its greatest potential good. Without any examination of the issues
colleges and educators faced, the United States risked “a lowering of intellectual standards, the
smothering of individuality, and the assembly-line production of half-educated men and
women.”187 As the corporation warned, a thoughtless approach to national higher education
would create an “enthronement of the ‘average’”—and only encourage democracy’s worst
tendencies.188
NMSC used standardized testing as its basis for scouting, assessing, and rewarding
academic talent. To determine who would ultimately receive a National Merit scholarship, the
corporation first proportionally allocated the number of scholarships available by state. The
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corporation directed each participating school—over 10,000 in the competition’s first year—to
allow the top 5 percent of its senior class to take a screening test. The corporation then used the
results from this screening test to pare down the applicant pool to ten times the number of
available scholarships. These remaining students were then invited to take the SAT. Based on
semifinalists’ SAT scores, NMSC selected a pool of finalists—and after collecting their
biographical information, school grades, and recommendations, the corporation decided who
would receive an award.189 From the 58,000 students who participated in the initial talent hunt,
NMSC chose nearly 5,100 semifinalists and granted 555 National Merit Scholarships.190
NMSC’s approach to awarding scholarships normalized standardized testing by making it a
participatory, incentive-driven activity that revealed more to colleges than academic and
biographical information could alone.
Although the corporation used test scores to determine who received scholarships, the
actual amount of the scholarship depended on the perceived need of the student. Whereas some
students received full coverage for four years of tuition and expenses, others received
considerably smaller stipends. In either case, the corporation made payments to colleges and
universities rather than to the students.191 By making the institution the point at where education
was subsidized, the corporation also increased the incentive for universities to get on board with
the program. Schools would not have to pay out of pocket to receive the best and the brightest,

189

“News of Science—National Merit Science Program,” Science 122, no. 3168 (September 16, 1955):

508.
190

“Merit Scholarships,” Science 123, no. 3195 (March 23, 1956): 499; “NMSC History and Facts,”
National Merit Scholarship Corporation website,
http://www.nationalmerit.org/s/1758/interior.aspx?sid=1758&gid=2&pgid=451 (last accessed August 3, 2016).
191

“Merit Scholarship Corporation,” Science 125, no. 3249 (April 5, 1957) 639-640.

107

thus encouraging them to participate in the program and, in time, actively spend resources on
courting national merit finalists.
While some early Cold War scholarship programs seemed to promote vastly different
agendas than the National Merit program, many used standardized testing to reward students
who, with college training, could boost American prowess while strengthening conservative
social relations. Beginning in 1955, General Mills Foods administered the Betty Crocker
Homemaker of Tomorrow Scholarship program, which aimed to “to focus national attention on
the so-called ‘forgotten career’ of homemaking.”192 Like the National Merit program, the Betty
Crocker Scholarship used a standardized test—in this case, a 50-minute, 150-question multiplechoice exam—to determine winners at statewide and national levels. By providing young women
the means to pursue college studies that would promote the science of homemaking, the Betty
Crocker Scholarship pursued an objective similar to other corporate scholarship providers:
harnessing brainpower to place men and women in positions that would ensure constant
American progress with minimal social friction. Corporations used their scholarships to improve
existing social structures—never to dismantle them.
Even so, some women awarded Betty Crocker scholarships didn’t conform to the social
expectations they believed these prizes symbolized. Many women (including Massachusetts
Senator and 1966 Betty Crocker scholarship recipient Elizabeth Warren) recalled the scholarship
program as a pragmatic means to get into college when other methods weren’t possible, even if
they had no personal interest educational experience in home economics. As with those teens
who did well on the SAT, some of the women recalled simply being good at standardized tests.
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Their test savvy proved the key to success, suggesting that standardized scholarship tests not
only rewarded those who showed promise in a particular field of knowledge, but also those
whose cleverness revealed a different, albeit unintentional, set of abilities. Although some
corporate scholarship programs used standardized tests to help reinforce a particular worldview,
many young Americans used the tests as an opportunity to springboard to a different,
untraditional life path.193
Realizing their award recipients could be treated as an unparalleled data set, the National
Merit Corporation tracked the life paths of its earliest award recipients in order to see if their
scholarships allowed the gifted to reach their greatest potential. In 1968, the organization
released a study on the educational trajectories of its first two cohorts of scholarship recipients.
Even among these men and women—ostensibly the most gifted young adults the nation had to
offer in the mid-1950s—educational disparities persisted. Eight years after receiving National
Merit scholarships, 6 percent of men had yet to receive a bachelor’s degree, and another 13
percent had completed yet to complete any graduate work. Although these rates of college
completion were drastically higher than the national average, the corporation mined into the
backgrounds of award recipients to see what factors prevented these men and women from
advanced studies—in other words, what issues were beyond the company’s responsibility.
193
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Among women who received National Merit scholarships in 1956 and 1957, nearly one-third had
yet to advance beyond undergraduate work by 1964. Gender cross-cut socioeconomic patterns:
women who received scholarships typically came from better-educated families than men in their
cohort, but women who continued onto advanced studies received considerably higher stipends
than those who didn’t—a pattern reversed among men. Whereas women who left their studies to
become homemakers overwhelmingly indicated a desire to continue school, the several dozen
men who had yet to receive a bachelors degree “appeared to have relatively more than their fair
share of emotional problems.”194 Through this longitudinal data, the Corporation was able to
hold 95% as a natural statistical limit for the proportion of National Merit recipients who would
complete college, all while posing broader social forces as the quirks of individuals and their
families. The corporation remained as concerned with mitigating responsibility for scholarship
recipients’ failure to achieve full their potential as it was with measuring what, exactly, a student
could achieve after receiving the sudden advantage of a National Merit scholarship.
Critics lambasted the National Merit Scholarship competition and similar businessbacked talent hunts for their perpetuation of class and racial inequities. Mapping the location of
National Merit winners in several states, educationist Horace Mann Bond concluded that award
recipients did not reflect the truest peak of young America’s talent but simply the brightest
among whites of some considerable means. As Bond argued, the scholarship company ignored
the sociocultural and economic factors that would allow well-educated middle-class white
children to succeed. By allocating scholarships on a state-by-state basis, National Merit did
nothing to discourage policies that limited educational equity for blacks and poor whites—and
by maintaining the scholarship was awarded on the basis of talent, only reinforced the idea that
194
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blacks were inherently less intelligent that their white counterparts. This idea would gain even
more steam, Bond feared, as federal programs aimed to replicate the National Merit model of
nationwide scholarship programs allocated on a state-by-state basis. Bond insisted the same
results for a national talent-search could be achieved by using a different “‘diving rod’ for
‘talent’”195: the average number of working toilets per household. For Bond, the competition
“might better be called ‘States Rights, Upper Class’ Scholarships”—a criticism that did not
disappear as the corporation attempted to highlight talented African-American youth through the
National Achievement Scholarship program. 196
Other critics of the National Merit program believed standardized testing would stifle
society by relying on an overly narrow idea of talent. Analyzing the limitations of his own field,
psychologist David McClelland maintained existing standardized testing devices were only
equipped to measure ”academic excellence, skill in taking examinations, in following
instructions and finding solutions to problems set by others.”197 Although this type of ability was
needed for success in higher education, McClelland worried the growth of educational testing
would only encourage Americans’ fondness for conformity. Widespread conformity would, in
turn, discourage other kinds of extracurricular intelligence vital for American vitality, such as
curiosity and entrepreneurism. For such critics, standardized testing programs stifled what higher
education could provide by reducing talent to a specific quantifiable psychological concept.
Scholarship competitions—and the language of merit—offered a way for corporations to
help individuals’ chances of attending college without ever having to disrupt or challenge the
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forces that kept many groups outside of the winner’s circle. More than the rhetoric of the
educational elite, the language of merit reflected the way corporations approached postwar
educational philanthropy: the best prospects would make themselves apparent, and would
succeed with the right investment. These scholarship programs reinforced the idea that
standardized tests made excellent sorting devices, easily making clear the vast majority of
applicants who merited no genuine attention while also revealing the very few with superlative
aptitude and abilities. Although these programs used biographical information and school grades
to make their final decision, this data always followed the test scores: one’s identity was always a
supplement to one’s numbers. Test designers and scholarship funders often acknowledged—and
in their philanthropic capacity, tried to undo—trenchant socioeconomic disparities, but many
scholarship programs often failed to account for those discrepancies when considering award
winners. The logic of merit, that the best students would receive the best training, reconciled the
gaps between the narrow abilities the tests measured, the brainpower demands corporate
philanthropists aimed to satisfy, and cultural clout bestowed upon young adults who received a
college scholarship. Merit presented the sense that test-takers arrived at an examination at a level
playing field: after all, if tests measured aptitudes, there’s a limit to what accounting for external
social differences could accomplish.
Sputnik and the Federal Embrace of Testing
It would take a geopolitical space crisis to fully cement standardized testing as a statesanctioned educational practice for promoting talent. Over the course of several weeks in late
1957, the Soviet Union launched two artificial satellites into the earth’s atmosphere. These two
artificial moons, Sputnik I and Sputnik II, sparked widespread concern over how the United
States had fallen behind in technological supremacy. Americans used the surprise of the satellites
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to probe how their national education system had failed to provide their children adequate
training. The federal legislative response to the sputniks—the National Defense Education Act of
1958—set a precedent for the type of intervention the federal government would make in
educational agendas. In the process of codifying which testing programs it would support, the
federal government also delineated its limited responsibility for the shape of American science
education.
The sputniks drove American educationists, corporate leaders, and technical experts into
a fit of introspection: How had American science fallen short? Pundits pointed to several
systemic causes for American scientific shortcomings. In its comparison of American and Soviet
education systems, General Electric blamed a widespread educational “doctrine of
permissiveness” within a society that placed more emphasis on consumer spending patterns than
educational expenditures.198 Atomic scientist John Dunning argued in a New York Times essay
that, although “the Government cannot legislate scientists into being,” it had to move beyond
“the conference-and-cliché method of planning policies” if United States were to ever outpace
the Soviet Union.199 As the president of the New Jersey Education Association deduced, the
Soviet satellites represented the American educational system’s long-term failure to build a corps
of trained experts:
“‘It is not hard—just a little less comfortable—to say we could
rather have two American sputniks in the air that two cars in every
garage.’[…]’But two sputniks in the air are the result of 2,000 or
200,000 scientists in their laboratories. And scientists are made in
elementary schools, as well as colleges.’”200
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To determine how well American education stacked up against that of its main rival, the
National Science Foundation (NSF) conducted its own study of the Soviet education system in
the mid-1950s. Using available Soviet statistics and refugee reports, the NSF examined the full
breadth and evolution of the Soviet schooling from the early Stalinist era to the immediate postStalin moment. What set American and Soviet schooling apart, the foundation argued, were
fundamentally different ideological beliefs about the relationship between education, society, and
the state. Whereas American education prioritized humanities-heavy “training for the realization
of the full capabilities of an individual,” the Soviet system valued a centralized “service-to-thestate” model that created scientists and engineers who fulfilled the state’s research agenda.201
Soviet scientific work, by extension, involved demonstrating and applying known scientific
truths rather than challenging conventional wisdom or posing feasible alternative explanations
for observed reality. The Soviet state instilled these core scientific and educational values
through its polytechnic model for compulsory schooling, which mirrored Marxism’s opposition
to the division of labor by training youth both mentally and physically. By valuing “productive
work as an integral part of training,” polytechnic education offered the promise of immersive,
integrative science instruction at every level of education.202 Even when Soviet schools fell short
of what polytechnic education promised—which happened often, the NSF insisted—they
instilled a political imperative for scientific study from an early age.
Yet, the NSF warned against placing too much emphasis on the role of communist
ideology in Soviet education. Focusing squarely on socialist indoctrination obscured the Soviet
state’s primary aim to use education as a means for rapid industrialization. To assume Soviet
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youth wholeheartedly believed the ideological aspects of their schooling would ignore an
obvious reason for pursuing a career in the sciences: social prestige. Scientific careers offered
better guarantees of higher wages and social comfort, albeit at the cost of enduring additional
propaganda. By centrally managing job placement and benefits, the Soviet Union had
inadvertently created an incentive system for occupational prestige divorced from overt MarxistLeninist rhetoric: the state will reward the brightest with the best jobs, so long as they remained
loyal. Whether or all young adults sincerely believed the promises of the socialism, the Soviet
state had created an education-occupation network that, above all, valued the production of
scientists.
As the NSF determined, both the American and Soviet educational systems possessed
particular strengths for producing scientists and engineers, creating a virtual dead heat in
brainpower production. Although the Soviet Union had far fewer young adults in its higher
education system—the revolution hadn’t truly unmoored the peasantry from its rural agricultural
base—proportionally far more Soviet students completed university studies in sciences and
engineering than their American counterparts. While American students completed two more
years of compulsory schooling than Soviet youth, they spent considerably less classroom time
learning science and mathematics, a pattern even more pronounced when comparing each
country’s collegiate programs for scientific studies. As a whole, American youth were more
educated while Soviet youth had more proficiency in specific fields. Vastly different approaches
to public education left the United States and Soviet Union fairly evenly matched by the middle
of the twentieth century, and American educational policy choices would determine “whether
within the next decade or so the scales will be tipped off balance.”203 Hesitate and be left behind.
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Businessmen also staked in interest on where American brainpower fell short. During the
mid-1950s, scientists, technologists, and psychologists from CalTech researched the potential
drain humanity would place on resources over the next several generations. The team presented
their findings to dozens of corporate executives and publishing their study in 1957. The
published report, ominously titled The Next Hundred Years, made clear where the United States
should focus its efforts for resource preservation: shoring up the massive erosion of potential
scientists and engineers caused by premature dropouts. As the CalTech experts argued, American
brainpower shortages didn’t stem from a low proportion of science and engineering majors, but
from steep drop-offs at every stage of education. For every 100 students who entered grade
school, the researchers observed, only 59 graduated high school and just 20 entered college. The
13 young adults who completed a college degree—even the 3 who earned science and
engineering degrees—did not reflect all the “technical brainpower” the United States could
offer.204 “Educational attrition” took away between one-half and two-third of those capable of
completing college, all while the Soviet Union produced scientists and engineers at twice the rate
of the United States.205
Despite the vast room for improvement, the experts behind The Next Hundred Years
warned of the political limits to brainpower development. The nation could not follow the Soviet
Union’s path to scientific prestige. Rigorous compulsory science education and state-managed
job markets would boost the United States’ pool of trained brains, but would ultimately prevent
“a world where people can lead lives of abundance and creativity within the framework of a free
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society.”206 The authors insisted the United States could undo its impending science deficit
simply by plugging in gaps where capable youth left school. By their calculations, American
schools and businesses could jointly expand national technical brainpower by a factor of eight
before approaching any natural population limits. By identifying how and when students become
discouraged from advanced studies, private enterprise could devise ways to encourage
structurally disadvantaged youth into participating in the American marketplace of ideas.
To make the case that the United States possessed far more potential technical
brainpower than it actually employed, the authors of The Next Hundred Years defined
intelligence and ability through standardized testing models. Researchers used Army General
Classification Test score distributions to illustrate the rate of educational attrition between high
school and college. Asserting AGCT scores were roughly equivalent to individuals’ IQ scores,
the authors drew several conclusions about untapped American brainpower. Even though AGCT
score for college graduates was 120, far less than half of the population with that level of
aptitude completed higher education. An even smaller fraction of Americans with the average
aptitude found in science and engineering graduates pursued such studies. Such a steep drop-off
wasn’t a natural phenomenon, the authors insisted, but the inevitable result of a secondary school
system that employed unqualified math and science teachers while neglecting to guide talented
youth toward challenging coursework. Addressing the dearth of women scientists and
engineers—a gender gap far more pronounced in the United States than in the Soviet Union—
could effectively double American technical brainpower. By leaning on standardized test score
models, researchers could identify social causes for squandered American brainpower, and in
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doing so, emphasized the United States was not destined for second place so long as it genuinely
managed its human resources.207
The Eisenhower Administration, meanwhile, anticipating the following year’s midterm
election, leveraged the shock of the sputniks against the ongoing desegregation crisis in Little
Rock, Arkansas. Despite initially aiming to keep the integration of Central High School outside
of partisan politics—indeed, being sour to the idea of educational desegregation in itself—
Eisenhower hoped to use Little Rock as a symbol for the Democratic Party’s inability to
understand the United States’ role in the postwar world. Being caught unawares by the sputniks
may have been bad, but Democrats’ willingness to flaunt judicial rulings only helped create
scenarios that played to Communists’ strength. A party that pledged to cut taxes while resisting
integration, the administration warned, failed to understand the depths of America’s scientific
shortcomings as well as the impact images of white resistance would have in newly independent
unaligned nonwhite nations. As Vice President Richard Nixon warned, the sputniks were not “‘a
scientific stunt’” but a sign that the federal government, under continued Republican leadership,
needed to aid the development of American scientific brainpower.208
Proclaiming “a severe blow—some would say a disastrous blow—[had] been struck at
America’s self-confidence and at her prestige in the world,” The Congressional Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare held a series of hearings during the first three months of 1958 to
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consider how the federal government should revise its approach to scientific education
support.209 Throughout the hearings, senators grappled with the boundaries of the federal
government’s responsibility for education. Whereas South Carolina Senator and virulent
segregationist Strom Thurmond routinely used his time to insist the federal government had no
authority in the state of American education—the word “education,” after all, appeared nowhere
in the Constitution—others on the committee were more interested in finding a line for federal
involvement without breaching traditional local authority. The solution, many witnesses testified,
would include merit-based scholarships for promoting science education and funds for helping
states develop widespread standardized testing and guidance programs. As Health, Education,
and Welfare Secretary Marion Folsom argued, providing matching funds for state testing
programs would allow communities to better guide youth through school in ways that served
local needs and upheld local values. To Folsom, the idea that federal assistance for identifying
and supporting talented youth would lead to centrally dictated education was “a groundless fear
of an imaginary danger.”210 The secretary also assured the committee that a national scholarship
program would be a better use of federal funds than an extensive educational loan program;
merit-based awards would “put a little more prestige in the intellectual level of achievement” and
stimulate college attendance among talented youth more fruitfully than any model for economic
redistribution.211 Through these hearings, Congress aimed to settle on an approach that would
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change the shape of American science education without triggering suspicions of federal
intervention or social control.
The resulting National Defense Education Act (NDEA) cemented this middling federal
approach, ensuring that the government would not interfere in the content of instruction while
also setting an agenda and incentives that would inevitably alter the shape of American
education. Within this environment—neither radically transformed nor structurally untouched—
standardized testing thrived. Title V of NDEA not only provided explicit provisions for testing,
but also promoted a national educational environment that would give greater weight to
standardized testing. Title V allocated state educational agencies sixty million dollars over a
four-year period “to assist them to establish and maintain programs of testing and guidance and
counseling.”212 States were eligible to receive funds if they developed testing programs for
public school secondary school students that would “identify students with outstanding aptitudes
and abilities,” the results from which would them be used by guidance programs to steer
exceptional youth into demanding college-preparatory high school coursework.213 The title also
provided an additional 28 million dollars for colleges to design guidance and counselor training
programs, so that those working in secondary schools could better steer their charges toward
nationally meaningful life paths. When combined with NDEA’s other provisions—hundreds of
millions for student loans, grants for states for science equipment, and a new National Defense
Fellowship graduate study program, among others—Title V cemented a general approach to
scouting talent, in which standardized testing programs would help satisfy national needs without
breaching traditional educational authority or embedded discriminatory behavior.
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Sensing the guidance provisions allowed by Title V would confuse laypeople, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) eventually published a primer for parents,
teachers, and administrators explaining the basics of educational testing. The Department
stressed that any testing program was “not an end in itself, but rather a valuable tool” guidance
counselors and educators could use to adjust youth toward ideal paths of study and lines of
work.214 The booklet advised those without technical expertise to adopt a moderate opinion of
testing: neither the cure for all society’s ills nor a pseudoscientific racket. Instead, the department
assured readers that, when designed correctly, standardized objective tests were devices for
making reasonable judgments about a person’s behavior or ability to perform. Good standardized
tests went through an extensive construction process—with designers drafting several times as
many test questions as would appear on the final version, and publishers arranging numerous
experimental administrations in order to actually standardize a test. A well-constructed
standardized test ideally targeted a very specific, clearly delineated skill set. As the department
suggested, trained guidance professional would never use results from one standardized test to
make judgments about a student’s other capabilities, nor use a single standardized test score to
project a student’s entire educational and employment future. Rather, the department stressed,
standardized tests should be seen as an integral part of a student’s cumulative record, which
would ideally “begin with information about the pupil before he enters school and continue until
he has been our of high school at least 5 years.”215 As school districts began to adjust to Title V’s
provisions, HEW aimed to convince parents and teachers that the best approach to standardized
testing was to use many, many more tests.
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While the federal government promoted the benefit of comprehensive standardized
testing programs to parents and teachers, the College Board sought to deepen its relationship
with colleges and students. Ironically, the organization did so by first encouraging college
officials to deemphasize the role standardized test scores played in admissions decisions.
CEEB’s aim was not to lessen the importance of its exams in college admissions, but to heighten
their value by stressing their technical limitations. The SAT and College Board achievement
exams scores were only truly useful admissions tools when used alongside high school grades,
and when treated more like a range than an exact measurement of educational aptitude.216 CEEB
also decided to grant colleges permission to disclose test scores to students for the first time. The
move, effective for all scores after December 1958, seemed to be a way to placate students’
curiosity while pressuring schools not to use secret test scores as a convenient way to maintain
racially segregated campuses.217 By 1959, the organization developed a new standardized test
specifically for high school juniors: the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test (PSAT). The
College Board maintained the PSAT would “give the junior a forecast of his senior-year
performance on the [SAT],” and encourage him to make better-reasoned college plans sooner.218
CEEB stressed, however, that the new test would not make high school juniors familiar enough
with the format of aptitude tests to game the system, as only senior-level courses provided the
mathematical and verbal material needed to noticeable raise scores. The organization instead
suggested that college hopefuls may as well familiarize themselves with the SAT with a
preliminary version of the exam because, by its own projections, all degree-granting colleges
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would require some sort of entrance examination before the end of the next decade.219 For the
College Board, standardized admissions tests were becoming nearly unavoidable—and if higher
education was increasingly pegged to the idea of successful citizenship, then preliminary and
supplementary standardized tests could only help students adjust their ambitions accordingly.
Well before the Eisenhower administration responded to Sputnik, the federal government,
extra-governmental educational organizations, and corporations began building a network
dedicated to catching the United States’ brightest youth and steering them toward scientific and
engineering careers that would secure American geopolitical supremacy. Sputnik did not spark a
commitment to science and mathematics so much as solidify the direction multiple stakeholders,
both private and public, took in harnessing brainpower for geopolitical ends. Scholarship
programs allowed corporations to use standardized tests to cull talent while promoting the merits
of American capitalism. Standardized testing also allowed the federal government to dodge
accusations of centralization at a moment when some alleged it had superseded traditional local
control for education. Rather than restructure U.S. education, standardized testing became the
netting that bound all vested parties together. Where the rhetoric of American democratic
brainpower fell short, standardized testing provided a convenient solution.
Although standardized test designers noted the limited statistical usefulness of their
products, they also developed a rhetoric that stressed standardized testing could create
tremendous social good. The more popular standardized testing became, the more opportunities
arose for students, parents, educators, administrators and policymakers to draw from this
psychometric optimism and make outsized conclusions about what standardized tests meant and
measured. These tensions between expert, layperson, and corporate understandings of what
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standardized tests could do created an educational culture in which standardized tests easily
became associated with bigger political and cultural forces. Test scores became shorthand for an
individual’s worth to the state and the quality of American brainpower: a symbol for the fate of
the America’s future. What became difficult to accept for many, then and now, was the basis by
which educational aptitude was defined. If standardized tests measured natural talent, then the
United States had failed to steer the majority of its brightest youth into college. But if
standardized tests measured the skills that came from years of schooling, then test scores
provided clear proof of how deeply racial and class inequities shaped social educational
disparities. Despite experts’ specific understanding of test validity and reliability, aptitude
remained a slippery concept—and one the public would continue to invest with multiple, oftencontradictory meanings.
The use of standardized testing as a means for harnessing brainpower persists—but, more
frequently, international standardized tests have served as way for Americans to fret over
whether their youth will maintain geopolitical preeminence through scientific innovation. The
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issues a multi-subject
standardized test to hundreds of thousands of students in several dozen countries every three
years. Along with other capabilities, the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)
gauges the complex mathematic and scientific problem-solving skills of teenagers in
participating member countries. Although the United States spends disproportionately more
money on students than most other PISA participant countries, American students continually lag
behind their Asian and European counterparts on the math and science portions of the
standardized test. While the geopolitical dimension of PISA scores remains less tightly bound to
any particular state—Estonia, Singapore, or Finland seem far less threatening than the Soviet
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Union did—the fear remains that American brainpower is withering on the vine.220 So, too,
remains Americans’ faith that standardized tests can help them make sense of their place in the
world.
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CHAPTER THREE: MAPPING MARGINAL MEN: STANDARDIZED TESTING
AS A FORM OF RACIAL SOCIAL CONTROLIN THE POSTWAR STATE
Race is a defining feature of American society, but its persistence as a categorical marker
for social disparity is too often attributed primarily to the misdeeds of individual actors. Race, by
this circular logic, depends upon the racism harbored by racists. The burden of proof for the
presence of racism thus becomes whether or not a person openly admits that racial ideology
fueled their actions, thereby turning racialized motivation into incomprehensible malice. When
unmoored from their socioeconomic bases, race and racism thus seem analytically impenetrable:
ineffable mysteries only combatable through the politics of affect. Yet what fuels the usefulness
of race as a hierarchal system for social sorting—and, in turn, gives currency to racial ideology
and racist actions—are the institutions and organizations that give nation-states a sense of
continuity and legitimacy. State-sanctioned structures carry out projects that entrench and justify
racial difference in everyday life, and give anchorage to the various ways groups and individuals
make their own versions of racial meaning. At each level, racial ideology shapes a reality in
which the fact of race is self-evident. The tension that keeps race afloat is thus not between fact
and fantasy—ideology creates its own logic—but between the conservative impulse of the
nation-state and the profound flexibility and variety in individuals’ racial interpretations.221
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The salience of race persists even when the state has backed away from overtly racial
policies. This persistence occurs because the state depends upon technologies—such as
standardized testing—that are built upon and contribute to racialized frameworks for
understanding ability and social utility. Postwar institutional desegregation was one such
moment in which the state abandoned racist policies while maintaining the racialized technology
of standardized testing. Over a several-year period following the Second World War, the United
States Armed Forces integrated its troops, marking one crucial early moment in the dismantling
of legal racial segregation within American institutions. Certain branches—namely the Army—
underwent more extensive overhauls of their race-based personnel management policies. In
addition to gradually integrating its troops, the Army also abandoned restrictions to the amount
of black soldiers within its ranks at any given time. After a year of consistent pressure from
President Harry Truman’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services, Army leaders agreed to abandon this racial quota. In its place, the Army adopted a
quota based on the Armed Forces’ standardized aptitude entrance exam: the General
Classification Test (GCT). By replacing the racial quota with a GCT quota, policymakers used
standardized testing to forge a postwar social order that, on the surface, prioritized ability over
race—but in effect used standardized testing as a means to avoid disrupting too much of the
existing white supremacist social order. By allowing some viable channel for deeper black
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participation in the armed forces, however limited, the Truman Administration could satisfy its
aim to integrate and modify the military without creating too much discontent within military
leadership at a vital moment in American statecraft. These actions would set a precedent for the
postwar state, in which standardized testing would continue to use as a seemingly race-neutral
device that nonetheless reinforced the perception that black men were marginally useful to both
state and society.
Racial Ideology, the GCT, and Desegregation
The ways in which the American state mobilized for World War Two and sorted men for
military service depended upon psychologists’ ability to maximize manpower within prevailing
racial ideology. Although the Selective Service Act of 1940 established a superficially
nondiscriminatory draft policy—establishing quotas only for geographic divisions—the Army
carried out white-only drafts in many regions, and continued to segregate its forces even after
public pressure from black journalists and political leaders compelled the Roosevelt
Administration to make several administrative concessions. Military segregation endured even
after Executive Order 8802 prohibited defense industry workplace discrimination, an order made
effective when black women pressured federal agencies and labor unions to ensure
manufacturing corporations did not weasel out of nondiscriminatory hiring practices. Throughout
the war, the American state used the language of manpower to thread the logic in which
nondiscrimination policies and segregationist practices could occur simultaneously.222
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During the war, psychologists and Army leaders amassed a tremendous amount of data
about men’s military usefulness by subjecting millions of incoming recruits to the Army General
Classification Test (GCT). For the Army, GCT data became a useful tool for valorizing
American democratic principles in contrast to Axis racial ideology. In an omnibus report on
black soldiers, the Army Service Forces’ Military Training Division asserted that assumptions of
black Americans’ mental inferiority premised on the Army Alpha and Beta test data were not
only scientifically unsound but also reminiscent of the very fascistic rhetoric the United States
was currently combatting. In the ensuing quarter-century, the Army asserted, testing devices had
improved, and the GCT provided “ a quick and reasonable dependable measurement of an
enlisted man’s working level and ability to learn,” no more and no less.223 By posing the
differences in black and white aptitude test scores as a matter of job readiness—without ever
suggesting which parties, exactly, were responsible for maintaining racially disparate educational
funds and job opportunities—the Army could congratulate itself on not falling prey to the race
science of a previous generation, all while avoiding casting blame on any politicians who kept
white supremacist structures intact. The Army, as it portrayed itself, was an institution that
granted equal opportunity of service: it was not the Army’s problem to fix the lack of
opportunity elsewhere in American society.
Some of the chief psychologists behind the GCT held less overtly nationalist analyses of
the exam—but they nonetheless established a connection between a man’s standardized test
scores and his worth to society and the state. After the end of conflict, War Department Chief
Psychologist Walter Bingham published general findings about the GCT’s reliability in
predicting a recruit’s eventual military successes in Science magazine. Bingham insisted the test
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data illustrated a clear general pattern: the lower a man’s GCT score, the less likely he would
successfully complete a job training course with at least average marks, and the greater
likelihood he would “prov[e] to be more of a burden than a help during mobilization.”224 Yet, the
sheer number of men who took the GCT—about 10 million—allowed Bingham to make broad
generalization about a massive population while also noting sizeable exceptions. While about
5,000 men who lacked grammar school educations still received high enough GCT scores to earn
the highest possible Grade classification, this sizeable number of men was still one half of one
tenth of one percent of all men examined. This unprecedented amount of score data thus allowed
the armed forces—and the American state—to be convenient with how it discussed population
statistics, toggling between percentages and numbers depending on which sense of type of figure
would better serve state needs.
During World War II, American military leaders assembled to determine how to make
the best use of black personnel, setting the foundation for using standardized testing data to
uphold white supremacist power dynamics. One military committee, led by Assistant Secretary
of War John McCloy, considered how to juggle the dire need for able-bodied men, regardless of
race, with the seeming intellectual shortcomings many black recruits displayed in their low GCT
scores. Nearly half of all black recruits scored in the lowest GCT score category (Grade V),
compared to nine percent of their white counterparts. In an aborted scheme, the McCloy
Committee planned to replace low-scoring black personnel with higher-scoring men, relocating
Grade V men to labor troops. The committee reasoned this reshuffling would create little friction
among low-scoring black soldiers, as “the majority of Negroes falling into Grade V [were] from
the South where they have been accustomed to performing common labor under immediate
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white supervision.”225 Disagreements between the Army’s Ground and Service Forces
eventually undid this plan, yet the McCloy Committee’s model reflected a willingness to trade
upon existing racial power dynamics—black men in menial tasks overseen by powerful white
men—in order to ensure the military ran as efficiently as possible.226
Although the McCloy Committee’s redistribution plans failed to take shape during the
war, some members spent time just after the end of hostilities considering where black men
would fit into the postwar defense system. In a late August 1945 memo to his superior, McCloy’s
assistant Davidson Sommers recommended the “eventual non-segregation and assignment of
Negro troops solely on the basis of ability.”227 Yet Sommers referenced GCT scores to claim
that, overall, black soldiers were poorly equipped for Army demands when compared to white
soldiers. This claim, Sommers reassured McCloy, did not need to be premised on “racial
theories,” as black soldiers’ relative “lack of educational, occupational, and social opportunities
[was] a sufficient explanation.”228 By asserting that environmental factors created black recruits’
low aptitude test scores, Sommers hinted at the Army’s institutional resistance to abolish its
racial policies. If the Army provided one of the few consistent social opportunities for black
Americans within a broader racial system designed to subordinate them, then the abolition of
racial controls would provide an even more compelling case for black men to serve in the armed
forces. The Army would thus make itself responsible for providing what other American
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institutions and systems refused to do, at the risk of diluting its overall talent pool. Yet in his
proposed solution—using GCT scores as a barrier for entry—Sommers also acknowledged that
the opposition would be both internal and external. Although most parties agreed that black men
would continue to have a role in securing the postwar American state, any changes that
threatened the institutional characteristics of the Army risked upsetting at least some of its
constituent groups.
Several months after the dissolution of the McCloy Committee, the War Department
assembled a new panel to revise its use of black troops in the uncertain postwar period. The
panel, led by Army Chairman Lieutenant General Alvan Gillem, released their recommendations
as a circular memorandum in April 1946. Within Circular 124, the Gillem Board established the
unenviable position the Army believed itself to be in. Postwar defense required maximum
possible manpower, but “the manpower available, of itself, [varied] in quality.”229 Black soldiers
were far more qualified during World War Two than their counterparts in World War One, and
the Army prided itself on offering additional training and education opportunities otherwise
unavailable for black troops outside of the military, but considerable gaps between the quality of
manpower black and white troops brought upon entering service endured. The Army felt an
institutional responsibility to continue serving as a conduit for opportunity—but it also aimed to
prevent wasting resources on improving the manpower of too many black men. Hence, the
Gillem Board announced that, in order to attain “maximum utilization of the authorized
manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency,” the Army would accept black
troops at a ten percent quota, approximate to the proportion of black Americans in the general
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population.230 Black soldiers, however, would remain in segregated units, and black units with a
disproportionate amount of men with low GCT scores would receive additional supervisors. The
Army positioned itself as an institution for black advancement—but as an institution, it also used
numerical and testing quotas to set a firm boundary for how much change it would accept.
The Army sought to normalize Circular 124 among troops while also limiting its own
responsibility for sustained institutional segregation. The War Department publication Army Talk
devoted a three-part essay to the new policies mandated by the circular, designed to be read
aloud and discussed in organized group settings. Deeming the issue of black manpower a
“special problem,” Army Talk detailed “the Army’s concerns with matters of race as they relate
to its effectiveness and its status in a democracy.”231 As the newsletter explained in digestible
segments, the Army did not hold any policy of racial hierarchy, but simply maintained
segregated troops as a matter of organizational tradition. The essay’s writers insisted that the
Gillem Board did find certain racialized military structures detrimental to national security. The
postwar peacetime army had to be treated as “our war machine in miniature”—and overly large
black units overseen by white officers would wreck efficient American combat.232 While the
Army held a position of equal opportunity, it declared itself “not an agency of social reform in
matters either of race, racial relationship, or anything else.”233 As the Army hoped to instill
among its personnel, the military was not the party responsible for society’s larger
shortcomings—nor was it responsible for addressing those issues at the risk of efficiency.
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As the Army made the policies within Circular 124 an accepted institutional norm, it also
complained to the Defense Department that it endured unfair testing and racial standards
compared to the other branches of the military. After hearing various arguments and responses
from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal issued findings on
the how feasible it would be for the Armed Forces to maintain uniform GCT caps. The Army
alleged that the 1948 revision of the Selective Service Act forced it to accept an unfair amount of
marginal manpower compared to other branches; while the Navy and Air Force could refuse men
with GCT scores below 87 and 90, respectively, the Army was bound by law to accept men with
at least a score of 70. The Army also demanded that other military branches adopt a uniform
quota for black personnel, insinuating that the Navy’s resistance to racial quotas conveniently
obscured the fact that it employed only 4 black officers within its ranks, compared to 1000
within the Army. Forrestal agreed that the Army bore a disproportionate burden employing
marginally useful men, but concluded that the branch “has many vital, but ‘dirty,’ jobs in
wartime that compare unfavorably in creature comforts, danger and interest to jobs in the Navy
and Air Force”: the Army would invariably attract the least acceptable men because it needed
more of them to do the most unsavory work.234 Further, Forrestal acknowledged that creating a
uniform GCT standard would help the Army’s manpower, “but at a cost to the Navy of 9%, to
the Air Force of 10%, and to the National Military Establishment as a whole of 3%.”235 Because
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black soldiers remained disproportionately clustered in lower GCT score brackets, the peacetime
burden for black personnel had to be shouldered largely by the Army. As Forrestal remarked, the
existing peacetime military, unprecedentedly massive as it was, still had to represent “the
nucleus of a future wartime force,” and the manpower burdens faced by one branch could not be
altered to the detriment of the entire armed forces’ manpower output.236
But broader geopolitical pressures compelled the federal government to push further on
nondiscriminatory military policy. For the Truman Administration, systemic racial
discrimination and segregation had become Cold War rhetorical weapons—a source of
international criticism and scorn by enemies and allies alike.237 To combat one aspect of this
geopolitical quandary, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in July 1948. The order
mandated “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without
regard to race, color, religion or national origin”—with all necessary changes to take place “as
rapidly as possible.”238 To help all branches of the military reach this goal, the executive order
also established the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Services, a seven-member advisory group authorized with determining and
recommending desegregation policy. Truman designated former Solicitor General Charles Fahy
to chair the new committee. The president filled out the group with members that straddled
educational, corporate and civil rights interests, appointing to the committee the presidents of
Oberlin College, General Cable Corporation, and A.J. Donahue Corporation, as well as the
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executive secretary of Urban League and the publisher of the Chicago Defender.239 Those on the
Fahy Committee recognized the geopolitical esteem the United States risked by maintaining
segregated forces. In a letter to Cleo Blackburn, superintendent of Indianapolis’s AfricanAmerican social service center Flanner House, James Evans lamented “that the world denies us
recognition which would otherwise justly be ours” were the military desegregated—adding that
most Americans remained unaware of “the devastating effects of this deplorable situation on the
prestige of America abroad.”240 President Truman established his aim for concrete, thorough,
expansive policy at a brief introductory meeting with the new committee, Secretary of State
James Forrestal, and Defense Department leaders the following January. Truman envisioned that
the committee would go beyond examining existing military barriers to carrying out his
executive order, but also related federal bureaucratic procedures that could also gum up military
desegregation. Through this committee, the Truman Administration could partially address a
prevailing domestic concern that had become an international spectacle.
Some in the Fahy Committee quickly realized that the only effective line of reasoning to
convince the armed forces to desegregate would be an argument about manpower. In early
March 1949, the committee’s executive secretary, E.W. Kenworthy, warned Fahy about the
potential pitfalls in appealing to broader principles. Whether framing military desegregation from
the perspective of constitutional authority or as a matter of practical politics, the president’s
capacity to act as Commander in Chief was checked by Congress’s responsibilities to oversee
military policy and appropriations: an executive order and committee report alone would carry a
weak mandate. Kenworthy also dismissed using the moral high ground embedded in
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foundational American legal texts because, from the military’s perspective, the lofty ideals of the
Bill of Rights had nothing to do with effectively winning wars. Where the committee could
instead force the Army’s hand is by confronting them on the inefficient use of black manpower.
By deferring to racial models of intelligence and failing to create a cadre of black leadership
during peacetime, Kenworthy reasoned, the Army rushed into combat with large, unsupported
black units. This created low morale and panic among black troops—and ultimately unfavorable
service records when compared to the conduct of black soldiers allowed to serve within white
regiments on the Western Front. By appealing to efficiency, the Committee could “find a side
entrance” to changing Army policy that relied on the military’s own alleged priorities.241
In its initial report, issued late March 1949, the President’s Committee premised its
recommendations on the belief that the armed forces and the postwar state could only succeed
through “the maximum efficient use of manpower.”242 If the increasingly technical qualities of
war rendered manpower an abstract quality detachable from any particular man, then a soldier’s
race should have little bearing on their job detail: black or white, men were vessels for
manpower and brainpower. Hence, the President’s Committee recommended that the Army
remove discrepancies between black- and white-unit organization that effectively barred black
troops from certain military occupational specialties (MOS). The President’s Committee also
recommended that the Army no longer use race as a factor when assigning men to Army Schools
courses, nor for assigning men to units once they’ve completed advanced training. Above all, the
President’s Committee recommended that the Army abolish its 10% quota for black troops. If the
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Army wanted to maximize manpower, it needed to do so on the basis of aptitude and not racial
composition.
The Army, meanwhile, adopted various tactics to make its ranks whiter. Between May
1948 and March 1949—a period without any immediate demands for troops—the number of
Army officers and enlisted personnel grew by nearly 95,000, to roughly two-thirds of a million
people. In that same ten-month window, however, the number of black officers and enlisted
personnel grew by only 3,500 men. While technically still accepting more black men, the Army
effectively thinned out the proportion of black men in its ranks to almost exactly ten percent. But
this adherence to the racial quota did not extend to upper rank: black officers still comprised less
that two percent of the officer corps.243 By April, the Army used the racial quota to halt black
recruitment outright. Assessing that its proportion of black soldiers remained unacceptably high,
the Army declined black volunteers, all while lowering its GCT minimum to increase the pool of
potential white recruits. The Army also extended these race-based personnel policies to its
protocol for reenlistment. Although all soldiers had twenty days to reenlist in their same position,
the Army granted white soldiers an additional three-month window to reenlist at the same pay
grade; black soldiers who missed the first window were barred from reentry “until the Negro
quota [was] open.”244 Yet the Army did not gather any GCT scores for black men they turned
away, let alone any sense of whether low-scoring white men were accepted into the army in lieu
of higher-scoring black hopefuls. The racial quota had already predetermined these dismissed
black men were numerically beyond what was the acceptable burden of the national security
state.
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The Army resisted abandoning its racial quota by instead demanding that all three
branches of the military adopt a uniform cutoff for the General Classification Test. At the time,
the Navy used a GCT cutoff score of 90, arguing that the technical demands of modern naval
defense meant it could not employ the services of men with below-average scores—nor, by
deduction, below-average intelligence. The Army countered by contending that, were it to
abandon its racial quota without being allowed to adopt a higher GCT cutoff, a disproportionate
amount of intellectually deficient men would flock to Army recruiting stations. The Fahy
Committee found this line of reasoning unacceptable, citing the Air Force’s policy of using men
with lower scores, and instead recommending low GCT cutoffs across all three branches in order
to cull all possible useful manpower.245
To make sense of the Army’s insistence on racial quotas—and how standardized testing
fit within the racial logic of its revised personnel management systems—the Fahy committee met
with several military officials in late April 1949. As departmental and Selective Service officials
explained over the course of several hours, the GCT had become just the first of several
standardized exams that determined the line of work an incoming recruit would eventually be
assigned. After clearing the Army’s peacetime GCT quota—with lower-scoring hopefuls
needing to earn a higher physical rating to pass muster—recruits endured a battery of ten
aptitude assessments as part of their induction process. Each test within the battery measured
some combination of ten capabilities, including pattern analysis, shop mechanics, and clerical
speed. Following this series of exams, recruits then took the Army Activities Preference Blank,
another standardized inventory designed to objectively gauge the fields of work a person was
most attracted to. Army intake officers compiled the results from a recruit’s Preference Blank as
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well as the average skill scores from each aptitude test to determine which set of jobs he should
be assigned. For the Army, the GCT worked as a manpower-harnessing device when it was used
as the first in a series of standardized assessments.246
Despite this new system, the War Department officials interviewed by the Fahy
committee continued to assert that race remained a meaningful category for sorting and limiting
Army troops. When asked why the Army continued to segregate its GCT figures by race,
department officials evaded a concrete answer, only noting that GCT scores figures remained
categorized by race because all Army data was divided in that fashion. When members of the
committee then suggested a soldier’s level of education would be a more meaningful frame for
analysis, one military representative, Roy Davenport, rattled off a series of statistical extremes to
suggest race remained a more meaningful basis of categorization:
However, you might be interested to know that of those individuals
who reported some schooling, for whom the records show some
schooling but not completion of grade schools, three tenths of one
per cent of the whites scored in Grade 1, 35.5 per cent in Grade 5.
For the colored two-tenths of one per cent in Grade 1 and 73.1 per
cent in Grade 5. […] At the other end of the scale, those who had
completed college, for the whites 47.5 scored in Grade 1 and no
individuals were reported as scoring in Grade 5. For the colored,
6.4 per cent scored in Grade 1 and 1.5 per cent scored in Grade
5.247
The committee’s executive secretary, E.W. Kenworthy, pressed on, asking Davenport whether
non-segregated units would create fewer occupational pathways for black soldiers—that is,
whether the Army felt segregation beneficially limited job competition. Even then, Davenport
deferred to test score figures: over a third of all white men scored in the two highest score tiers
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on the GCT, while fewer than 4 percent of black soldiers did so.248 Through an avalanche of
statistical data absent of any sense of scale or scope—percentages and comparisons without
tangible numbers for anchorage—the army used GCT scores as a means to justify its racial
quotas without having to provide racially motivated rationales for those restrictions: numbers,
after all, don’t lie.
The Secretary of the Army separately took great pains to stress that, among the four
services in the Armed Forces, his branch made the greatest efforts to include black Americans. In
a May 1949 memo to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Acting Secretary of the Army Gordon
Gray outlined the sheer numerical advantages black Americans had in the Army when compared
to the Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. Gray stressed that, numerically speaking, black Army
servicemen totaled “more than triple that of the Air Force or Navy and almost double that of all
other services combined.”249 Further, black soldiers had far more pathways to attain a
noncommissioned officer rank than their counterparts in other branches of the Armed Forces. In
Gray’s estimation, his branch was not the one to blame for the Armed Forces’ underutilization of
black Americans.
Gray also used General Classification Test score patterns to defend the relatively small
number of black commissioned officers in the Army, but his faulty math exposed the trouble
many non-specialists faced when attempting to make sense of testing patterns. Grey conceded
that black commissioned officers were relatively rare—numbering about 1,300, or just 1.65
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percent of all Army officers. The secretary argued, however, that this relative dearth of black
commissioned officers was not a product of discriminatory policy but a mere byproduct of the
General Classification Test. At the time, the Army required a minimum GCT score of 110 for
any soldier to be considered for a commissioned officer position. For every black soldier who
scored at least 110 on the GCT, 6.5 white soldiers met the same qualification. Grey then
convoluted these score patterns to justify the Army’s use of a racial quota: multiplying the
existing percentage of black commissioned officers by the racial ratio of soldiers who scored at
least 110 on the GCT would “equal competitively to a 10.7 per cent ratio, or slightly in excess of
the total Negro strength ratio.”250 Whether in good or bad faith, such gibberish mathematics
allowed the Army to use the aura of statistics to stand by its racialized personnel policies.
The Army’s use of specious calculations for justifying its low levels of black
commissioned officers reflect officials’ compulsive fear of the branch being overwhelmed by
black men with low intelligence. Gray once again used GCT score patterns to justify to his
superior the Army’s reluctance to abandon its racial quota. Whereas other branches of the Armed
forces were “in the fortunate position of being able to maintain an enlistment standard of 90 GCT
and higher,” the Army was restricted by the Selective Service Act to use a GCT cutoff of 70
before calling upon the draft.251 Black recruits were much more likely that white counterparts to
receive low GCT scores, and the group of potential recruits with scores between 70 and 90 was
thus included a disproportionate amount of black recruits relative to the general population. For
Gray, the Army faced the burden of accepting those men who were not intelligent to get into
other military branches—and the relative strength of the army corps was thus compromised by
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this dilution of manpower. In the absence of a racial quota, Gray forecasted the Army would
shoulder the immense burden of accepting black men who other branches deemed unfit to defend
the American State, warning that “an Army of even 15 percent Negroes suffers a jeopardizing
decreases in efficiency.”252 By expressing GCT scores as a representation of military manpower,
efficiency, and cooperativeness, the Army could present its racial quota as the soundest way to
open opportunity for black soldiers without risking defensive chaos.
Although the Fahy Committee remained flummoxed by the Army’s resistance to abandon
the racial quota, its response to the Army’s third series of proposals revealed the limits to the
postwar state’s sense of racial justice. In a July 6 memo to other committee members, Executive
Secretary E.W. Kenworthy accused the Army of having “the same disregard for efficiency as for
equal opportunity.”253 Although the Army’s proposals to eliminate racial quotas in training
divisions considerably expanded the ability for black soldiers to reach specialized training, its
insistence on maintaining racially segregated military units rendered any manpower gains moot.
Kenworthy found the Army’s plan to apply its 10 percent racial quota within certain military
occupations even more disastrous because it made “numerical representation the criterion of
equal opportunity.”254 For the Fahy Committee, postwar defense had to be premised on
efficiency. Eliminating the racial quota and desegregating units were not primarily matters of
redressing social injustice, but instead, means for ensuring that the military’s internal
organization, training procedures, and promotion protocols placed the most capable men in the
correct places.
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At the end of his memo, Kenworthy suggested a potential solution for the Army’s
stubbornness: replace the racial quota with a General Classification Test Quota. If the Army
resisted abandoning the racial quota was because it feared its ranks would be overrun with black
recruits, Kenworthy reasoned, then a quota based on GCT scores could effectively keep the
Army from adopting black men it deemed undesirable without resorting to overtly racial
methods. The Army could set a cap on the number of men it would accept with GCT scores
between 70 and 90; as monthly recruitment reports from the Army confirmed, a disproportionate
amount of black recruits earned scores within that range compared white counterparts.[cite] As
Fahy would eventually suggest to the Army, the cap would be based on the “the normal
distribution in the Army as revealed by the operation of Selective Service during the war”—in
other words, using preexisting test data to set the parameters for what the Army would continue
to consider acceptable degrees of intelligence.255 The Army could also use other standardized
aptitude tests to solve the problem of reenlisting men with low GCT scores. Men with marginal
scores on both the GCT and the Aptitude Area I test could be barred from continuing their
service beyond the initial term. Kenworthy posited that this new quota “would not be racial
discrimination, but a defensible procedure for keeping the Army from having a heavier
percentage of Class IV men than there is in the population.”256 By shifting the basis of the quota,
the Army could outwardly redefine who was marginally useful to the state—and thus whose
presence had to be strictly monitored and regulated.
The Fahy Committee also gathered its own population figures to deduce that the Army’s
fears of being disproportionately filled with black recruits of low intelligence had no statistical
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bearing. Kenworthy used current population data and existing GCT score patterns to see under
what circumstances the Army would become at least 30% black. For the Army to reach that
proportion, it would have needed just over 200,000 black voluntary enlistees among its troops.
Yet, statistically speaking, fewer that 140,000 physically healthy black men in the national
manpower pool would have scored over 70 on the GCT. Even if the Army shifted from voluntary
to mandatory service, the Army mathematically could not be saturated with the amount of black
men that it feared unless it abandoned the GCT or expanded its age range for service.257 In case
of national geopolitical emergency, the authorized size for military branches would likely
expand, even further reducing the odds black men would represent a disproportionate share of
Army strength.
Still, Kenworthy acknowledged that the difficulty for the Army—and the difficulty in
convincing the Army to adopt a test-based quota—hinged on how it would manage black
soldiers whose test scores prevented easy placement. After drafting the committee’s interim
report, Kenworthy detailed to Fahy the infrastructural problems that could result from
abandoning the racial quota. The “professional privates” whose scores barely qualified them for
service would be easy to place in a new system: in the same types of menial jobs their aptitude
scores indicated would be the best use of their manpower.258 So, too, would be black soldiers
who scored highly on the GCT, as desegregated training schools and unit placements would also
ensure the Army was making the most of their capabilities. But Kenworthy remained flummoxed
by the considerable number of black soldiers “who have higher scores, and who are now in
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Negro combat units, but who do not have the qualifications for school.”259 Dismantling these
units immediately would create an organizational nightmare, by Kenworthy’s estimation.
For several months, the Fahy Committee and the Army lobbed proposals and
counterproposals at one another, each side using different statistical interpretations of available
American manpower to determine the degree to which a GCT quota could be trusted by itself to
control the proportion of black troops. The committee cushioned its insistence on abolishing the
racial quota by suggesting that the Army could accept fewer marginal-scoring men if it simply
accepted more men with higher scores. The GCT quota would thus not be a rigid quantity to fill
but, instead, a ceiling. Army General Counsel Karl Bendetsen argued that department should
retain its 10 percent racial quota, but only for the men with the most marginal set of GCT scores.
Fahy dismissed this offer as an “absurd” way to curb black recruitment. One Army statistician
warned that there were “2,000 to 3,000 Negroes over [GCT score] 80 ready, willing and able to
join the Army and Air Forces every month”—which, in the absence of a racial quota, would lead
to black troops comprising up to 31% of the Army’s strength.260 Kenworthy took the same raw
figures, Army intake caps, and potential GCT quota to determine black soldiers would comprise
no more than 11% of all new recruits. (Soon after the Army realized the committee had
somehow procured these figures, Kenworthy met a major dismayed that the department did not
heed his advice to “never on any account submit figures to the Fahy Committee.”)261 In a press
release, the Army reiterated that its decision to offer training for all men who qualified for
Military Occupational Specialties, regardless of race, would reamin the full extent of its revised
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policy.262 By mid-November, Bendetsen admitted to Kenworthy that the Army’s predictions
were “based on the Army’s over-all military experience in forecasting enlisting tendencies and
trends and not on any specific experience”—but, nonetheless, nothing short of a numerical quota
would suffice.263 Numbers became a rhetorical weapon, not for their specificity but their ability
to be malleable enough to support vastly different scenarios.
The quota debate came to a head in late November, when the Army attempted to thwart
the Fahy Committee’s ambitions by instead proposing amendments to Circular 124 that would
eliminate some, but not all, racialized limitations. The Army motioned to remove racial
restrictions occupations and training schools, while retaining segregated units and racial quotas.
Kenworthy observed that the GCT would make these changes effectively “meaningless”: if black
soldiers typically received low GCT scores, then black-only military units would retain a relative
lack of occupational diversity, undermining the amount of manpower they could provide the
Army.264 Unless the Army was willing to place black soldiers into existing white units based on
occupational demands as well as ensure the most capable black soldiers entered service by
enforcing a GCT quota—both measures the Army still refused to consider—then personnel
organization and management would remain effectively unchanged.265
As stubborn as the Army remained in its extended discussions with the Fahy Committee,
it soon officially abandoned its race-based personnel policies. At the beginning of 1950, the
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Army stipulated that black soldiers would henceforth be placed in units by basis of their
qualifications rather than by race, and soldiers serving in mixed-race units would be integrated
both on and off the job.266 Even so, Fahy still prepared statistical material to show how a GCT
quota would aid the Army’s desire “for eliminating the perennial low-scoring men, both white
and Negro.”267 By early March, Fahy received word that the Army would drop the racial
quota—a couple months ahead of the publication of the Committee’s final report.268 Although
segregationist practices endured for another several years, the Army no longer used race as a
precondition for entering service or the types of work one could do.269
For the Fahy Committee, the Army’s racial quota and race-based personnel policies were
unjust devices that punished individuals’ capabilities based on broad statistical data about an
entire segment of the population. By denying talented black men entrance into the Army while
also retaining “professional privates,” the Army squandered the potential depth of its
manpower—the wasteful effects of which multiplied by keeping black soldiers out of most job
tracks and in occupationally-homogenous units. The Committee advocated that the Army replace
its racial quota with a GCT quota to guarantee that the brightest men, regardless of race, would
be able to contribute their manpower. Yet this maneuver also established the racial logic of the
postwar security state. Race may have been removed as an explicit condition for who could and
266
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could not belong in the armed forces, but it remained foundational to the meaning made out of
standardized testing data used to determine aptitude and ability. By shifting entrance caps from
race quotas to GCT score minimums, the armed forces redirected how it used race to designate
who was marginally useful, a policy shift that would reverberate in the postwar American state
and society.
Standardized Testing as a Means for Postwar Racial Social Marginalization
The Army’s use of GCT testing as a means to appear nondiscriminatory while
maintaining a broader racial social order set a foundation for subsequent educational actors to
use standardized testing as the means for designating black brainpower as marginally useful to
state and society. This pattern developed over decades from several directions. During the 1950s
and 1960s, psychologists began to fret about the potential social harm posed by underachievers,
reinforcing in the process whiteness as an invisible norm for psychological types.
Psychometrically speaking, an underachiever was someone who scored high on standardized
aptitude exams but whose performance on standardized achievement tests was relatively
lackluster. In other words, their measured capabilities noticeably outpaced their measured skills.
Psychologists leaned on standardized aptitude and achievement tests in their assessment of
underachievement because, by their lights, teachers frequently incorporated irrelevant and
subjective factors when determining the relationship between students’ capabilities and effort.
(Some notable researchers, namely educational psychologist Robert Thorndike, did stress that
poor test design and statistical knowhow often created an exaggerated sense of
underachievement among youth.)270 Although distinct from juvenile delinquents, underachievers
and other gifted youth were more prone to deep-set emotional turbulence, and who, without
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proper intervention, would prove to be a societal drain in adulthood. Guidebooks advised
counselors and parents alike how to encourage underachieving youth, overwhelmingly boys, into
finding meaningful life paths.271 Because earlier standardized tests such as the GCT had already
placed black test-takers—and by extension black Americans in general—at the threshold of
socially useful intelligence, the underachiever was a figure whose whiteness was unspoken but
always presumed. If black youth by and large scored relatively low on standardized aptitude
tests, particularly aptitude tests that reflected white middle-class educational experiences, then
their relative level of achievement became hard to gauge. Whereas black underachievers would
remain relatively invisible for another couple decades, white underachievers became a popular
midcentury psychological phenomenon.272
What rendered black underachievers invisible for so long was a deep social-scientific
pathologization of black families that portrayed educational disparities as a symptom of cultural
and genetic shortcomings. This argument hinged on the insistence that low educational
attainment among African-Americans, even if it reflected centuries of structures and systems
designed to maintain a black underclass in the United States, primarily illustrated blacks’
unwillingness to achieve due to genetically-eroded substandard intellects.273 This psychological
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pathologization of black intellect depended upon a resurgent interest in standardized intelligence
tests during the late 1960s and 1970s. In particular, certain psychologists argued that IQ testing
was a meaningful way to deduce the heritability of intelligence, and by extension, the persistent
gaps between white and black Americans’ capabilities. For Arthur Jensen and his acolytes, the
United States’ economy and security increasingly relied on technological knowhow, which likely
required IQ levels not typically found among black citizens. Black families transmitted both
harmful cultural values and diminished mental capabilities to their children—and no amount of
social policy or intervention could meaningfully enrich black youths’ mental faculties. Society
failed its low-intelligence citizens, these researchers argued, when it attempted to educate them
as one would white, middle-class youth. For these psychologists, the humane and socially
beneficial solution for low-intelligence youth would be to nurture those mental capabilities they
did exhibit. Equal education opportunity, then, was the byproduct of misplaced white liberal
guilt—a sentiment that caused more harm than good.274
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Some black parents did, however, successfully challenge the use of standardized testing
as a diagnostic method that overemphasized intellectual disability among black youth. On
October 16, 1979, after years of intermittent litigation, the United States District Court for
northern California made a decisive ruling against state special education practices in the case
Larry P. v. Riles, calling the fundamental premises of standardized aptitude testing into question
in the process. Larry P. v. Riles stemmed from a complaint filed at the beginning of the decade
against the San Francisco Unified School District.275 Parents of black students who had been
placed in special education tracks for the “educable mentally retarded” (EMR) believed the
standardized intelligence tests used to assess their children were fundamentally flawed. The
litigants alleged that the cultural and racial biases built into these standardized tests—and which
fueled their misinterpretations—led to a disproportionate amount of black students receiving an
EMR diagnosis. Whereas African-Americans comprised 10 percent of California’s population in
the 1970s, black youth made up a quarter of the students in EMR classrooms.276 Because
students placed in EMR classes received severely limited educations compared to their
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mainstream counterparts, the effects of a low standardized intelligence score snowballed
throughout a youth’s schooling. Black students who already came in with educational
disadvantages were thus more likely to be marked as EMR, placed into separate education tracks,
and leave school without many of the skills necessary for successful independent living.
In his decision, District Judge Robert Peckham used the history of intelligence testing to
determine that standardized aptitude tests were racially and culturally biased instruments, and
thus designed for discriminatory educational practices.277 As Peckham deduced, racial ideology
drove the meaning made out of test scores. For decades, black children typically scored about
fifteen points lower on IQ tests than their white counterparts. Yet, as virtually every expert
witness testified, even if researchers came to an agreement over what intelligence was, existing
intelligence tests could not measure intelligence directly. Peckham declared the state’s method
for identifying youth as EMR ultimately violated black children’s civil rights as well as denied
them equal protection under state and federal law. The judge thus maintained that standardized
testing became a method for the state to beg the question of black intelligence: education
officials already presumed that black youth displayed disproportionately lower intelligence more
frequently than white children, and the evidence provided by biased testing instruments
confirmed that presupposition.278
Despite some legal limitations on how governing authorities could use testing to
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marginalize its black citizens, white Americans used the logic of standardized testing to resist
educational admissions policies designed to undo systemic racial disadvantages. For many white
Americans, affirmative action educational policies were—and remain—synonymous with
reverse discrimination.279 Standardized testing gave the fantasy of reverse discrimination
evidentiary heft: How fair was it to deny white students educational opportunities when,
according to standardized admissions tests, they had greater likelihood for success than admitted
minorities with considerably lower test scores?
The connection between standardized testing scores and the logic of reverse
discrimination gained momentum through the Supreme Court case Regents of University of
California v. Bakke.280 Allen Bakke, a white engineer who sought admission to UC Davis
Medical School, filed suit against the California state university system after being denied
admission in 1973 and 1974. Although multiple factors minimized Bakke’s odds for
admission—his relatively late application in one cycle, a low interview score by a member of the
279
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admission committee, his relatively advanced age (medical schools at the time were loathe to
admit students in their thirties)—Bakke and his lawyers decided to focus on his whiteness.
Bakke’s counsel argued that his solid MCAT scores, among other metrics, proved he would be a
far more capable medical student than any of candidates chosen to fill the sixteen spaces UC
Davis reserved for minority applicants. This racial quota, Bakke’s counsel reasoned, unfairly
reduced their client’s chances for admission because only eighty-four spaces were available to
Bakke and other white applicants. Bakke’s counsel insisted that, by denying white applicants a
full opportunity for admission while also allowing minority applicants a chance to fulfill a quota,
UC Davis violated Bakke’s rights to equal protection and nondiscrimination established by the
14th Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bakke
was disjointed and convoluted—colleges and universities could consider race as a positive
attribute in admissions, but could no longer use quotas and quota-like practices to guarantee
minority candidates would have a presence in student bodies—it did reinforce the idea that
standardized test scores marked genuine capability. By extension, affirmative action opponents
could more easily use the Bakke ruling to accuse colleges and universities that actively aimed to
undo intergenerational educational discrimination through their admission polices of engaging in
tyrannical, anti-empirical social engineering.281
Even in subsequent Supreme Court cases that upheld more holistic collegiate affirmative
action practices, jurists continued to portray standardized testing as a technology that revealed
true capabilities in light of liberal educational activism. In Grutter v Bollinger, the court affirmed
281
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that the University of Michigan’s narrow consideration of race as a categorical positive in law
school applications was an acceptable practice, neither falling into the quota trap nor violating
white applicants’ 14th Amendment rights. In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Clarence
Thomas upheld the use of the standardized law school admission test (LSAT) as a worthwhile
gauge of students’ readiness for advanced studies. If collegiate practices such as legacy
admissions already made the concept of meritocracy a farce, Thomas reasoned, then law schools
should employ the LSAT as they see fit—so long as those practices did not correct for wellknown racial differences in test scores. Even in the majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor asserted that LSAT scores could not be eliminated outright for law school admissions
because “they are important (if imperfect) predictors of academic success in law school”282 As
with Bakke, a certain standardized test had already become a stable unit of information used by
virtually all accredited degree-granting graduate programs for a specific profession. Thus, even if
jurists and educators alike felt that the LSAT (or MCAT or GMAT) had its predictive limits, the
basis by which people could be admitted by other categorical or socio-historical factors was
limited to the extent that the LSAT (or MCAT or GMAT) served as a de facto unit of objective
information. Holistic affirmative action admission policies thus held test scores as clear data,
however limited and qualified, against which supplementary applicant information could be
weighed. Indeed, the qualified use of standardized test scores strengthened their educational
utility. Now universities could portray LSAT, MCAT, GMAT and other post-baccalaureate
admission exam scores as a component with checks and balances in a just admissions system.283
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The final action that solidified standardized testing as a method for maintaining black
social marginalization was the development of minimum competency testing in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Minimum competency testing emerged mostly in southern states amid the
backlash to mandated desegregation, as well as in response to growing concerns that students
were leaving high school functionally illiterate and innumerate. State-level school systems,
heightening their capacity as an intermediary between the traditional local nexus of control and
the growing federal role in education, introduced minimum competency tests as a way to monitor
high school students’ mastery of fundamental skills. In several states, these standardized basic
skills tests became the determining factor for whether a high school senior received a diploma.
Such minimum competency exams often focused on fundamental reading skills that state
educational officials believed students ought to have developed over the course of their
education. Yet, as some pundits at the time worried, such tests may have instead encouraged
early cohorts of students to drop out before facing a final competency exam.
More often, as seen through a series of Florida court class action suits filed by black
students and their parents, minimum competency testing regimes failed to accommodate for
early cohorts of black students who received substandard segregated elementary education and
who did not benefit from any early intervention programs or secondary school curricula geared
toward ensuring mastery of basic reading and mathematical skills. Although these legal
challenges delayed the timetable for when minimum competency testing could be used as a
prerequisite for matriculation, the use of such tests nonetheless created, as Scott Baker argues, an
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educational landscape in which the burden of education shifted from the school system to the
student. High-stakes standardized accountability testing placed the onus of functional illiteracy
and innumeracy on the products of the school system—students—rather than the system itself.
This shift allowed state-level politicians to avoid the onus of increasing educational spending in
ways that would upset white constituents. The surface-level neutrality of accountability testing
programs rendered social marginalization as individual shortcomings. Because the system was
no longer overtly discriminatory, test scores could offered the sheen of fair and genuine
measurements of students’ skills—and whatever shortcoming black students faced on such
exams were no longer the problem of school systems.284
Accountability standardized testing regimes persist, more ingrained into curricular design
and pedagogical practice than ever. What also continues is the burden placed on black students
for their persistent low test scores, without any meaningful intervention into educational funding
policies that leave students in majority-black schools comparatively ill-equipped to master
material on such standardized tests. Because accountability regimes often peg school funding to
standardized test scores, students in chronically underfunded areas—typically majority-black
urban schools—are compelled to accept testing regimes in order to prove they merit social
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investment, even if the resultant school funding hinges on “teaching to the test” practices
detrimental to robust learning and development. The consequences for not accepting these
testing regimes—or rather, failing to perform to these standards—often involve public
disinvestment from problematic schools, the introduction of profit-driven charter schools, and
the collapse of educationally-oriented community investment.285 Through such testing
mechanisms students are forced to play along with the charade of equal educational opportunity
without ever being provided the economic means that could make equal opportunity possible, let
alone desirable. Black students thus often have the most to lose in accountability testing systems.
Meanwhile, researchers continue to examine the phenomenon of the achievement gap
between white and black students on standardized tests, without interrogating the racial
pathologization that undergirds such as idea. Psychologists and pundits repeatedly question why
black students fare poorly on annual accountability exams, often anchoring their explanations in
sociocultural rationale rather than economic explanations. By ignoring the economic foundations
for standardized testing disparities—and, by extension, the way race is concomitant with
economic inequality in American society—educational pundits continue to locate low black test
scores as a phenomenon explainable by students’ ineffable blackness. As such, black students
who perform outside the expected band of marginal performance continue to evade
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psychological diagnosis: black students are still markedly less likely to be diagnosed as gifted. 286
Black nerd subcultures, meanwhile, are examined for the phenomenon of “acting white,” as
though black Americans could not conceive of fandom and passionate study otherwise.287 The
concept of the achievement gap has, meanwhile, endured its ability to dislocate black students
from the structural bases for their disadvantageous standardized testing scores. The logic for the
achievement gap emerged in the early postwar period, when the American state began to shift
from overtly racist institutional policies toward technologies that maintained, to a considerable
degree, the country’s foundational racial order. Standardized testing allowed a psychometric
sheen for racial disparities in the military and, eventually, higher education—all while absolving
the state from culpability in the persistence of a black underclass. Race-patterned score gaps,
whatever the psychometric nomenclature, continue to be made the burden of black students
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rather than the product of standardized testing regimes that naturalize white middle-class
educational opportunities as an ideal norm.
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CHAPTER FOUR: BAD AT MATH: STANDARDIZED TESTING,
MATHEMATICS ACHIEVEMENT, AND GENDER POLITICS

Over the past several decades, the relationship between girls and mathematical
achievement has gone from being seen as a largely unremarkable fact of life to a chronic social
problem. Girls who are good at math pursue degrees and careers in mathematical fields less
frequently than boys with similar talents. In the early postwar period, functionalist theory
chalked this phenomenon up to sex roles: society ran more smoothly when men and women
pursued life paths that fit commonly-accepted sex roles, and those who bucked those trends must
have some abnormal qualities to their personality. Along with second-wave feminism came a
thorough examination of why women remained in the margins of math and science—and many
argued that the actual problem was the widespread social belief in mathematical talent as a
distinctively masculine trait. Yet the belief persists among many researchers that something
innate, some small bit of genetics, holds girls back from mathematical excellence. As these
arguments stormed within academic and mainstream circles, the number of women pursuing
high education vastly expanded. Women now earn the clear majority of postsecondary degrees,
yet remain a minority in math and related subjects—with no clear consensus on why this
phenomenon continues.
All along the way, standardized testing provided the fuel for researchers’ arguments
about the true reason girls had considerably different experiences with math than boys. For some
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researchers, standardized test data provided a way to show that social attitudes toward proper
feminine behavior made otherwise talented girls disinvest in mathematics during adolescence.
For others, standardized testing data illustrated that girls were rewarded for behavior and
obedience in the classroom rather than talent, and that boys naturally had a numerical edge
among the most mathematically gifted youth. Some held an ambivalent position between these
two extremes—but argued that the blunt-force misuse of standardized test scores by college
admissions officer and scholarship organizations essentially reinforced whatever social problems
already existed by denying mathematically talented young women equal education opportunities.
None of these positions, however, seriously questioned the use of standardized testing in itself.
Critics of the findings gathered through one standardized math test would instead use other
standardized testing data to stake a competing claim. Standardized testing data thus became an
increasingly valuable currency in the ongoing argument about what, exactly, limited girls’
mathematical achievement—an argument unlikely to go away anytime soon as educational
policymakers and pundits consider how the United States can best develop experts in STEM
fields.
Gender Ideology, Postwar Science, and Functionalist Theory
Gender is a foundational power relation in American society. Gender not only includes
the social meaning of perceived biological differences—those which transform males into men
and females into women—but also the laws, policies, practices, and symbolic representations that
enforce a power dynamic in which men possess control over women. This system is typically
rooted in the idea that society should reflect a presumed natural order in which heterosexual
couples reproduce (both themselves and their values), and in which women’s primary
responsibilities revolve around children and the home. Gender thus not only involves the power

163

dynamics within interpersonal relations, but also the mechanisms used to give societies order and
structure, as well as the cultural productions borne from social relations. As an ideology, gender
is pervasive but incomplete—filled with inconsistencies, contradictions, and variations at all
levels. Gender persists because it is replicated, however messily, at every social level, through
institutions and with other forms of power, such as race or class. Gender also persists because of
the repercussions for deviating too far from social norms: homosexuals, transgender and
genderqueer people, masculine women, and feminine men have historically faced legal,
occupational, and physical punishment for their actions and identities. Hence gender persists as a
power dynamic because its malleability and incompleteness also makes it resilient.288
The modern American state has served an important but peculiar role in altering gender
norms. On the one hand, the post-1945 American state has been a source of enumerated rights
based on sex and gender, whether by federal legislation (the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972), or judicial decision (Roe v. Wade, Griswold v.
Connecticut, Obergefell v. Hodges). On the other hand, specific constitutional protections of
rights on the basis of sex remain absent, despite a nearly successful push for the Equal Rights
Amendment in the 1970s. The federal protections that do extend to equitable private sector
treatment—namely, the Lily Ledbetter Act of 2009—only provide extended timelines for the
right to file suit against discriminatory companies rather than mandate equal pay for equal work.
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The federated structure of the United States, meanwhile, creates different gender-based rights
and regulations based on where they live. The ability to push back against gender-based
discrimination is complicated when an aggrieved class inhabits multiple marginalized social
categories (e.g., black women) because American law—and by extension, social institutions
related to the law—often cannot account for the unique state of discrimination borne from
intersecting identities. The state, as a political entity, thus plays a role in the politics of gender,
but in a haphazard and variable fashion reflective of the idiosyncratic features of American
federalism.289
Experimental science has likewise been a historically powerful tool for maintaining and
reinforcing gendered social relations. As a historical phenomenon, science remains attached to its
social contexts, as does its practitioners. The scientific appeal to objectivity does not erase the
political contexts for certain lines of inquiry, the basis of credibility, or burdens of proof.
Scientific inquiry often naturalizes social gender disparities in several ways. Scientists often use
male bodies (and, more specifically, white male bodies) as the default in their research—
inadvertently relegating female bodies as defective variables or ignoring them altogether.
Scientific research has also been used as the means to justify preexisting gender stereotypes and
subordination; such research begs the question, but typically shields itself with a scientific appeal
to objectivity in order to dodge claims of logical fallacy. These practices are reinforced by
journalistic and layperson treatments of scientific studies that either exaggerate the results of a
study or insert a gendered interpretation where none had explicitly existed before. The enduring
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result is that scientists persistently seek to explain gendered differences through biological rather
than social causes. These explanations often also ignore the relationship between society and
biology—namely, how long-term conditions for a certain social group may create observable
biological peculiarities. Instead, non-genital organs are often assigned a sex and treated as
though they exhibit discernably male or female tendencies. Above all, the human brain becomes
gendered—“the male brain,” “the female brain”—in a way that often presumes that a brain’s
capacity is predetermined by prenatal sexual development. The gap between scientific research
and its nonscientific discussion thus frequently turns the brain into a sexed organ.290
Sitting at the intersecting gender politics of the state and scientific discourse, postwar
American state-sponsored science maintained a complicated relationship with women in the
field. Women did enter higher education in larger numbers after World War II, but their
participation in scientific fields of study was complicated by social policies that privileged
educating male veterans, as well as persistent social beliefs that limited women’s advancement in
the workplace. Those women who did secure roles in the emerging postwar state-science
complex—by and large women from the white middle class—often had to assure colleagues and
broader society that their participation in basic and applied research would not come at the cost
of their responsibilities as wives and mothers. These women scientists and engineers, working
largely between first- and second-wave feminism, instead emphasized the importance of their
trained brains to the state. Deemed “technocratic feminists” by the historian Laura Micheletti
Puaca, many early postwar women engineers and scientists emphasized that their brainpower
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was as useful to national security as that of their male counterparts. Yet, by insisting a
“’Woman’s Place Is In the Lab, Too,’” these technocratic feminists could also subtly assure
colleagues and the general public that they were not opposed to traditional feminine spaces.291
While these women made tremendous headway gaining acceptance in their field, they also
operated largely without workplace protections or positions of power within their disciplines—
ultimately limiting the way individual achievements benefited women within their fields, or were
even recounted within the historical record.
Postwar social science, meanwhile, remained wedded to functionalist theory, which
influenced the types of questions researchers asked about their human subjects. Within
functionalist logic, social differences between men and women were not a problem but, rather, a
core feature of society itself. Functionalist theories upheld “the status quo in sex role allocation,
differentiation and reward”—that is, the maintenance of distinct sex-based social roles.292 Boys
and girls, then, needed to be socialized appropriately in order to fulfill social expectations—
expectations rooted in sustained, naturalized, sexualized differences between men and women.
As seen in one 1955 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) publication on
raising adolescents, the family unit was at once an incubator of appropriate roles and an arsenal
against subversive ideas. HEW encouraged parents to “forestall criticism of a youth by helping
him build up interests that will make him acceptable to his peers,” lest they risk their son to “be
291
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considered a ‘sissy’—something any normal boy shies away from.”293 Tomboys who refused “to
see satisfactions in the feminine role they [were] expected to play,” had been, like their sissy
counterparts, failed by their parents and risked dismantling social order.294 Functionalist theory
helped blur the line between what aspects of sex roles were natural and which were social
constructs by suggesting that, in the end, parsing the difference was not productive.
Midcentury social scientists carried these ideas into their research on mathematical
achievement, often naturalizing the difference between girls’ and boys’ math skills in the
process. The very idea of achievement was frequently discussed in gendered terms: the social
problem of the underachiever was often framed as an issue largely faced by boys and men. (One
trade paperback went so far as to assert “80 percent of children with educational problems are
boys.”295) Although researchers typically found that girls fared better in many verbal
standardized tests, boys scored better in certain mathematical standardized tests, particularly
those involving spatial reasoning and arithmetic reasoning. Some psychologists who did not find
sex differences in achievement test scores openly questioned whether their own findings were
baseless or if the test-makers had already reformatted their test without anyone’s knowledge.296
Psychologists also observed marked sex differences in school achievement—while girls
outperformed boys in grade school, men fared better than women in college—but also suggested
that the “cultural artifacts” which created these trends were not at odds with a well-functioning
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society.297 Girls performed better in math class because teachers rewarded cooperation and
obedience, traits that boys had difficulty expressing at earlier ages. The solution for these
problems in math achievement, some psychologists reasoned, was not to create sex-neutral
pedagogy, but simply to have boys start school a year later: educational institutions would thus
allow the underlying natural order of things to run more smoothly.
Some early postwar psychologists tried to make sense of women who bucked trends by
faring better on math standardized tests than verbal ones. This sometimes involved the use of
personality inventories to determine whether girls who did well on standardized math tests were
also abnormally masculine.298 In one early postwar study, women at Santa Barbara College who
scored disproportionately high on the quantitative components of the American Council on
Education Psychological Examination were then administered the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI).299 The researcher conducting the study, William Altus,
categorized questions on the MMPI by their potential for revealing personality oddities, and
compared the answers of mathematically minded women to their verbal-minded schoolmates.
Altus deduced from the responses that a young woman skilled at math “tends statistically to be a
somewhat more anxious, straightlaced, conventional, dysphoric person who dislikes to read”—a
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lavender-tinted obsessive-compulsive type who, “beneath their Pollyanna-ish, conventional
façade, [has] considerable anxiety and some prickly-pear attitudes.”300 In this line of thinking,
women who learned differently than typical women—who learned like men—had to have been
socially and psychologically abnormal.
Mathematical Feminism and Biological Essentialism in the Second Wave
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, feminist and liberationist politics began to change
the kinds of questions many researchers asked in their work—and, in turn, mainstream
publications influenced the way their audiences perceived academic examinations of socially
radical questions. This often led readers to encounter feminist ideas through a filter of detached
journalistic skepticism. Consumers of Psychology Today could, for example, read an article on
observable differences between baby boys and girls—one peppered with observations that the
nature-versus-nurture debate “now sets off furious blasts among interest groups from women’s
liberation to gay liberation.”301 Readers could also find this swirl of journalistic coverage and
rhetorical dismissiveness in the pages of Time, which devoted many column inches during the
time to actions of prominent feminists. Kate Millett could, at once, be on the cover of Time and
regarded as “the Mao Tse-tung of Women’s Liberation” within the feature story.302 Writers for
the magazine portrayed Shulameth Firestone and Elizabeth Janeway as women with good
premises but extremist conclusions—and observed that “[m]any of the new feminists are
surprisingly violent in mood, and seem to be trying, in fact, to repel other women than attract
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them.”303 This journalistic approach to women’s liberation—as Gloria Steinem would
characterize it, an effort to “[report] it as a small, privileged, rather lunatic event instead of the
major revolution in consciousness”—helped cultivate a public that became more aware of gender
politics while calling into question the legitimacy of its tenets.304
Federal actions also changed the gender dynamics of educational policy and
organizational culture during the 1970s. The broadest, most substantive changes came through
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which was eventually signed into law by
President Gerald Ford in May 1975.305 The title pegged equal educational opportunity to federal
financial funding: schools at every level of education had to commit to nondiscriminatory
practices if they wanted to keep receiving money.306 This requirement extended not only to
curricular and extracurricular offerings, but also admissions, housing provisions, and retirement
annuities. Title IX also created a new level of educational bureaucracy—the Title IX
Coordinator—and mandated that such officials be easy to identify and access, whether at an
individual university or in a state education agency. Yet the vast majority of state educational
agencies failed to create Title IX bureaucratic structures within the one-year timeline mandated
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by the law.307 Although the federal government had created policy protecting the education of
women, not all components of higher educational bureaucracy were quick to comply.
These broader social, political, and educational changes made it possible for certain
researchers to challenge prevailing assumptions about why girls failed to find equal footing in
mathematics. Some—particularly the University of Madison–Wisconsin mathematics
educationist Elizabeth Fennema—used standardized testing data as the means to question the
actual roots of sex differences in girls’ mathematical achievement. Before releasing her own
research, Fennema had already tapped into the broader emergent feminist critique of schools as
sites that reinforced sexist social hierarchies. Fennema engaged in conversations sparked by
other educational writers who argued that, contrary to the prevailing notion that schools were
spaces for girls to shine, existing educational curricula had been “denying girls and women the
right to full development of their cognitive and emotional abilities.”308 Fennema believed that,
through “cold empirical data,” feminist researchers could clearly illustrate that every aspect of
American education—from elementary school through college—contained material, attitudes,
and practices that kept women from seeing themselves as mathematically-minded beings.
In 1974, Fennema published a meta-analysis designed to challenge the prevailing
assumption within both academia and the greater public that girls simply were not as capable at
mathematics as boys. In a meta-analysis, researchers comb through previous studies on a topic,
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often conducted over a number of years and with many particular focuses, and use statistical
techniques to synthesize findings in a way that makes a more potent statement about what
research suggests in general. Looking through fifteen years’ worth of educational research,
Fennema wanted to address two core questions: What, if anything, did studies indicate were
actual differences between girls and boys in mathematics achievement? And what did the
research suggest were the root causes of any differences? Fennema did not want her metaanalysis to be misinterpreted as some hunt for the exact age at which girls became naturally less
mathematically capable than boys. Instead, Fennema used the method of meta-analysis to make a
feminist critique of the American educational system: girls’ diminished math skills were a
symptom of learning environments that held little value in the idea that women could participate
as equals. If the aggregate research indicated that boys had better math skills than girls, Fennema
argued, then American educators had “a moral responsibility as well as an economic necessity”
to thoroughly redesign American mathematics education to eliminate sex bias.309 Only then
could girls live up to actual natural potential.
Fennema’s meta-analysis, printed in the Journal for Research in Mathematics Education,
revealed no deep-seeded differences in girls’ and boys’ mathematical skills. The existing
research on children up to the third grade showed “no consistent significant differences” in sexbased mathematical capabilities, and studies on students between fourth and ninth grade were too
erratic to make any meaningful overarching conclusions.310 Among later grades, the only clear
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point at which boys outperformed girls in mathematics was in standardized achievement tests
administered to high-school seniors—and, even then, only one study had produced such results.
In that study, conducted by Margaret Backman in 1972, sex marked a greater distinction between
achievement test scores than ethnicity or socioeconomic status. Backman nonetheless cautioned
against assuming these differences had any biological component, given that “the social
implications of the physical differences [between males and females] can play an important role
in the development of characteristic abilities.”311 Even the scant pieces of research Fennema
could find suggesting boys out-tested girls in math already came with the disclaimer that nothing
about the results was strictly a matter of biology.
Fennema deduced that the only reasonably clear trend was that high school boys had
greater tested strength in “higher-level cognitive tasks”—leading her to conclude that this latedeveloping difference must have stemmed from a series of social causes.312 As Fennema noted,
girls were less likely to take as many math courses as boys, while boys were more likely to drop
out of high school; these concurrent phenomena created high schools in which boys who
remained often had more extensive mathematical instruction and thus tested better on
standardized tests and in studies. For Fennema, the social basis for these differences meant that
sexism pervaded both American education and mathematics-education research. The
presumption that girls would eventually fare worse than boys in mathematics created lazy
research methods and destructive classroom practices that held teenage girls back from their full
potential. At the very least, teachers and researchers who understood that girls may approach
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math differently than boys yet found no incentive to develop new learning methods only
reinforced the ideas that girls’ approach to the subject was abnormal, unorthodox, and imprecise.
Fennema soon teamed up with University of Wisconsin–Madison psychologist Julia
Sherman to develop an instrument for measuring girls’ comfort with mathematics. Using a grant
from the National Science Foundation, the researchers developed the Fennema-Sherman Scales
in 1976 to empirically gauge girls’ perceptions of parent and teacher interest in their math
studies, their levels of confidence and anxiety toward math, and “the degree to which [they] see
mathematics as a male, neutral, or female domain.”313 Fennema and Sherman sought to measure
the factors that kept girls out of advanced math classes in high school despite displaying similar
aptitude to boys when given standardized math tests at earlier ages. The pair built their namesake
scales partly in reaction to published findings from the recently developed National Assessment
of Educational Progress (NAEP), which indicated that marginal differences in math skills
between 9- and 13-year-old boys and girls ballooned into gaps that could “only be described as
overwhelming” by young adulthood.314 Even though NAEP asserted that the score gap was “the
result of different but systematic cultural reinforcements for the sexes,” Fennema and Sherman
argued that the study suffered from poor sampling techniques and, worse yet, the results had
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been misreported in broader circles as a sign of boys’ natural superior mathematical minds.315
The Fennema-Sherman Scales, by contrast, could provide empirical evidence on mathematical
attitudes that would be less prone to interpretive mangling among nonexperts.
Using their scales, Fennema and Sherman made the case that attitude was everything, at
least when it came to achievement in mathematics. Fennema and Sherman argued that girls
pulled back from taking additional math classes in later grades “because mathematics is
perceived as a male domain” in broader society.316 Girls instead gravitated toward fields of
study that reflected socially sanctioned sex roles. This conditioned avoidance of mathematics led
girls to pursue fewer extracurricular activities that strengthened their spatial reasoning skills as
well as underestimate their problem-solving skills—social phenomena misread as a natural
phenomena when comparing girls’ and boys’ performance on relevant standardized test
questions. Conversely, when Fennema and Sherman compared standardized math test
performances for boys and girls who took a similar number of math courses, significant
differences between the two groups evaporated. Although other factors, particularly
socioeconomic status, altered the attitudes girls and boys held toward mathematics, Fennema and
Sherman maintained that girls’ measurably lower confidence in learning math and stronger belief
in mathematics as a men’s field provided a clearer basis for test score gaps than any alleged
natural differences.317
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As Fennema and Sherman argued for the social basis of girls’ mathematical
demoralization, other women in mathematics created work for youth, adults, and colleagues alike
that showcased women’s longstanding contributions to the discipline. These efforts emerged as
women mathematicians formally organized during the early 1970s. Realizing that American
academic mathematical associations paid little attention to the small amount of women within
their ranks, American University professor Mary Gray and several other women mathematicians
created the Association for Women in Mathematics (AWM) in 1971. The AWM spent part of its
early years not only holding well-attended panels on women’s historical contributions to
mathematics, but also printing biographical and thematic essays on women mathematicians in its
newsletter, such as “Lady Lovelace and the Analytical Engine,” “Emmy Noether: Twentieth
Century Mathematician and Women,” and “Women in Combinatorics.”318
Other researchers eventually developed biographical anthologies for broader audiences.
Some anthologies, particularly those created by mathematics educator Teri Perl, integrated
biographical sketches of past and present women mathematicians with short activities related to
their innovations. In Perl’s workbooks, readers examined parabola diagrams after learning about
Hypatia of Alexandria, folded various three-dimensional models following an essay on Grace
Chisholm Young’s contributions to plane geometry, and translated decimals into binary numbers
after reading the stories of the women mathematicians of the Masdison Academic Computing
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Center. While other authors created less interactive biographical anthologies, they shared a
similar belief: the accomplishments of the women highlighted in these collections should not be
taken as a sign that anything resembling gender parity in the field of mathematics had been
achieved. Rather, these women became preeminent mathematicians amid a modern Western
“feminine mathique” that placed mathematical proficiency “at variance with one’s
womanhood.”319 Their deep influence on mathematics, these authors emphasized, should be
viewed as a reminder of the countless women discouraged from the field. How many Sophie
Germains or Sonya Kovalevskys could have existed in the absence of patriarchal institutions and
social mores?
Not all researchers ascribed to a social model for girls’ mathematical shortcomings,
however. Fennema and Sherman’s main critics, the educational psychologists Camilla Persson
Benbow and Julian Stanley, offered a competing hypothesis based on their observations of
academically gifted youth during the early 1980s. Although Benbow and Stanley accepted
Fennema’s claim that gender-related mathematical differences could be observed in early
adolescent students, the pair argued that such differences stemmed from girls’ “less welldeveloped mathematical reasoning ability.”320 The pair argued that girls did not do worse than
boys in mathematics because they took fewer math courses—but, instead, that girls took fewer
math courses because they had inferior math skills, a fact reflected by their test scores. For
Benbow and Stanley, “superior male mathematical ability” was most likely “an expression of a
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combination of both exogenous and endogenous variables,” but differences in the math courses
teenagers took carried no weight.321
The pair also used standardized testing data to build their competing claim. The
researchers analyzed the SAT performances of roughly 10,000 junior high-aged girls and boys,
all of whom had taken exam as part of the long-term Study of Mathematically Precocious
Youth.322 Benbow and Stanley maintained that measuring younger adolescents’ mathematical
capabilities through the SAT would eliminate the need to control for differential coursework;
gifted junior high girls and boys were far more likely to have identical math classes than their
senior high counterparts. Although gifted boys and girls performed equally well on the verbal
portion of the SAT, boys consistently outperformed girls on the math portion of the standardized
test. Further, boys in the study were far more likely than girls to receive high math scores on the
SAT (at least 600 on the classic 200-800 scale)—and in any given cohort, the highest-ranking
boy earned anywhere from 30 to 190 points more on the SAT math section than the highestscoring girl.323 When students from earlier cohorts later took the SAT for college admissions
purposes, the same general pattern held: boys continued to outperform girls on the math section.
If the nation’s most academically gifted youth continuously produced gendered score gaps on the
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SAT math section before any of the students had a chance to differ in their math class choices,
Stanley and Benbow concluded, then Fennema and Sherman’s hypothesis did not hold up.
Whether of not such boys eventually took calculus more frequently than girls could not change
the fact that a foundational, partially innate, difference was already in place.
Benbow and Stanley’s study, published in Science at the end of 1980, soon received
criticism from various scientists, psychologists, and educational researchers. Science published
an assortment of these critiques several months later. Some writers, such as the physicist Carl
Tomizuka and consultant Sheila Tobias, argued that boys and girls’ willingness to participate in
the study was itself the byproduct of gendered social attitudes toward mathematics. If girls were
typically more reluctant to join math programs for gifted youth, and often discouraged from
participating in extracurricular activities that sharpened math skills, the pool of students available
for the study had already been markedly socially influenced before early adolescence. Other
critics, particularly the scientists Elizabeth Stage and Robert Karplus, found fault with the
assumption that students who took similar courses had similar experiences in the classroom: girls
and boys had been shown to receive considerably different treatment in math instruction even in
elementary school. The mathematician Edith Luchins and psychologist Abraham Luchins
questioned why, knowing how difficult it would be to control for pervasive cultural factors,
Benbow and Stanley did not focus instead on designing question types that would eliminate sex
differences in math test performance. One Department of Education employee wondered what, if
anything, the SAT genuinely revealed about mathematical ability. The math section of the SAT
consisted largely of word problems—a question type prone to content bias. The employee
lamented that, more than anything, Benbow and Stanley’s convenient depiction of the SAT as a
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test of mathematical reasoning only contributed to the rhetorical laziness with which researchers
generalized their findings:
“Should we ever discover a genetic and organic basis for
mathematical ability, we can be certain at a minimum that some
girls will have more ability that almost all boys—a subtlety that
keeps getting lost in our ‘Boys are more or less X than girls’
language.”324
Benbow and Stanley chastised their critics for failing to understand the nuance within
their findings. As the two researchers insisted, “superior male mathematical ability” and “greater
male ability in spatial tasks” should not have been misinterpreted to mean boys were “inherently,
intrinsically, or genetically abler” than girls—just that endogenous factors could be one of
several reasons boys outperform girls on the SAT math section and spatial reasoning tests.325 To
Stanley and Benbow, questions about earlier forces that discouraged girls from participating in
the study evaded the numerical reality that fewer girls qualified—and those girls who did qualify
for the study earned lower average scores and lower peak scores than the boys in their cohorts.
Benbow was far more blunt in her statements to popular media about the meaning of her and
Stanley’s research. Insisting that the observed test score data was accurate—that the numbers did
not lie—Benbow stated that the backlash to her research stemmed from a discomfort with the
truth: women could not “’bring themselves to accept sexual difference in aptitude,’” much less
help girls “’accept it and go from there.’”326 For Benbow and Stanley, Science had not provided a
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space for meaningful criticism but “a forum for subjective judgments and anecdotal evidence.”327
By their logic, the math portion of the SAT had captured irrefutable data—something calculable
and therefore true—that feminist politics willfully ignored.
Benbow and Stanley’s line of reasoning held value at a moment when sociobiology
revived the idea of primordial bases for human social patterns. Stemming largely from the work
of insect biologist E.O. Wilson, sociobiology argued that the most useful starting point for
understanding human behavior is to observe similar behaviors found in other animals, and to
consider the evolutionary and preservationist purposes for certain social phenomena. As Wilson
suggested in the infamous final chapter of his 1975 work Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, “the
time [had] come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and
biologized.”328 Altruism, territoriality, and homosexuality made far more sense, Wilson noted, if
one first accounted for the behavior of chimpanzees and other mammals. Wilson’s arguments,
along with those made by contemporaries such as David Barash and Mary Midgley, sparked a
wave of contentious debates within scientific circles—soon morphing into a verbal slugfest in
which sociobiology’s critics accused its supporters of being quasi-fascist eugenicists, and its
defenders dismissed detractors as groupthink leftist conformists. Although sociobiology did not
necessarily advance wildly novel ideas, it built upon the previous generation of sociological
functionalist theory to offer an even more essentialist explanation for social sex roles: men and
women were, in many ways, no different than the males and females of other species, whose
social patterns also follow from the reality of sexual difference.329 More generally, it added
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weight to criticisms of feminism. If women’s liberation had the right ideas, critics mused, why
hadn’t these changes already come to fruition?330 While sociobiology did not directly influence
Benbow or Stanley’s research, the theory gave currency to academic arguments at the time that
suggested deep-wired biology played some unavoidable role in the differences between men and
women—that social forms followed biological function.
Benbow and Stanley followed up their initial report with additional studies that held the
SAT as the most accurate gauge of sex-based differences in mathematical reasoning ability. The
researchers repeated their analysis of precocious adolescent performance on the SAT with a
second, larger group of boys and girls. The same patterns Benbow and Stanley observed with
their earlier subjects reappeared. Far more boys than girls earned high scores on the math section
of the SAT, and the ratio of boys to girls grew more severe as the level of performance
increased.331 Benbow and Stanley also analyzed the high-school math coursework, later SAT
performances, and college majors of first-year college students who had participated in their
earlier Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth. Overall, these students’ average SAT scores
were now roughly 200 points higher than the national average for college-bound high school
seniors—but the gap between men and women’s SAT math scores had inched even wider than
what had been measured in their early adolescence. Although the young men and women had, on
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average, taken over four years’ worth of math courses in high school, men typically began taking
advanced math classes earlier than women and took more extensive coursework, particularly
calculus. Despite this, gifted girls typically received slightly better class grades than boys, and
were more likely in their first year of college to declare a major in mathematical sciences.
Benbow and Stanley nonetheless concluded that, “[i]f one is interested in the question of why
women do not pursue careers in mathematics and science as frequently as men do,” one had to
make use of data which provided a logical explanation for such phenomenon.332 For Stanley and
Benbow, only the gap in math SAT scores and what it suggested about innate differences offered
that.
The two also dismissed the claims of researchers who challenged the usefulness of the
SAT over other standardized math tests. What ensued was an argument over what, really,
different standardized math tests measured and whether an individual’s performance on one type
of standardized math test gave any meaningful data about the skills measured by a second
standardized math test. Educational sociologists Aaron Pallas and Karl Alexander reconsidered
the differential coursework hypothesis, arguing that sex-related differences in SAT math scores
more likely reflected the factors that kept girls out of advanced math classes rather than whatever
skill differences already existed by the time girls and boys entered high school. Pallas and
Alexander tested their hypothesis by calculating what factors caused a test score gap to emerge
between when ninth-grade boys and girls took School and College Ability Test (SCAT) to when
they took the SAT as high school seniors. The pair determines that test score gaps developed
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largely in high school and were largely “due to the sparse quantitative programs of study
typically pursued by girls.”333
Stanley and Benbow countered Pallas and Alexander by pointing out, exasperatedly, the
incompatibility of the standardized tests used in the study. Of course Pallas and Alexander found
no sex-related test score gap in the SCAT only to see one emerge in the SAT: the tests measured
drastically different aspects of mathematical ability. Performances on the SCAT, which was
thick with word problems and focused on computations and arithmetic concepts, could not be
used to gauge how test-takers fared on an algebra-dense test such as the SAT.334 When
challenged more bluntly by other researchers to defend the interpretive significance of high SAT
scores, Benbow asserted that superior math scores on the SAT “[related] closely to success in
high-level, fast-paced mathematics and science courses, to educational acceleration, and
(especially) to the choosing of careers requiring excellent quantitative ability.”335 The SAT
remained useful for Benbow and Stanley because it was the only standardized test to give a
reasonably clear idea of gifted adolescents’ likely college and career paths.
As Benbow and Stanley published and defended their findings, the demographics of
American higher education and labor were in the middle of several major shifts. In 1970, U.S.
colleges and universities enrolled about 50% more men than women: 4.4 million versus 3
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million. While men’s enrollment numbers rose throughout the 1970s, women’s skyrocketed,
nearly doubling by the end of the decade. During the 1980s, women’s enrollment rates continued
to grow as men’s stagnated. By the end of the 1980s, about 1.25 million more women than men
were enrolled in higher education. This broad shift, however, varied depending on students’
ages. Men outnumbered women in U.S. colleges at every measured age level in 1970—but by
1980 men only outnumbered women among college students in their twenties. The only
consistent point at which men outnumbered women at the end of the 1980s were among students
aged 22 to 24. Despite the change in the composition of college students, the number of men
who completed at least four years of higher education remained substantially higher than that of
women during this period, even though more women had completed at least some college.
Within a generation, women became the larger group on American campuses by a sizeable
margin—but nonetheless remained less likely to have a four-year degree in hand by the time they
reached twenty-five.336
The gender dynamics of the U.S. workforce also changed noticeably during this period.
Between 1970 and 1990, the percentage of women over the age of sixteen in the U.S. labor force
grew from roughly 43% to about 58%, while the percentage of men coasted downward from
nearly 80% to 76%. During this same time period, the number of civilian men and women in the
U.S. grew by nearly about 52 million—but as millions of women entered the workforce, millions
of men left.337 When viewed alongside the rising age of first marriages during the same time
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period, these labor and education figures suggest a partial—but very incomplete—change for the
terms of successful young adulthood for many American women.338 Attending college and
entering the workforce took more and more priority for many women over getting married.339
Federal Fascination with the Gender Gap
By the late 1980s, the academic debate about “sex differences” in mathematical test
performance had expanded into a broader discussion about the “gender gap.” The argument had
expanded beyond the causes of the differences between men and women’s mathematical and
scientific capabilities, growing to include debates about why the differences endured despite the
persistent attention paid to it. Standardized testing was central to this shift. As more students
took more standardized tests, particularly in mathematics, researchers had more data to test
hypotheses and offer explanations.340 Depending on the study, the gender gap in math
(last accessed February 11, 2017). The number of women outside of the U.S. labor force remained relatively stable
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standardized test scores was either closing, holding steady, or resurfacing; girls were either
continually underrated by tests or overrated in the classroom; comparing high school students’
standardized test performances provided a useful gauge for assessing social pressures on
adolescents or ignored more meaningful differences established early in grade school; and
women’s continued underrepresentation in math and science jobs was a profoundly social issue
or a bit of feminist mythmaking. Because various researchers used different standardized tests to
reach contradictory conclusions, testing data held currency for nearly all participants in the
debate. Whether researchers and pundits believed standardized tests were biased tools that
perpetuated social disparities, or that they were refined instruments that simply reflected social
and educational problems, standardized testing data became a valuable commodity.341
During the late 1980s, the federal government also took an interest in considering the role
standardized testing played in perpetuating the gender gap, as well as the general extent of sex
bias in standardized tests themselves. In a three-panel hearing before its Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, the House Judiciary Committee examined the role standardized testing
played in the math and science gender gap. But the testimony did less to point to one clear
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answer so much as indicate the sheer inextricability of standardized testing from the organization
and economics of higher education. Among the first panel was Ms. editor Phyllis Rosser, who
had written about standardized testing bias for both popular magazines and the National Center
for Fair and Open Testing throughout the 1980s. Rosser asserted that the sheer volume of
standardized tests used for admissions and scholarships created systemic sex bias in higher
education. Over three million high-school students took one of three college-readiness
standardized test (the SAT, ACT, and PSAT), and young women consistently earned higher
marks in college courses than predicted by their test scores—calling into question the entire
legitimacy of these exams. If the SAT were an accurate predictor of college-bound women’s
first-year grades, Rosser argued, “girls would score 20 points higher than boys, rather than 61
points lower.”342 This systemic under-prediction shut girls out of higher-ranking schools and
scholarship competitions, eventually causing “a real dollar loss for females in later life, as they
get less prestigious jobs, earn less money, and have fewer leadership opportunities.”343
Not all members of the subcommittee, however, found Rosser’s arguments equally
compelling. Colorado Representative Patricia Schroeder—the only woman representative in the
entire House Judiciary Committee—observed that her sixteen-year old daughter already had
fallen prone to the disorienting effects of surprisingly low test scores: she and her friends began
342
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“to wonder if their high school performance, or if they had charmed their high school teachers, if
maybe suddenly they’re not as good as they used to be.”344 Schroeder found it unconscionable
that guidance counselors would likely discourage her daughter’s friends and many other girls
from applying to certain schools strictly because of these test scores, despite many having
studied math well beyond what was tested on the PSAT, ACT, and SAT. Alan Slobodin, the
subcommittee’s Republican minority counsel, remained dubious. Slobodin questioned Rosser to
define what, exactly, bias was—“I mean, if there’s a one point difference, would you consider
that bias? How about five points?”—and whether the overall impact of test score differences was
negative given how some fields, particularly law, had recently experiences a massive surge of
women.345 How, Slobodin wondered, could these standardized tests be biased if two-thirds of
their developers are women? And what if the classrooms themselves produced biased results?
Although the subcommittee officially deemed the issue of sex bias a topic worth further
examination, some members remained unconvinced the issue was as drastic as some witnesses
professed.
Rosser submitted with her testimony a reading comprehension passage to illustrate the
depths to which bias against women pervaded standardized testing content. The short passage,
taken from the June 1984 version of the SAT, focused on the anthropologist Margaret Mead’s
depiction of sex roles in food production. Although test-takers were asked to consider the short
passage’s intent, form, and tone, the passage itself was riddled with several logical
inconsistencies. The passage’s author chides Mead for making “such a dubious generalization”
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about commonly-observed gendered divisions in food preparation—but only after directly
quoting Mead’s insistence that such divisions “’can be modified, and the modifications provide
proof that the pattern itself is not something deeply biological.’”346 The author then proposes
that two patterns actually exist: the basic pattern Mead described, and “one in which food is
produced by the men with relatively little help from women,” which the author deems “the
female and male systems of farming.”347 This argument not only was logically needless, as it did
not depart from Mead’s quoted statement or the idea of sex roles in itself, but also muddied the
lines between biological and social functions by deeming the variations “male” and “female.”
Faulty logic aside, Rosser’s bigger concern remained the multiple effects such a passage would
have on girls who took the SAT. In one of the few instances girls encountered a women
researcher on a standardized test, they also saw her ideas discredited by an anonymous
uncredentialed commentator. This experience, by Rosser’s estimation, would not only jar young
women in the moment by possibly slowing them down and harming their test scores. Such an
encounter could also have had an discouraging and enduring subconscious effect on their future
paths of study.
The College Board and Educational Testing Service officials interviewed in the
subsequent panel did not, unsurprisingly, share the same disdain for standardized testing as
Rosser did. Their defense was that, if anything, standardized testing had opened more pathways
for woman into colleges and universities than any other method. The gradual decline in women’s
SAT scores was not a reflection of test bias, but of the expanding number of women who took
the test. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, women went from being the minority to the
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majority of SAT candidates—and by 1987, the year of the subcommittee hearing, about 40,000
more women than men took the exam. This broad trend, these officials stressed, “correspond[ed]
exactly to the times periods in which the scores of women declined.”348 Because the test-taking
population was self-selecting (students voluntarily took the exam, regardless of their skill level
and without any prerequisites), the larger number of women taking the SAT also included more
racial minorities and women from lower socioeconomic households. These newer test-takers’
lower scores were not a reflection of some inferior capacity, officials stressed, but of their lower
readiness for college based on poorer educational opportunities. If anything, the officials noted,
the SAT and other standardized admission exams predicted first-year success for women
accurately while over-predicting the academic success for men. For ETS and the College Board,
the gender score gap simply reflected a broad influx of new college-goers, using the SAT and
other standardized tests to access a world previous closed off to them.
To counter allegations of test bias, the testing officials submitted several documents that
detailed the processes Educational Testing Service and the College Board had developed during
the 1980s to reduce gender stereotypes and analyze peculiar testing results. ETS formalized its
Sensitivity Review Process several years earlier to ensure tests “contained questions recognizing
the varied contribution that minority members made to our society” and that “there was no
inappropriate or offensive material in the tests.”349 Frequently, ETS changed the descriptive
material of a question for the purpose of diversification without altering the tested concept;
revising a grammar question to include “a representational women’s reference” to the poet
Gwendolyn Brooks did not affect the question’s core purpose of seeing whether students could
348
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identify a comma splice. ETS also removed sexist stereotypes and language from its test
content—depictions of mechanical incompetence, “aviatrix” and other feminized diminutives,
use of “generic he,” among many others—unless contextually necessary.350 Although the
College Board and ETS insisted that the SAT and other standardized tests had useful predictive
capabilities regardless of the demographic group in question, they did acknowledge that some
individual questions may have elicited wildly different results between certain groups of testtakers and thus warranted “differential difficulty analysis.”351 For each of the 60 math questions
on the SAT, ETS and the College Board conducted a differential difficulty analysis between
white men and white women, comparing the percentage of test-takers in each group who
answered correctly. The test-makers calculated that the correlation between what these two
groups found difficult were extremely close, even if the overall gender gap in test performance
remained persistent. For ETS and the College Board, the continued differences between men and
women on standardized tests, through real, were not the result of either organization failing to
scrutinize and improve their measurement tools.
The question of who, exactly, was responsible for the persistent gender gap became no
clearer when the congressional subcommittee took statements from an MIT admissions director
and a testing reform executive. As the admissions director admitted, women’s lower scores in
math and science standardized admissions exams led to a consistent under-prediction of their
final grade point average. The SAT had failed to determine that women at MIT had the same
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GPA as men, but lower dropout rates.352 Even so, the admissions officer maintained that
standardized test scores ideally played a supporting role in determining which applicants would
be accepted; although nonselective schools would have little reason to make test scores the key
barrier to entry, selective schools typically used them as part of a more complex formula. Yet
Denise Carty-Bennia, the executive chair of FairTest, stressed in her testimony that over onethird of colleges and universities had a minimum SAT or ACT score required for admission.
Schools kept these hard cutoffs, Carty-Bennia noted, despite the College Board’s insistence that
a student could potentially retake the SAT and earn a score 130 points higher or lower than their
original marks without any genuine statistical difference. (Even discounting this extreme
example, most SAT test-takers had a normal variation of about 30 points in either direction for
each half of the exam.) When compounded with the number of scholarships premised on
standardized test scores, a sizeable chunk of higher education admissions—not only who got in
but also who was rewarded for their potential—had become based on an exacting, highly
imprecise use of standardized tests that only reinforced existing social biases.353 This misuse of
tests in admissions and scholarships passed the burden of back onto test-takers: the system may
be unfair, but you also already knew the hurdle you needed to clear.
Although Congress’s investigation of the gender gap stopped short of intervention, some
state-level governments amended their educational policies during the late 1980s to reduce the
352

Michael C. Behnke, statement to subcommittee, 284. The lower dropout rate is significant because the
larger pool of women had the opposite effect than it did with SAT scores nationwide, in which a larger number of
women led to lower average scores. It is also worth noting that the admission director, Michael Benhke, was also a
Chairman of the New England Regional Council of the College Board and a member of the scholarship selection
committee for the National Merit Corporation; see congressional testimony at 290. This is not noteworthy for being
unusual so much as in the difficulty in completely separating testing bureaucracy from admissions bureaucracy.
353

Denise Carty-Bennia, statement to subcommittee, 297-301. As Carty-Bennia noted, the College Board
advised admissions officials that “score differences of less than 66 points on the SAT verbal and SAT mathematical,
respectively, [had] little significance” (300), a statistical grace window at odds with the admission procedures at
many schools.

194

effects standardized tests had on girls’ and boys’ life paths. New York in particular restructured
the way it used the SAT for its two largest college scholarship funds. As a cost-saving measure,
New York State Education Department began using the SAT as the sole determinant for its
Regents Scholarship and Empire Scholarship recipients during the late 1970s. After numerous
complaints that this method discriminated against girls—who, despite being the majority of
applicants, received well less than half of all state scholarships—the state temporarily switched
to a formula that considered both SAT scores and high school grades. The state’s legislature
allowed this method to lapse, leading to class action suit filed on behalf of girls throughout the
state. The plaintiffs in Sharif v. New York State Education Department alleged that the use of
SAT scores as the sole determinant for New York’s merit scholarships violated girls’
constitutional right to equal protection as well as Title IX provisions. The defendants maintained
that grade point averages were an unreliable way to gauge which students merited a
scholarship—particularly after many elite schools fudged records to ensure more of their
students received Empire and Regents Scholarships, thus maintaining the prestige of their
programs.
The presiding judge for the U.S. District Court of southern New York ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs. Judge John M. Walker reasoned that New York’s use of SAT scores for
scholarship funding was so far from the original intended use of standardized tests—and, even
then, the SAT chronically underpredicted girls’ college achievement—that its sole use in
determining Regents and Empire scholarship recipients violated girls’ equal protection and Title
IX rights. Walker asserted that these violations occurred even if no discriminatory intent existed:
good intentions were no defense for educational sex discrimination. The judge also noted,
however, that New York could still use SAT scores to decide Regents and Empire awards if the
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state also used other metrics, or that it could instead develop a standardized achievement test
specifically suited for determining which students merited state funding. Even when states
directly intervened in misuses of standardized testing that contributed to lifelong gender gaps in
mathematical achievement, they never abandoned the idea that a fair standardized test could be
developed to measure girls’ genuine math skills. Specific tests and the way they were
mishandled may have perpetuated social gender disparities in math and science, but standardized
math testing itself was too integral to the business of higher education to remove completely.354
The Enduring Mystery of the Gender Gap
Decades after the debate about girls’ mathematical skills began, several key features
persist. Most notably, the gendered gap between men and women’s relationship to math and
science remains, despite continued shifts in the demographics of American higher education and
the U.S. work force. Although women now outpace men in the number of postsecondary degrees
they attain—accounting for over half of all doctorates, nearly 60% of all masters degrees, and
about 57% of all bachelors degrees conferred in the 2013-14 academic year—they remain
relatively underrepresented in certain scientific and mathematic fields. Whereas women receive
more degrees in biomedical and psychological disciplines, men significantly outnumber women
354
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in computer science, engineering, mathematics, and physical science degrees; taken altogether,
the gap within STEM fields has remained stagnant for the last several years.355 While women
make up nearly half of the American workforce, as well as half of the college-educated active
workforce, they only make up one quarter of workers in STEM occupations. Despite STEM
occupations providing considerably higher wages and relatively smaller gender wage gaps than
the average job, women with degrees in mathematics, engineering, technology or physical
sciences remain “less likely than their male counterparts to work in a STEM occupation.”356 As
STEM has grown into a prized, sometimes fetishized field of study, women remain a marginal
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presence—exacerbating persistent wage gaps attributable to gender and race, particularly as the
narrowing of those gaps has stagnated over the past decade.357 If standardized tests play some
role discouraging or preventing women access into highly esteemed fields of study, then they
ultimately hold some deleterious effect on women’s economic power.
As women continue to lag behind men in their pursuit of STEM degrees and occupations,
researchers keep mining standardized testing data as a way to determine the onset and severity of
the math and science gender gap. While many educational pundits continue to investigate the
enduring SAT-M score gap, others have asserted that the SAT is too limited a test, administered
at too late a stage in secondary education, to deliver a full set of observable differences. While an
earlier generation of researchers used standardized testing data to fuel a debate about the core
causes of the math and science gender gap, contemporary researchers are now more hesitant to
357
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point to a singular cause.358 Whether inspired by sociobiological models of development,
convinced that capitalism fuels disparities more than culture or biology could–or simply
unwilling to retread old arguments—researchers seem less certain to ascribe a singular cause to
the gender gap. More potently, whatever the argument, standardized testing data remains a
highly valued way to consider women’s worth to society. Test scores continue to serve as both a
psychological and an economic form of data, serving as a monitor for how well girls with
mathematical skills become women who fulfill the state’s STEM needs.
More than anything, the persistent gender gap in standardized test scores has made it easy
for numerous Americans to continue suggesting that there must be something essential—
something innate and pure and true—about quantitative data that shows differences in men and
women’s mathematical skills. The examples are both relentless and repetitive. In fact, what
makes the contemporary period remarkable is how redundant the story has become. Consider, for
example, Lawrence Summers’s remarks at a National Bureau of Economic Research conference
in early 2005, in which the former Harvard president insisted “issues of intrinsic aptitude”
contributed more to women’s underrepresentation in tenured engineering and science
professorships than “socialization and patterns of discrimination.”359 For Summers, the
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“unfortunate truth” was simply that fewer women had intellects “three and a half, four standard
deviations above the mean.”360 Or consider, similarly, the numerous studies over the past decade
that have sought to make meaning out of test-based sex differences among the most extreme
cases of mathematical talent. Even though many of these researchers ultimately discredit—or, at
least, greatly minimize—the role biology plays in mathematical talent, they still feel obliged to
frame their studies as investigations of the validity of biological essentialism. This framing
suggests that, despite mounting evidence of the attitudinal and socioeconomic factors that
prevent all but a few girls at select institutions from competing on a level mathematical playing
field with boys, the idea that standardized testing data reveals genuine inborn aptitude still
carries tremendous social cachet.361 By grafting essentialist gender politics onto standardized
test data, and by treating numerical information as something untainted by social influence,
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Americans still entertain the idea that biology is the clearest arbiter of talent—and that only the
most extreme cases of measurable talent can be used to frame an argument about gender and
society. In this way, standardized testing has helped ideology shape destiny.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE BIRTH OF THE STUDENT-CONSUMER: STANDARDIZED
TESTING, CONSUMER ADVOCACY, AND THE EDUCATIONAL MARKETPLACE

Standardized testing has become an evergreen item of scorn. Websites, think tanks, and
periodicals devote considerable time and money producing commentary on the dangers of
American education’s obsession with, and dependence on, standardized tests. Whether speaking
of high-stakes statewide testing schemes or college admissions exams, standardized tests also
seem increasingly unpopular among American parents and students, particularly those in the
white middle class, among whom opposition to nationwide standardized tests often serve as a
proxy for political beliefs. Yet, while pundits and the general public often share a disdain for
testing itself, standardized test preparation remains as popular—and profitable—as ever. The
market remains flush with guidebooks, practice tests, tutoring programs and even coaches, all for
the purpose of improving standardized test scores. The current state of educational testing is
anchored in irony: few seem to embrace the degree or types of standardized testing students
endure throughout their education, but many seem willing to participate in the test-preparation
marketplace in order to score as well as possible. The tests may attract considerable disdain, but
the socioeconomic stakes for poor performance are too high for many to avoid participating in
the test preparation market.362
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This chapter examines how this knotty relationship developed between the late 1960s and
the mid-1980s. During this period, middle-class white Americans expressed their dissatisfaction
with standardized testing in two key ways: challenging the legitimacy of testing practices
through consumer advocacy networks, and purchasing the products and services of testpreparation (“test-prep”) companies. Through both practices, standardized testing came to be
publicly discussed as a consumable good. Testing companies, in turn, were posed as corporations
subject to certain responsibilities, and test-takers (or, by proxy, their parents) were framed as
consumers entitled to certain rights. Two groups of consumers ushered in these changes to
standardized testing during this decade. On one front, young consumer advocates nurtured by
Ralph Nader conducted a several-year investigation of Educational Testing Service (ETS)—by
far the United States’ largest creator of standardized admissions exams. These consumer
advocates, many of whom started as student activists, published their searing findings in 1980 as
the report The Reign of ETS: The Corporation That Makes Up Minds. These consumer advocates
also helped usher in New York’s truth-in-testing law, which mandated that test-makers divulge
the correct answers and explanations for standardized exams. On the other front, standardized
test-preparation (“test-prep”) entrepreneurs developed and expanded standardized testpreparation operations, both in terms of geography products offered. The mixed findings of
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation into the ethicality of test-prep services offered
the industry enough legitimacy to continue diversifying into the 1980s.
The functional relationship between standardized tests, test-makers, and test-takers
changed considerably by the mid-1980s. Whereas testing companies once held colleges and
universities as the key consumers of standardized testing—and students as the testing candidates
whose results created the data needed for test scores to have any meaning—by the mid-1980s,
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students held a more dominant role. Those who took standardized admissions tests were no
longer students but student-consumers, who had the right to question the legitimacy of
educational gatekeepers by invoking their right to quality products. But transparency laws and an
expanding test-prep industry helped transform student-consumers’ satisfaction into a commodity
in itself, creating an environment in which ETS and other test-makers bundled old tests for
commercial publication, and test-prep companies increasingly staked their marketing on persona
rather than content. This commoditized satisfaction did more to reinforce standardized testing as
an educational gatekeeping device—and, in turn, cemented standardized testing as a key
gatekeeping mechanism for the middle class. Test-prep devices and transparency measures made
middle-class Americans feel a greater sense of ownership and participation in the test-taking
process and thus solidified a pattern in which the clearest way to maintain intergenerational
middle-class status was to score well enough on standardized tests to earn entry into a college or
university socially designated as befitting one’s class status.
Focusing on this consumerist turn—found in both the rhetoric of the publication The
Reign of ETS, the FTC investigation of test-prep companies, and the actions of both test-prep
companies and test manufacturers following transparency laws—illustrates several curious
features about the American middle class during the late-twentieth century. In particular, the
emergence of the student-consumer reveals the slipperiness with which consumer advocates, test
manufacturers, and test-prep companies alike have equated test-takers with the future middle
class and consumption with higher education. Indeed, then and now, these three entities have
accused each other of defending the interests of a narrow band of Americans—the white-collar
middle-class—while hiding behind the idea of “public good.” To this end, consumer advocates’
push for transparency in standardized testing operations illustrates a rhetorical slight-of-hand
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between “the middle class” and “public interest,” insomuch as the problems of the former have
been used to invoke the latter. This slippery language is much more than just word games,
however. It reverberates throughout higher education policy debates, when the structural needs
and privileges of the solidly middle class are used to dictate the priorities and ideals for the
future U.S. higher education.
Consumerism as a Framework for Understanding Standardized Testing
What typically complicates the historiography on standardized testing is that researchers
are often woven into in the history of standardized testing itself. Nicholas Lemann, whose work
The Big Test remains the most notable critical inquiry on the SAT’s impact on American social
structure, was eventually appointed on a 2008 National Association for College Admission
Counseling commission that higher education institutions scale back their reliance on
standardized admission test scores when selecting students.363 After writing None of the Above,
a searing indictment of the logical legerdemain Educational Testing Service used to validate its
tests and operations, David Owen composed the forewords for two publications by the Princeton
Review—a test prep company whose marketing angle was premised on dismissing the SAT as
pseudo-scientific hogwash.364 Conversely, the College Board and Educational Testing Service
routinely smudge the author-subject relationship with their numerous institutional histories and
defenses of standardized testing methods.365
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A more stable historiographical foundation for this topic can be built on the history of
consumerism and consumer advocacy—particularly postwar U.S. consumer action. Although
Lizabeth Cohen and Lawrence Glickman disagree about the relationship between consumers,
collective action, and public space in post-1945 America, both authors’ respective work show
how the role of consumer has often also been wielded as a political position, to varying
success.366 As Matthew Hilton has argued, some hesitance may exist in classifying consumers as
political actors because postwar consumer activism—domestic, international, or transnational—
has not wedded itself cleanly to left/right political dynamics; consumers haven’t articulated a
politics as definably partisan, or at least as easily outlined, as those espoused by postwar activists
and social movement actors that historians and social scientists tend to cover.367 Postwar
consumers continually used their position to exert political influence (albeit with periods of
abeyance), and in the process defined public space and political action through the ability to
consume or not.
During the 1960s and 1970s, a growing number of Americans began to express their
social and political discontent from the position of wronged consumers. Consumption and

http://about.collegeboard.org/region-offices/puerto-rico. See also: John A. Valentine, the College Board and the
School Curriculum: A History of the College Board’s Influence on the Substance and Standards of American
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Examination Board, 1967).
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disparities; see: Rebecca Zwick, “Is The SAT a ‘Wealth Test’?” Phi Delta Kappan 84, no. 4 (December, 2002): 310.
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consumerism had long served as bases for Americans to frame their identity and air their
grievances—from the rejection of chain stores during the Great Depression to the tactical
boycotts of the Civil Rights Movement—but the consumer activism of the late 1960s and 1970s
reflected a growing dissatisfaction with individually-felt repercussions of postwar Keynesian
economics.368 The booming postwar economy may have created unprecedented wealth and
marketplace options for the white middle class, but it also agitated many who felt they had been
conned into wasting hard-earned money on expensive defective goods. Stuck participating in an
economy premised on consistent consumption, in which their social status hinged on
conspicuously embracing trends, but lacking any safeguards against bad-faith business practices,
many consumers developed a sense of powerlessness and cultural estrangement. Such
consumers, reasoned business researchers at the time, also believed the marketplace lacked
norms or genuine meaning.369 Airing their grievances as consumers allowed many in the white
liberal middle class to press for changes that would materially benefit their own status without
either upending the market system or seeming like an imposition of values: What American
doesn’t want quality goods? Although this wave of consumerism had one foot in the politics of
environmentalism and social justice—most notably, the sustained boycott of table grapes from
368
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the Coachella Valley—such consumer activism was, in many ways, a way to signify social status
and class values.370 Forgoing Di Giorgio grapes and avoiding appliances with low Consumer
Reports ratings allowed in the white middle class to externally portray their self-perception as
savvy, rational actors who simply wanted fair conditions in the marketplace, without tearing
down the market altogether.
No figure epitomized this era of consumer activism—or had as much influence on how
college students would articulate their grievances from the position of citizen-consumers—as
much as the consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Nader relied heavily on the efforts of college
students for his investigation of the Federal Trade Commission in the late 1960s. Nader believed
college students could harness their advanced training to improve their conditions as both
citizens and consumers through direct investigation, advocacy, action, and lobbying. This
conviction inspired Nader to develop the initial framework for Public Interest Research Groups
(PIRGs) in the early 1970s. PIRGs researched, lobbied, and litigated issues on behalf of students,
using funds culled from tuition fees. PIRGs also took advantage of American education’s
decentralized form, operating as state-level corporations that held offices at various college and
university campuses. Although PIRGs ostensibly represented the various political interests of
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college students, a few critics believed the fundraising schemes that kept most PIRGs afloat were
themselves acts of consumer fraud. While some states let college students voluntarily pay PIRGearmarked tuition fees, others mandated that students must explicitly request their college stop
assessing PIRG fees with their tuition, and others still gave students to ability to choose one way
or the other. (As Nader’s friend-turned-enemy David Sanford noted, while the opt-out model of
collecting fees made it possible for certain PIRGs to generate much larger revenues than
counterparts with opt-in models, this form of “negative option” selling was more disingenuous
that the book-of-the-month clubs Nader had already lambasted for using similar approaches.)371
This varied state-by-state fee system left some PIRGs flush with funds, full-time attorneys, and
staff, and others with less than $50,000 in annual funds by the mid-1970s.372 Whatever their
funds, however, all PIRGs reported that most of their staff were volunteers—and whether or not
their efforts reflected the politics of every student who contributed funds, PIRGs offered a venue
for students to invoke their democratic rights and responsibilities as active, dissatisfied
consumers.373 Nader’s PIRGs created a concentration of money, voluntary and paid labor,
political agitation, and shared democratic-capitalist vision that enabled New York’s PIRG to take
on the standardized testing industry in the latter half of the 1970s.
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Central as Nader’s PIRGs would eventually be to standardized-testing reforms, students
developed other approaches during this period for challenging educational practices as wronged
consumers. Notably, some students sought redress for their consumer dissatisfaction through the
courts. These students who filed suit against educational institutions and school districts claimed
they were victims of educational malpractice. These attempts to claim educational malpractice
were buoyed by changes to the American legal landscape—most notably, the end of in loco
parentis and the 26th Amendment—that made it much clearer for young adults to make legal
claims on their own behalf.374 In such cases—namely, Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School
District and Donahue v. Copiague Union Free School District—students sued school districts
after completing high school, claiming profound educational deficiencies that rendered them
unemployable. Although both Peter W. and Donahue ultimately proved unsuccessful for the
plaintiffs, they did establish a precedent that students and parents could at least imagine
education as a consumable good whose practitioners, as in medicine, remained liable in instances
of willful neglect.375 By extension, these lawsuits posed the student litigants as defective goods.
An education was thus not necessarily the product in these lawsuits, but the process by which the
students became valuable commodities in the marketplace. Although the Naderist approach
would win out in changing educational practices (at least, in the short term), the elision between
students as consumers of education and students as commodities produced by educational
institutions endured.
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Educational malpractice also has a root in a series of court cases between Marjorie
Webster Junior College and the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools
(MSACSS) during the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. MSACSS refused to grant accreditation
to Marjorie Webster, which was one of about two-dozen degree-granting for-profit higher
education institutions in the United States at the time. MSACSS claimed that for-profit
institutions fell outside of the purview of accreditation agencies. Marjorie Webster filed suit,
claiming that MSACSS’s refusal to consider accreditation detrimentally harmed their ability to
attract new students, despite being in operation for nearly fifty years. The District Court of
Washington, DC sided with Marjorie Webster in 1969, declaring that MSCASS’s refusal to
consider accrediting the school solely on the basis of its proprietary status was an unreasonable
restriction of trade. The district court judge ruled that MSCASS, through its accreditation
process, “engaged in a quasi-governmental function,” thus “subjecting it to the restraints of the
Constitution.376 Even if education was neither an explicit constitutional concern nor primarily a
commercial realm, the restriction of accreditation amounted to a violation of Fifth Amendment
due process rights in addition to Sherman Antitrust principles. This decision was overturned the
following year. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Sherman Antitrust regulations did
not apply to the nation’s six regional accreditation corporations, no matter how vital the quasigovernmental function they served, because protections against “incidental restraint of trade,
absent an intent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession” was not
transferrable to “the noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions.”377
That is, the primary business of education was education and not business. The Supreme Court
376
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refused to grant certiorari, thus allowing the appellate court’s decision stay. While the courts
were thus not opposed to proprietary schools per se, they ultimately decided that the corporations
that performed quasi-state functions regulating national education had a primary responsibility in
forging standards and not maintaining schools’ fiscal solvency. This primary responsibility of
quasi-governmental educational corporations would later prove useful—but not entirely
successful—for Educational Testing Service in its defense of certain testing practices.378
As the courts refereed the boundaries between education and business, the legislative and
executive branches became embroiled in a several-year squabble over whether consumers
required separate federal-level representation. Although Congress had created consumer
protection measures since the 1920s, it pushed for more substantive bureaucracy during the late
1960s and early 1970s. What undermined this congressional effort, however, was a switch from
legislation proposing a cabinet-level department for consumers to bills proposing an independent
Consumer Protection Agency. This switch—largely sparked by Ralph Nader’s testimony
advocating for a more flexible and supervisory body than a department could provide—also
inadvertently opened up competing consumer protection agency legislation as well as
emboldened a minority of congressional members to filibuster to lengths that weakened support
for popular bills.379 The executive branch also resisted approving such measures for a separate
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Consumer Protection Agency, categorizing the effort as an exercise in government overreach. A
government that too much influence on ensuring consumer satisfaction, Richard Nixon and
Gerald Ford maintained, would be an overreach of government into business affairs. Making
consumer advocacy a specific government responsibility would place government in direct
opposition to the interests of business—and a marketplace told what to do by the state could not
naturally develop the best possible solutions for its own consumer problems. Regulations and
their resultant bureaucracy unduly burdened business leaders from being nimble enough to fix
new problems as they emerged. A centralized consumer agency, by extension, would rob
individual departments of the ability to manage relations with citizen-consumers in the scenarios
most frequently encountered.380 The Ford administration in particular maintained that the best
solution was requiring all cabinet-level departments and agencies to develop consumer
representation plans so they could “determine where additional consumer input might be
desirable.”381 From a conservative perspective, “consumer rights” could easily be used to cudgel
business and government without ever representing what actual consumer interests.
Although the Ford Administration’s bureaucratically decentralized approach to consumer
affairs won out, this effort also inadvertently synchronized various federal approaches toward
380
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consumers of education. Because no single governing body had sole control over American
education, any effort to maintain a distilled approach to educational oversight had to, ironically,
involve considerable interagency coordination. Beyond the Office of Education, the federal
bodies alone responsible for funding and maintaining postsecondary schooling included the
Social Security Administration, Department of Defense, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Labor Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Federal Aviation Administration, and Veterans Administration. The Federal Interagency
Committee on Education (FICE) attempted to forge a standardized federal approach to
educational consumers, publishing its findings and recommendations in 1975. FICE aimed to
create consensus regarding who was a consumer of education, which rights they held distinct
from other types of consumers, and what role government could play in addressing grievances.
The subcommittee maintained that students held special consumer rights due to “the expensive
and intangible nature of the services [they are] purchasing, and in light of the potential for
consumer abuse in ‘future service contracts’ used by most schools.”382 As such, students needed
specific consumer protection mechanisms—such as tuition insurance in instances of school
bankruptcies, or loan forgiveness for fraudulent training programs—particularly when the federal
government had already funded both students and the postsecondary institutions they attended.
In the realm of education, a “buyer beware” approach would not only waste government funds
but also diminish students’ eventual usefulness to the state. The subcommittee nonetheless
insisted that protecting consumers of education had to involve public-private partnerships and all
levels of governance. The federal government could not overtake the accrediting and licensing
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responsibilities of existing private organizations—but this effort to share responsibility for
educational consumers using existing systems still left students without a clear or direct path to
file complaints against institutional misdeeds.
By the mid-1970s, then, the federal government was more primed than ever to treat
students as a special class of consumer, but still lacked clear avenues for those complaints to be
addressed. Students had attempted to build legal precedent for educational malpractice, but
courts ultimately decided not to extent antitrust legislation or malpractice concepts to cover
educational consumption. Consumers of education were instead treated as a special class of
consumer, who were the shared responsibility of public institutions, state and federal
governments, and private accreditation organizations. Where students interests became more
directly represented were through Public Interest Research Groups—but these Naderite
organizations often relied on convoluted tuition fees to fund actions on citizen-consumers’
behalf.
Ralph Nader and Public Distrust of Educational Testing Service
As the broader legal and federal system reconsidered its relationship toward education
and consumption, the American public grew increasingly critical of standardized tests—
particularly the SAT. In particular, many parties obsessed over the long, slow decline of average
SAT scores. Between the mid-1960s and the end of the 1970s, the mean SAT score for American
high school students dropped by 90 points, sparking a angst-riddled hunt for the cause of this
declining national benchmark. The College Board launched its own series of investigations, and
concluded that the seventeen-year score decline reflected two consecutive and related
phenomena. During the 1960s, as high schools absorbed the first waves of the Baby Boom, an
unprecedented number of young adults completed their high school education rather than drop
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out beforehand. The organization argued that the sheer number of college hopefuls, particularly
those from educationally underserved socioeconomic communities, gradually dragged down the
overall average performance among high school seniors year after year. By the 1970s, as Baby
Boomers continued to stretch the limits of available educational resources, many school districts
reduced the rigor of their high school programs in order to manage large numbers of students
without risking high rates of attrition. Declining SAT scores, argued the College Board, reflected
what inflated grades, dumbed-down textbooks, and softer course requirements tried to hide: a
growing number of American students who wanted to attend college were poorly prepared for its
academic challenges. This argument followed from the College Board’s position on test
coaching. Because the College Board insisted time and again that its tests were not coachable—
and that SAT scores were the reflection of the skills and abilities developed throughout a
student’s years in school—any massive downward trend in test scores had to be reflective of
shortcomings in American education at large. The test was “an unchanging measurement” in the
College Board’s eyes, and any public dissatisfaction with test due to low scores was misplaced
frustration toward broader social problems.383
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Most midcentury criticisms of standardized testing were not rooted in a consumer
mindset. Critics such as Banesh Hoffman instead claimed exams like the SAT were fraudulent
because standardized testing was a pseudoscientific enterprise. Hoffman, a physicist who once
collaborated with Albert Einstein, turned his attention to the flimsy logic of standardized tests in
the 1960s. For Hoffman, the very structure of multiple choice testing—the format upon which
objective standardized testing had been built decades earlier—was a phony attempt to seem
scientific. By asking test-takers to select the best among presented answers, test-writers could
dodge complaints that none of the options were exactly correct. Rather than identify the most
capable students, Hoffman maintained, standardized tests punished mentally nimble youth.
Clever students with enough awareness to sense what test-writers wanted still wasted time and
energy discerning the designated “best” answer from other worthwhile choices. Straddling
logical precision and compulsive pedantry, Hoffman dissected standardized testing questions
used in several high-profile exams in The Tyranny of Testing, accusing test-writers of knowing
nowhere near as much as they or the general public presumed they did. Hoffman reserved the
most scorn for Educational Testing Service. If ETS was the best standardized testing had to offer
yet it still produced a considerable amount of deeply flawed questions, Hoffman argued, then
less capable testing companies were truly dangerous. The “testolatry” which gripped American
society would only punish the best and brightest through false expertise.384
By the mid-1970s, however, a consumerist criticism of standardized testing had
developed, fueled mainly the efforts of student volunteers at the largest of Nader’s Public
Interest Research Groups, the New York PIRG. Nader regarded Educational Testing Service’s
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operation as secretive and unethical, and teamed with Princeton undergrad Allan Nairn to lead a
several-year analysis of ETS’s business practices. Nairn, Nader, and the New York PIRG
publishing their findings in 1980 as The Reign of ETS: The Corporation that Makes Up Minds.385
Central to The Reign of ETS was how Nairn, Nader, and PIRG research assistants positioned
themselves as dissatisfied consumers who aimed to make Educational Testing Service play by
the established rules for consumer-corporation relationships. Nader set this tone in The Reign of
ETS’s preface, persuading readers to view the consumer-corporation bond between American
students and Educational Testing Service as thoroughly rotten. Above all, Nader primed the
reader to see ETS as a corporation that thrived on “its long-standing policy to remain hidden
from public view.”386 Nader deemed this policy of corporate secrecy as “inimical to the
opportunities—both analytic and normative—which a democracy should provide all its citizens
from all classes, races, age groups, and genders,” thereby not only accusing ETS of being antidemocratic, but also staking as capacious a claim for citizenship as possible.387 Citizens were
thus doubly burdened by ETS, subject to corporate services that heightened social inequities as
well as anti-democratic practices that undermined the premises of their citizenship. Nader
asserted that educational contexts alone could not fully explain why Educational Testing Service
was so deeply entrenched in American society. Rather, “the consumer perspective [was] needed
to examine the assumptions and consequences of contemporary standardized testing.”388 To this
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end, Nader linked opportunity and democracy to the frame of consumerism, and established
consumers as the most reliable actors for social analysis and institutional critique.
To built upon Nader’s introductory claims, Nairn and his associates posed a market-based
relationship between ETS and the public that differed from the nonprofit’s self-portrayal. This
first depended on redefining who, exactly, consumed standardized tests. Whereas ETS believed
that its main consumer base consisted of the colleges and universities that used its testing data,
and that students were only testing candidates, Nairn argued that the true consumers were the
students or parents who purchased these tests. By redefining the consumer, Nairn also placed
more emphasis on the act of test-taking (that is, how students used standardized tests) than score
analysis (how schools used such tests). Redefining the primary consumer also, in effect, changed
the actual commodity under exchange. For ETS, test data had value in its predictive validity and
its reliability, or, how closely test scores correlated with a subsequent metric—almost always
first-year grades—and how consistently any given test-taker would earn similar scores were they
to take multiple administrations of the same test. As Nairn suggested through his use of
numerous vignettes in which aspiring students were victimized by ETS practices, the actual
commodity was the sense of self rendered through the test-taking process. Just as a great testtaking experience could validate a student’s self-worth, a bad testing experience, even before a
student ever received a score, could generate feelings of worthlessness: I am useless because I
am stupid because my test scores are too low to go to college.389
To this end, Nairn’s redefinition of the consumer relationship in standardized testing also
reoriented consumers as victims of a rigged system. Nairn posed test-taking as “involuntary
consumption”: even though students ultimately had the choice to not take standardized
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admissions exams, such a choice would come to the serious detriment of their career plans.390
Even then, students who took the test could have their plans derailed by an underwhelming
score. Students, as consumers of tests, were caught in a “contract of adhesion” without any clear
understanding of their contractual rights.391 Suspicious scores could be canceled by ETS
without any recourse for affected test-takers—unless a student had limitless resources to go
against ETS’s team of lawyers. Test-takers were not only victimized by psychometric logic that
cast discontents as “those who simply have a painful time accepting their proper role in life,” but
also by the well-funded and legally-protected means ETS used to keep psychometric systems of
educational measurement in place.392
Underlying all of these claims was Nairn’s argument that Educational Testing Service’s
tests did not measure students’ aptitude but, instead, reflected their class position. After
illustrating that the SAT’s predictive validity was quite weak, even when combined with other
predictors (such as a student’s high school record), Nairn used SAT score data to argue that only
one clear correlation could be drawn with testing data: between a student’s test scores and their
parents’ income. Regardless of region or ethnic group, the higher the score range, the wealthier
the average household income. Nairn insisted this “score-income correlation” was “more a
reflection of socio-economic status than their actual potential for future accomplishment.”393 By
framing test scores as a reflection of class, Nairn in effect narrowed the range of critique; ethnic
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and cultural biases were downplayed for the economic conditions that allowed students to have
the specific type of education rewarded by ETS’s tests, a type of education historically reserved
for white men privately-educated in the Northeast.
This score-income correlation also blurred who, exactly, was given the greater grounds to
complain through their position as consumers: poor families, who often received the lowest
scores but may have other identities through which to stake their testing grievances; or middleclass families, whose relatively average scores generated a personal sense of mediocrity at odds
with prevailing social narratives for middle-class success. As Nairn maintained, only the wealthy
benefitted from ETS’s model of merit and aptitude, a model that did not match up with an ETS
study that found “actual accomplishments outside the classroom did not correlate with income
either.”394 By individualizing the rhetoric of test-taking—as a measurement of how one
performed against all test-takers, devoid of demographic contexts—ETS could continue to
commodify the self-assessments students generated through the test-taking process, all while
evading claims of systemic bias.
Nairn maintained that ETS was able to have such tremendous influence because its rarely
monitored nonprofit status granted it legal protection from consumer-focused scrutiny and
complaint. Nairn particularly emphasized ETS’s long-overdue paperwork for nonprofit status in
New York State, where the organization was based. As a non-profit, ETS operated “exempt from
the scrutiny of the [Federal Trade Commission]”—and as an educational enterprise, it benefitted
from weak federal oversight.395 (Although the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
would be split into the Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Education
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by the end of the 1970s, this separate Cabinet-level upgrade didn’t necessarily come with
tremendous additional federal-level controls over educational practices.) Nairn argued that ETS
was, for all purposes, a monopoly; other testing companies did exist, but they operated at
nowhere near as large a scope or scale as ETS did. Because so many institutions and
organizations—governmental, educational, and otherwise—relied on ETS-produced tests for
hiring, admissions, and classification, the nonprofit existed in a realm beyond legal scrutiny. For
Nairn, the scenario was bureaucratic absurdity: a virtual monopoly that evaded trustbusters,
providing educational products outside the reach of federal government, with its revenues and
operations protected by its nonprofit business designation.
The solution, as Nairn concluded, was to make ETS conform to the rules of business
through transparency legislation—an effort also undertaken by the New York PIRG. Nairn
detailed New York PIRG and State Senator Kenneth P. LaValle’s three-year effort to enact
“truth-in-testing” legislation in New York State.396 Signed into law of July 1979 and effective
the beginning of the following year, New York State’s Educational Testing Act of 1979
positioned test-takers as student-consumers entitled to special protections. Primarily, the law
mandated testing companies “give students specific information on what their scores meant and
how their scores would be presented to academic and other institutions” as well as “provide
students—on request—with a copy of the questions, correct answers and the student’s own
answers thirty days after the scores had been received.”397 By requiring ETS and other testmakers to adhere to certain regulations similar to other corporations, such truth-in-testing
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legislation allowed students and parents to observe and challenge psychometric principles from
the position of dissatisfied customers.
Although truth-in-testing became law in New York State at the turn of the 1980s, this
victory not without pushback from test-makers. Claiming the law would undermine test security
and create financial ruin through skyrocketing research and development costs, the Association
of American Medical Colleges and American Dental Association threatened to stop providing
their respective admissions exams in New York State. The AAMC later secured an injunction to
prevent MCAT administrations in New York.398 The Psychological Corporation followed suit,
pulling the Miller Analogies Test from the state. But despite test-makers’ full-throated
opposition to statewide and national transparency legislation, ETS and the College Board—by
far the two largest bodies in standardized testing—reversed their opposition to New York’s Law
days before it took effect, deciding to follow disclosure procedures in exchange for significantly
fewer test administration dates.399 Within a year, the College Board made disclosure a
nationwide policy, following in the steps of the Law School Admissions Council and other
bodies that oversaw admissions testing.400
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Other figures with a vested interest in college admissions remained critical of truth-intesting after disclosure legislation took effect in New York. Educational historian-turned-policy
wonk Diane Ravitch lambasted New York’s truth-in-testing law as “consumer fraud” in itself.401
Ravitch accused transparency advocates of having little sense of standardized testing’s expenses,
thereby pushing for a situation that would only harm consumers in the long run. Testing
companies would be forced to raise the price of entrance exams considerably in order to recoup
questions lost by disclosure policies, effectively reducing poor students’ ability to even take
standardized admissions exams.
Stanford Dean of Admissions Fred Hargadon was particularly critical of truth-in-testing
legislation, and went so far as to suggest that the push for transparency was emblematic of
middle-class moral bankruptcy. As quoted in the New York Times, Hargadon accused
transparency advocates of shielding behind the cries of the underprivileged to cloak their
concerns over the composition of the middle class:
“’It’s one thing to make it on your own on merit. […] ‘It’s another,
as parents, to have the same measures applied to your children. A
lot of self-make people aren’t going to hold their children to the
same standards they applied to themselves.’”402
New York Board of Regents member Kenneth B. Clark echoed these sentiments. (The
Board of Regents was responsible for granting and overseeing ETS’s status as a nonprofit
educational institution.) Clark opined that the law’s provision for students to request and review
testing materials was a “deceptive and meaningless exercise” that would only reveal the obvious:
that test scores reflected class-based disparities in educational opportunity, disparities that
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privileged students could broaden through their ability to access additional opportunities.403 By
Clark’s assessment, truth-in-testing was a well intentioned but misguided “placebo,” one that
erroneously aimed to solve the social inequities reflected in test scores by offering procedures
students could only follow after the fact. The new protocols offered little more than a legally
sanctioned way to vent frustrations rather than upend the system.404
One irony of the debate over testing is that, at the time, certain education writers
suspected the fight over transparency signaled the end of standardized college testing altogether.
New York Times education writer Fred Hechinger suspected the SATs would “almost certainly
be an academic paper tiger within a few years.”405 By Hechinger’s estimation, colleges and
universities had over-expanded to the point where they could not be too picky about who fills
their classrooms, so long as their tuition checks cleared. Completing the SAT would become less
of a hurdle to quality postsecondary education and more a minor nuisance, an examination with
little value in itself except for those students who achieved statistically abnormal results. This
“shift from selection to placement on the campus” would reinforce consumers’ wishes rather
than fulfill institutions’ missions.406 Indeed, as ETS and the College Board endured several highprofile scoring gaffes exposed by students who took advantage of disclosure policies, the
standardized testing industry seemed prone for obsolescence: What good would standardized
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tests be if they were riddled with errors and when college had become a literal and metaphoric
buyers’ market?407
The Legitimation and Expansion of the Test-Prep Industry
As consumer advocates pushed for greater transparency, standardized test manufacturers
also felt increasing pressure from standardized test preparation (“test-prep”) companies. Testprep companies had offered courses and study aids for standardized college entrance exams since
the beginning of the postwar period, but they were largely concentrated in the greater New York
metropolitan area and New England. Nonetheless, the College Board devoted considerable time
in the 1950s and 1960s commissioning studies that discredited the effectiveness of “test
coaching,” claiming that the only effective form of test-prep was a thorough education. To this
end, test-prep for college or postgraduate standardized test was ineffective because foundational
skills had already been set years earlier: aptitude for college success had already been set far
earlier in a student’s education.408
Despite the College Board’s insistence that coaching was a waste of time, test-prep
companies benefitted from several shifts to the standardized testing and American educational
practices during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Quite simply, far more young people were
entering college than in the early postwar period, and colleges and universities increasingly
turned to standardized admissions exams to make sense of their growing applicant pool. These
colleges and universities—particularly those in the Southern and Midwestern parts of the United
407
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States—increasingly turned to the American College Testing (ACT) Program as a standardized
admissions exam. While this growing test market may have been stressful for the College Board
and Educational Testing Service, it spelled security for the test-prep industry: more people taking
more standardized tests, whatever the test, created a greater demand for college hopefuls to
successfully clear the testing hurdle.409
Given the vast expansion of the college-going and college-hopeful populations during the
previous two decades, as well as the spectacular claims that certain test-prep companies made
about their ability to raise test scores, the Federal Trade Commission felt it necessary to probe
the $60-million industry to assess its ethicality and legality. Although plans to investigate the
test-prep industry were first announced in late 1976, the commission’s report would not be
finished for another two and a-half years. The results, however, would directly alter the
relationship between standardized test manufacturers, test-coaches, and the American public.410
Although the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection sought to “estimate statistically the
impact of commercial coaching on SAT scores,” the Bureau explicitly stressed its investigation
could not be categorized as experimental.411 The bureau avoided using a group of non-coached
students as a control group. While using a control may have elicited more statistically and
scientifically sound results, the Bureau stressed that in this instance, a control group would have
been financially and ethically unsound. The Bureau felt it could not “[deny] access to
409
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commercial coaching to students who want[ed] it.”412 Should coaching have proven effective,
parents may have been incensed over a policy that hobbled their children’s chances on the SAT.
At least one of the companies under investigation was reluctant to relinquish its
clientele’s personal information, leading to arbitration in the United States District Court for
Massachusetts. In Federal Trade Commission v. Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center, Ltd., et
al, the FTC petitioned the court to have Kaplan comply with its subpoena duces tecum.413
Presiding judge D.J. Tauro deferred in part to the precedent set by FCC v. Schreiber, in which
the Supreme Court decided that “courts should not substitute their judgment for that of
regulatory agencies more familiar with the industries they are charged with regulating.”414 The
court would thus not honor Kaplan and others’ request to prevent the subpoena because the FTC
had a better understanding of what would be necessary for a thorough and valid investigation.
Once obtaining the files, the bureau worked around its investigative shortcomings by
designing ersatz experimental and control groups. The bureau corroborated customer information
for the two schools under investigation against ETS and College Board files for all SAT
candidates who resided in the same postal-code hubs as the majority of the coaching schools’
clientele.415 The files for these coaching clients were then corroborated against ETS’s list of
SAT candidates from the New York metropolitan area for all academic years between 1974 and
1977. The Bureau winnowed this pool of identified coaching clients students from 1,568 to
roughly 1,000, discounting clients who never took the SAT, took it outside the New York City
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metropolitan area, or took the ACT instead.416 Finally, the Bureau forged a control group by
randomly selected the SAT-score records for 2,500 un-coached students from ETS files.
Although the investigation could not allow for a genuine experimental group, test coaching was
prevalent enough in the New York metropolitan area by the late 1970s to create large simulations
of experimental and control populations.
The investigators also used a standardized demographic device to clarify any preexisting
discrepancies between their coached and uncoached groups. The bureau compared coached and
uncoached students’ respective responses on the Student Demographic Questionnaire (SDQ), a
voluntary survey administered during each SAT administration.417 Investigators determined that
students who attended coaching schools tended to have higher course marks and PSAT scores
than their un-coached peers. Coached students were more often than not “A” students in their
English and math courses, while un-coached students were more often than not “B” students in
these same subjects. The bigger difference between coached and un-coached students, however,
could be found in their family’s income figures. Over two-fifths of the coached students came
from families whose parental incomes exceeded $30,000 per year, while nearly one-half of the
un-coached students came from households with incomes less than $18,000 per year. Even when
accounting for self-selection factors that would encourage more youth from more affluent
families to consider college (and thus be more likely to take the SAT), coached students were
considerably more likely to come from uppermost socioeconomic brackets.418
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Investigators employed multiple regression analyses in order to best gauge the genuine
impact of coaching on test scores. This statistical technique was preferred to others because it
allowed the “ability to analyze the impact of one variable on another variable while [... holding
constant] the effects of several other factors.”419 Given the sheer variance within the SAT
candidacy in any given exam administration, the Bureau found it necessary determine the effect
of test-prep on SAT scores by first controlling for gender, income, high school marks, class rank,
high school type, PSAT scores, and distance between PSAT and SAT sittings.
The Bureau determined “that coaching was effective at one of the two schools”: Stanley
H Kaplan Educational Centers produced, on average, a fifty-point increase in customers’
composite SAT scores.420 However, this assertion was somewhat misleading as the average rates
of improvement attributable to coaching among the four different testing dates used in the study
varied from 35.1 points to 71 points. When factoring in confidence intervals, the rate of
improvement attributable to Kaplan’s coaching ranged from 31 to 67 points, and among
individual test dates, confidence intervals ranged from 2 points to 96 points. The other coaching
school under investigation, Test-Preparation Center, Inc., had drearier results. On average,
students coached by Test-preparation Center had a mere 3.6-point improvement on their
composite SAT scores, and their performances on the verbal section tended to slightly decline.421
The difference in test-coaching results between the two companies could be attributed to
markedly different operating practices. Brooklyn-based Stanley H Kaplan Educational Centers
refused to operate without preponderant control over its material—and the namesake owner went
so far as to engage in nepotistic behavior during the early expansion of his business in order to
419
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ensure that every office outside of New York City operated according to his standards. As seen
in a 1975 ad placed in the New York Times, the Bronx-based Test-Preparation Center did not
necessarily engage in such tight-knit management:
PART TIME [:] Hi profit biz oppty [sic] created by & for
educators. Administer and educational program in your
community. Contact TEST-PREPARATION CENTERS, Inc.,
3701 Henry Hudson Pkwy, Suite ‘D’, Riverdale, N.Y. [:] 212796-1076422
For a “low investment,” one could manage a Test-preparation Centers branch.423 The company
also directly courted teachers in the classifieds section of the Times, offering math teachers
fifteen dollars per hour for part-time after-school work on Wednesday afternoons.424 Although
the company openly advertising the wages it would pay its employees, it did not use its
advertisements to specify how much its SAT-prep and speed-reading courses cost—only
stressing there would be a “DISCOUNT for Early Registration.”425
Although the bureau asserted test coaching worked in at least some instances, it
backtracked on this claim in the report’s second half. The investigators instead insisted the claim
“that School A [Kaplan] ‘works’ and School B [Test-preparation] does not” was half-baked.426
Any gains made by students enrolled in a test-coaching course had to be measured against their
preexisting levels of underachievement. According to the investigators, if students did poorly on
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the SAT “given their demographics and other personal characteristics” before being coached,
then coaching may not have caused genuine improvement.427 More bluntly, if a coaching school
led students to live up to expectations, then such improvement was not from genuine coaching.
Such students purchased coaching through self-selection—that is, recognizing the range of their
alleged capabilities and living up to them—rather than the desire to attain outstanding SAT
scores.
Had the Bureau unequivocally reported that certain coaching schools could consistently
produce genuine improvement in students’ SAT scores, Educational Testing Service might have
found itself in an unenviable position. However, ETS may have been partially responsible for the
tone of the Bureau’s final product. R. Jeffrey Smith alleged that the Federal Trade Commission
was “[h]arassed by [ETS] and nervous about a document lending credence to a suspect
industry.”428 The FTC decided to release the document only after a considerable delay and with
several pointed caveats—and following the resignation of Arthur Levine, who oversaw the
investigation.429 When questioned, Consumer Affairs staffers remarked that the findings did not
“provide enough information to question the legitimacy of standardized tests themselves”; the
study lacked a scientifically genuine control group of students, and thus could not be trusted
beyond a minimal degree.430
However tepid, the FTC’s findings were enough for the test-prep industry to claim a
measure of legitimacy. Following the report, Stanley Kaplan used rhetorical deference to give his
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company extra credibility. By asserting “’cram courses do not help,’” Kaplan distanced his
company from its competition, but also implied to the public that the test-prep industry should
not be seen as a cohort of enterprises with a shared agenda or product, but merely a broad
spectrum of companies dependent upon the continued use of standardized exams.431 Although
the FTC study sought to determine if the test-prep industry had engaged in consumer fraud, the
results may have ironically spurred some justification for certain test-prep companies to demand
high prices for their goods: Kaplan charged over three times as much for SAT prep that TestPreparation Center, and even factoring in the amount of time spent in direct instruction, a client
would have paid twice as much per hour at Kaplan.432 This per-hour cost comparison may seem
somewhat misleading because Kaplan had devised dozens of hours of supplemental audio
material students could use while at a Kaplan center. But, the use of such material was optional,
as a client could use as much or as little of Kaplan’s Test-n-Tape system as he or she desired.433
Regardless, the FTC report may have reinforced and popularized Kaplan’s method of
operation: one paid considerably more for test-prep when offered myriad possible ways to
prepare using a company’s materials. One was no longer strictly a student, but a studentconsumer, whose purchase signaled not merely a desire to improve, but the monetary means one
was willing to expend to reach those ends. If a student were to customize and fully use the
supplementary material, then Kaplan and its analogues could reinforce the claim that they were
engaging in long-term, multidimensional coaching—and that such holistic learning did not come
cheaply. Conversely, clients who ignored the various additional materials could be dismissed as
431
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careless students and thoughtless consumers, since the company’s numerous provisions
mitigated that company’s burden in guaranteeing significant test score improvement.
As the test-prep industry benefitted from a boost to its credibility, it also became more
competitive. During the 1980s, more test-prep companies gained national recognition—none
more than The Princeton Review (“TPR”). Founded in New York City in 1981 by John
Katzman, TPR held an openly antipathetic posture toward the SAT and similar standardized
tests. Katzman maintained that how well or how poorly a person scored reflected nothing more
than their ability to take that particular standardized test.434 The SAT was not an exam one
should slavishly devote countless hours toward, Katzman assured customers, but an
unremarkable and thoroughly predictable test that could easily be bested. For several hundred
dollars, students took TPR courses to learn how to game the SAT’s structure in order to attain
markedly higher scores.435 Both Katzman and his associate Adam Robinson had experience in
the test-prep industry prior to The Princeton Review, both having worked at Bob Scheller’s testcoaching company Pre-Test Review.436 But, by developing a corporate persona attractive to
teenage cynicism, Katzman was able to expand his own business from a boutique Manhattan
service for affluent students to a wildly successful set of nationwide franchises and trade
paperback prep-books. This corporate persona, when coupled with its two-tier system of
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expensive courses and inexpensive prep books, allowed TPR to serve the educational class
demands of an elite clientele while still profiting from the aspirations of a middle-class bookbuyers.437
Even in its earliest advertisements, TPR used a glib and sarcastic tone to establish its
stance toward standardized admissions exams. One early ad, printed in the New York Times in
late summer, 1981, hooked readers with the remark “Some people have an Uncle on the
Admissions Board…and some people have The Princeton Review.” 438 Although the ad noted
that TPR courses were taught “by a staff of Ivy League alumni and undergraduates” using the
latest computer technology, it remained silent on how an eight-week SAT prep course actually
cost.439 Such ads subtextually commended potential clientele for not being from an older order of
established money and power, while casually ignoring that these customers had enough
disposable income to pay for boutique test-prep.440 TPR also reinforced this position through its
slogan. By declaring itself “the nemesis of standardized testing” in early advertisements, TPR
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could signal that it had no fondness for testing practices, while sidestepping the obvious fact that
its existence dependent upon the sustained popularity of the SAT and other entrance exams.441
The Princeton Review also used its advertisements to set itself apart as cooler and more
effective than its competition—particularly Kaplan. A series of TPR ads printed in 1985
triumphantly declared “WE SCORE MORE!”442 Above this exclamation lay a bar graph
representing the alleged improvement to students’ SAT scores after various test-prep methods.
The Princeton Review’s 150-point increase not only dwarfed Kaplan’s modest 50-point gains,
but burst through the graph itself. Ads from later in the decade took more direct jabs. One,
printed in the Wall Street Journal in 1988, quipped “If You Can’t Afford The Princeton Review,
Stanley Kaplan Is An Acceptable Compromise.”443 This line of advertising mocked those who
chose inferior, understaffed, and outdated Kaplan SAT prep courses for the sake of maintaining
their family budgets. TPR courted its clientele by posing its SAT courses as an investment with
tremendous payoff—without ever suggesting that its target demographic could purchase classes
without making a financial sacrifice, that Kaplan had the same target demo, or that all students
consuming test-prep material had the same college (and class) aspirations.
Some TPR ads employed several clever techniques at once, including deceptive sources
of praise. One 1988 ad in Wall Street Journal joked, “Not everyone tests well,” below which lay
six comically drawn figures illustrating the evolution from chimp to modern man.444 Labeled
“Week 1” to “Week 6,” the figures suggested TPR could help students become “highly evolved”
441
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test-takers. The ad copy included snippet endorsements from Rolling Stone and The Christian
Science Monitor, appealing to the sensibilities of both clients and their parents. But the
testimonial attributed to Rolling Stone was misleading. As printed, it stated:
Rolling Stone reports, “Princeton Review Students are being
admitted to college that wouldn’t have considered them
before…When you raise a kid’s score 200 or 300 points, …you
change his whole outlook about himself.”445
These statements, while attributable to David Owen’s glowing profile of Katzman and Robinson
for Rolling Stone, were not written by Owen but said by Katzman himself. The second ellipses
simply erased any indication of who said what.446 For TPR, even self-generated praise could be
turned into a marketing material.
By the middle of the 1980s, Katzman expanded TPR’s product line to include test-prep
workbooks—courting a far wider consumer base than students who could afford expensive prep
courses. Released in 1986, Cracking the SAT built off of TPR’s cynical corporate persona,
attracting students who also believed the SAT was an obnoxious hassle but may not have shared
the same Ivy League aspirations as the company’s earlier clientele. For ten dollars, any student
could learn how to manipulate the mechanics and structure of the SAT to their own benefit, and
editorialists praised the bestseller for “exposing the gimmicks and flaws of [… the] SAT.”447 To
this end, any student who purchased Cracking the SAT could also feel as through they had tapped
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into coaching secrets typically reserved for upper- and upper-middle class teens. Cracking the
SAT offered the sheen of privilege without any of its material perks.
Cracking the SAT used a variety of rhetorical and pedagogical techniques to make its
readers feel like savvy consumers who, with TPR’s help, could easily avoid the College Board’s
tricks and traps. David Owen, who wrote the book’s foreword, insisted that preparing for the
SAT was a way to safeguard against dimwitted admissions officers, who “won’t understand how
to interpret the scores you send them” but nonetheless “[speculate] freely about your intelligence
and even your personality on the basis of how you do.”448 Katzman likewise assured customers
that “the SAT is not written by Nobel Prize-winning physicists of Pulitzer Prize-winning
journalists,” just “ordinary folks who had ordinary test scores.”449 Because normal people wrote
the SAT, one did not have to be a genius to do well. Rather, test takers needed to remember a
few basic rules: always guess rather than leave an answer blank, no matter what ETS or your gut
says; mark up the test booklet as much as you need; and rack up points by focusing on the earlier
questions in a set because they were invariably easier. Clever test-takers, Katzman stressed, only
bothered memorizing the 200 or so vocabulary words the College Board routinely used, and
worked backwards to save time on algebra questions. Readers of Cracking the SAT also learned
to avoid acting like Joe Bloggs, a thoroughly average student whose “hunches are always wrong
on on difficult questions.”450 Test-takers should always go for answers Joe Bloggs would choose
early in each verbal and math section, Katzman noted, and avoid all answers Joe would be lured
by at the end of each section. Once students mastered avoiding Joe Bloggs’s pitfalls for each
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question type, they could have their hand at a full-length practice test—which, for an additional
seven dollars, the Princeton Review would score and offer detailed computer-generated analysis.
Through Cracking the System, Katzman turned TPR into a brand that made customers at all price
points feel too clever to be average.
By the mid-1980s, Katzman was an ascendant figure who used relatively controversial
behavior to his company’s advantage. Such braggadocio occasionally crossed into illegal actions,
leading to a series of lawsuits and appeals between Katzman and Educational Testing Service
during the mid-1980s. The rulings in these cases further entrenched the test-prep industry in a
contentious but ultimately mutually beneficial relationship with standardized test makers over
the legality of certain business practices. Legal actions began in August, 1985, when ETS filed a
civil action against both Katzman and The Princeton Review in the United States District Court
for New Jersey. ETS aimed to forbid the test-prep company from using several hundred
“confidential test questions” allegedly pilfered by Katzman and his employees for TPR clients.451
Katzman and TPR were accused of coaching clientele with “facsimile” versions of SAT-Math,
SAT-Verbal, and other College Board test questions--causing ETS to discontinue nearly 300
“secure” test questions slated for use in the 1985 versions of the SAT.452 ETS maintained
Katzman’s theft of secure test questions not only compromised the integrity of the test but, more
importantly, was an act of copyright infringement.
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As the case opinions illustrated, ETS and already reached a détente with Katzman over
earlier instances of theft, when TPR was a fledgling sole proprietorship. In 1982, Katzman came
under the possession of “certain Math and English Composition Achievement Tests,” and
distributed material from these exams to his clientele prior to their official use by ETS.453
Katzman refused to reveal how he attained the material, but reached an accord with ETS the next
year with the following terms:
to return all copies of the purloined tests, to refrain from copying or distributing
any ETS copyrighted or copyrightable materials or registering for or attending
any test administered by ETS unless it was for bona fide purposes, and to notify
ETS if any unlawfully obtained ETS tests came into [his] possession and provide
ETS with information as to their source.454
ETS alleged that Katzman betrayed that agreement by copyrighting test-prep questions too
similar to actual SAT questions. The test-maker also indicated that in early 1985, “Katzman
attempted to take the SAT as a standby candidate at Dwight-Englewood School in Englewood,
New Jersey,” a tactic also used by other TPR employees after the earlier agreement.455 These
combined actions indicated to ETS that Katzman sought to profit off of the test-maker’s
creations and had no intention to stop.
The judges for these multiple cases had to determine whether the state of New Jersey was
the proper jurisdiction for ETS to file suit against Katzman or TPR and, most pressingly, whether
objects like standardized test questions were novel enough items to merit a copyright
infringement suit. New Jersey District Court Judge Maryanne Trump Barry deduced that, despite
being a New York resident, “Katzman [was] amenable to suit in New Jersey” because his 1983
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arrangement with Princeton-based Educational Testing Service was valid precedent for his
contact in the state, even if TPR had been incorporated in another state the interim.456 Third
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Dolores Sloviter upheld that Katzman’s distribution of
“facsimile” test questions was unjustifiable. Sloviter found both of Katzman’s arguments about
ETS’s choice of copyright lacking. Even if ETS copyrighted their tests as compilations, Sloviter
noted, the test questions within such compilations were still protected by copyright.457 The judge
also dismissed the claim that ETS questions were uncopyrightable ideas rather than
copyrightable expressions of ideas, and declared TPR’s educational benefits were too minimal to
consider the academic fair use loopholes for breach of copyright.458 But, although Sloviter found
some of TPR’s “facsimile” questions to be so similar to ETS originals to essentially be
unwarranted copies, the judge also declared that the preliminary injunction overreached. Sloviter
ruled that the earlier prohibition against “’adapting’ ETS’ materials may [have encompassed]
permissible use of ETS’ material,” as Katzman and TPR were unduly prevented by the
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injunction from potential legitimate business practices.459 Whatever Educational Testing
Service’s special needs were, it could not impede upon the business of testing.
What complicated Educational Testing Service’s litigious behavior was that test
manufacturers had already entered the test-prep market. Between truth-in-testing legislation and
the FTC’s qualified legitimization of test-coaching, standardized testing manufacturers found
themselves in a precarious position at the beginning of the 1980s. How could they continue
functioning if correct test answers had to be publicly disclosed, and if test-coaching companies
could continue expanding operations? Such changes could have created prohibitively large
research and development budgets. Test manufacturers found a solution to both problems in the
same place: by taking material rendered obsolete by disclosure policies and selling it in the
marketplace, thereby upending truth-in-testing advocates’ class-based complaints and consumer
politics.
By releasing old material, test-makers’ could reap both profits and public esteem while,
at the same time, maintaining their position that short-term practice was largely ineffective. The
College Board’s first mass-market preparatory product, 4 SATs, was a direct consequence of
truth-in-testing legislation. Its popularity led to the commercially sold 10 SATs in 1983.460 For
the first time, students could become acquainted with the SAT through previous versions of the
exam. But the organization also stressed that little good would actually come from sitting down
and taking all ten tests—nor thinking anything beyond long-term preparation would do much
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good. 461 As some critics noted at the time, many commercial SAT-prep products on the market
were ill suited to prepare students for the actual test. Many prep guides either mangled the
logical structure of question types or contained “bizarrely superfluous” vocabulary lists and
reference guides with little relevance to the SAT.462 Other products relied on new computer
technology, and offered practice tests stored on floppy disk, sometimes for as much as $300.463
The College Board’s commercial material, by contrast, automatically held market appeal because
it was guaranteed to be as similar as possible to the actual test material; the SAT’s validity and
reliability depended on relative consistency between subsequent versions of a test, so consumers
could rest assured that SAT released because of transparency laws were close to what they would
encounter on test day.464 What else could compare to the real thing, particularly when it cost less
than ten dollars? Commercially publishing obsolete material allowed the College Board to
convey that truth-in-testing legislation would not hobble the quantity or quality of its testing
content, while signaling to test-prep companies that even the release of genuine test questions
would not undermine entire system.
Although The Princeton Review ultimately lost its legal battle against Educational
Testing Service, Katzman’s company demonstrated that the test-prep industry’s legitimacy
during the 1980s hinged in part upon companies displaying distinguishable attitudes toward the
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SAT and standardized testing in general. (Katzman claimed his legal defeat was actually a
victory; the two years and hundreds of thousands of dollars ETS invested in its lawsuit only led
to a reward of “$52,000 in damages” and a massive growth in The Princeton Review’s
business.)465 Unlike Kaplan, The Princeton Review publicly held the SAT in contempt—and
Katzman would later liken the exam to “a cancer.”466 But Katzman’s disgust for the very
product that made his company possible makes sense when seen as an act of creating a corporate
persona. By publicly sharing a disdain for the exam with TPR’s key demographic, Katzman
allowed clients to believe that their choice in test-prep could also reflect their view toward
standardized testing —creating handsome profits for Katzman and his company in the process.
The Knotty Logic of the Contemporary Educational Marketplace
In the ensuing decades, certain test-prep companies have developed into massive
enterprises that court additional groups of educational consumers. No test-prep company has
experienced as much change as Kaplan, which grew into a for-profit educational provider that
now keeps an entire media conglomerate afloat. In November 1984, the Washington Post
Company purchased Kaplan, indicating a desire to broaden the test-prep company’s scope of
services and market penetration.467 Although Kaplan earned $35 million from nearly 95,000
clients that year, the company reached “only a small percentage” of high school students who
took the SAT at the time.468 Despite a steady growth in clientele, market reach, and revenues,
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Kaplan remained a relatively minor holding for Washington Post Company until the turn of the
century.469 Beginning in the late 1990s, Kaplan segued into offering its own higher educational
services, purchasing online postsecondary programs such as Concord Law School that had
already received accreditation. Kaplan thus plugged into the nascent for-profit higher education
market without investing too much on infrastructure.470 By 2005, these higher education
ventures overtook test-prep as Kaplan’s most revenue-generating sector.471 It was the Great
Recession, however, that made Washington Post Company “more dependent than ever on a
single business: Kaplan”—and in particular, its higher education division.472 As economic
calamity drove the newspaper industry into a tailspin, it also pushed economically insecure
Americans into for-profit colleges, allowing the Washington Post Company to weather the fall of
print journalism at the cost of becoming dependent on trends in higher education.
Kaplan’s expansion into higher education also illustrates the complicated relationship
between test-prep companies, their sources of profit, and the state. Of the $1.9 billion dollars in
revenue Kaplan, Inc. generated in 2015, about 45% came from its Higher Education division.473
Barriers for Millions of Students and Caused a Sonic Boom in the Business of Education (New York: Kaplan
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While this was considerably lower than its 2010 peak of $2.9 billion, Kaplan nonetheless
provided a greater share of Graham Holding’s profits than ever before, accounting for nearly
three-quarters of the conglomerate’s revenue that year.474 Kaplan University, which ran forprofit degree programs for nearly 40,000 students nationwide, derived its greatest source of
funds from federal student financial aid, particularly Title IV loans. These loans provided Kaplan
University about 628 million dollars by 2015—and by extension, nearly a quarter of all Graham
Holdings operating revenue. Kaplan University took in enormous revenues even after the federal
government had reached its breaking point with for-profit colleges’ student loan profit schemes;
the Department of Education had already caught Kaplan padding tuition bills and matriculation
fees by thousands of dollars, and had punished the school for producing graduates with
extremely high debt-to-earnings ratios and abysmal loan repayment rates.475 Although test-prep
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continues to generate hundreds of millions in annual revenues for Kaplan, for-profit education
has become its most profitable enterprise, deeply ensnaring the corporation within education
policy and federal funds.
As certain test-prep companies took on other educational roles, some test-makers started
acting more like sales-focused corporations. Over time, the College Board’s changes to the SAT
seemed less like efforts to fine-tune its flagship test and more like image-conscious rebranding
efforts. Addressing longstanding concerns with the integrity of the test score scale, the College
Board completely recetenered the SAT in 1995. Although recentering the test eliminated the
convoluted statistical process by which the College Board equated new versions of the SAT back
to a version created in 1941, some critics (notably educational historian Diane Ravitch)
suggested the most visible side effect—a dramatic rise in SAT Verbal scores—was a way to
placate students while sidestepping declining nationwide standards in language and reading
education.476 Other efforts by the College Board, such as changing the test’s name from
“Scholastic Aptitude Test” to simply “SAT,” seemed more overtly focused on improving public
relations.477 Even major changes to the composition of the SAT allowed the College Board new
opportunities for profit. Before debuting an overhauled version of the SAT in 2005, the College
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Board released The Official SAT Study Guide for the New SAT, which included eight practice
tests to familiarize students with the test’s new essay section and grammar questions.478 By
placing test-prep companies in a reactive position, the College Board could reassert itself as the
best possible source for SAT prep—banking on reliability and affordability to fuel studentconsumers’ satisfaction for their line of test-prep and, by extension, the SAT itself.
The College Board has since continued to blur the line between test-makers and test-prep
companies, posing their organization as the only ethical test-prep provider for those who aspire
for a secure spot in the middle class. The organization rolled out a revamped SAT in March
2016, touting the redesign as part of a larger “opportunity agenda” to preserve the bond between
college education and middle-class employment.479 Gone were the requisite essay, the
traditional guessing penalty, and “vocab you’ll never use again.”480 The College Board instead
assured teens that the new SAT focused on “the stuff you’ve been learning in high school, the
stuff you’ll need to succeed in college,” such as graphic interpretation, contextual meaning, and
evidentiary support.481 Citing trenchant, widespread rates of remedial college coursework—and
affirming that college education was increasingly necessary for stable employment—the College
Board premised the SAT overhaul on its belief that, if refined correctly, the standardized test
could serve as a potent conduit between secondary education and middle-class life. In the
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College Board’s view, revising the SAT could redress systemic problems in both education and
the economy.482
Central to the College Board’s revamped agenda for the SAT was the organization’s
partnership with the online nonprofit educational service Khan Academy. Khan Academy agreed
to design “free, world-class prep materials” to mitigate the class-based disparities that many
American students faced when preparing for the SAT.483 This preparatory material—which
included “hundreds of previously unreleased questions[,] videos with step-by-step instructions”
and “adaptive and game-based online instructional offerings”—aligned with Khan Academy’s
existing series of autodidactic materials.484 Noting its “close collaboration with the authors of
the SAT themselves,” as well as its development of “sophisticated, interactive software,” Khan
Academy assured future test-takers that its preparatory material would be both legitimate and
affordable.485 In remarks to the New York Times, College Board President David Coleman
portrayed the relationship as a part of larger class struggle, asserting “’[i]t is time for the College
Board to say in a clearer voice that the culture and practice of costly test preparation that has
arisen around admissions exams drives the perception of inequality and injustice in our
country.’”486 Coleman insisted the College Board had an obligation to undermine the way
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“’some test-prep providers intimidate parents at all levels of income.’”487 Salman Khan echoed
these sentiments when interviewed for Time, insisting “’If the test-prep companies think they can
add value, I’m sure they’ll try. But from my point of view, this is the College Board making sure
it’s not about money.’”488 The College Board’s partnership with Khan Academy was the next
rhetorical step in its relationship with student-consumers: the College Board was the only source
students-consumers could trust to guide them through College Board exams and into a middleclass life path.
The College Board’s partnership with Khan Academy sparked a heated (albeit
unsurprising) turf war with the standardized test-prep industry. Test-prep companies lobbed
dismissive statements about the College Board’s plans. Paul Kanarek, an executive for the
Princeton Review, admitted that “any test prep provider who [was] focused on teaching content
[was] now ruined,” but that his company had little to worry about, as its strategy-based
“philosophy [had] never been content-oriented.”489 One representative for Kaplan Test Prep
acknowledged that SAT prep, whatever its form, was crucial—but that consumers will still flock
to trusted companies such as Kaplan to secure an advantage.490 Even competing test
manufacturers inserted their opinion. Executives from rival standardized test manufacturer ACT
diminished the College Board’s plans, asserting that ACT had long valued creating testing
487
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material both relevant to collegiate needs and aligned with various secondary-school curricula.491
Whereas test-makers used to pose the illegitimacy of test-prep material on psychometric
principles—that test-prep courses and guidebooks were illegitimate because they fruitlessly
crammed students’ heads with information that could only be learned from years of schooling—
they now pose their disdain for test-prep companies as a critique of consumption. Or, as the
College Board and Khan Academy now quip, “Skills Aren’t Bought.”492 Certainly, consumer
advocates did not envision an educational environment in which test-makers retained incredible
sway over the course of American students’ education, nor one in which socioeconomic biases
reflected and reinforced through standardized testing regimens would endure as clearly now as
they did in the 1970s. But these tests remain, as do their many biases. Over the past four decades,
standardized test manufacturers have shifted the public justification of their exams—from
psychometric devices that predicted the likelihood of test-takers’ educational success to products
that could help young people make sound educational choices that would secure middle-class
comfort. Standardized testing companies took advantage of the blurry relationship consumer
advocates posed between the U.S. middle class and public interest, and thrived in a new
environment in which disclosure and transparency could be turned into profit. It was this shift
that enabled many of the features of standardized testing we take for granted today—and
generated, at least for some Americans, an uneasy sense of self when weighing test scores
against their ambitions.
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CONCLUSION: STANDARDIZED TESTING REGIMES
IN AN UNCERTAIN EDUCATIONAL FUTURE
Standardized testing represented the promises and perils of the postwar liberal state. For
those lucky enough to be in the middle class, particularly white men in the middle class,
standardized testing was a logical instrument meant to give order to individuals’ talents and steer
youth into productive academic and vocational pursuits. For those who were not of this
privileged sort—if one were a woman, or black, or working class, or neurologically atypical, or
any combination thereof—standardized testing was often a marginalizing device, a tool used to
provide data that would serve as evidence for existing ideologies and prejudices. Standardized
testing has thus always been an oppressive technology for some even as it has helped many
others: such is the horror of modern science and technology. What kept the practice afloat for
decades, however, was that the group who benefitted most from standardized testing did not feel
that the practice, however widespread, breached their sense of the acceptable reach of the state.
By acting as a force for business, state, and educational actors to cultivate mutual interests,
standardized testing kept all three entities in check—and also largely outside of scrutiny of the
white middle class. Hence, by serving the needs of several disparate institutional bases,
standardized testing could maintain a broad bipartisan appeal, even as it kept millions of
Americans outside of power.
The wholehearted federal embrace of accountability testing programs at the turn of the
twenty-first century changed the dynamic between the white middle class and the joint
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corporate-state-education standardized testing complex. Although federal consideration of
accountability testing had some roots in the Reagan Administration’s fear-mongering A Nation
At Risk and the Clinton Administration’s Goals 2000 initiative, the practice didn’t really take
flight until the G.W. Bush Administration’s No Child Left Behind program, which pegged the
idea of student success to proficiency models.493 Although No Child Left Behind was designed
to ensure students from the most disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds and historically
neglected communities received the funding and attention necessary to meet national standards
in reading and mathematics, the policy more often than not created a glut of standardized testing
in America’s least-equipped schools. Despite No Child Left Behind’s stated goal of ensuring
American students would be completely proficient in assessed subjects by 2014, no vested
parties ever spelled out what, exactly, proficiency meant, why the terms for proficiency could
vary from state to state, or how on earth 100 percent proficiency was even logically possible.494
While No Child Left Behind aimed to make educational opportunity more equitable, it often left
493
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the most disadvantaged students wading through a sea of standardized tests without many clearly
articled educational goals set in place.
What really made white suburbanites turn against No Child Left Behind, however, were
Obama-era policy amendments. Common Core sought to streamline the annual standardized tests
students encountered all while giving states greater leeway in coordinate nationwide efforts.
These changes put suburban schools under scrutiny in ways that exposed the creative accounting
used by many to maintain high ratings. The reaction against federal accountability testing
programs reflected the fears among the white middle-class that the standardized testing system
was no longer designed to create a social order in which their children were promoted though
school and guided into a collegiate path that will replicate their middle-class existence. White
parents this felt their children were victimized by the very system they once embraced and the
very system designed to benefit them.495 This white suburban opposition to Common Core
reforms combined with the racial animus at the foundation of American far-right politics.
Whatever critiques of standardized testing and accountability systems may have existed—and
many valid criticisms did exist—became swept under a larger racist fear in Common Core
represented the tyrannical whims of an overbearing and unacceptably black federal government.
Widespread discontent with Common Core, imbued with racist and anti-state fantasies,
helped propel Donald Trump into the White House, creating the nauseating educational policy
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moment that we now inhabit. In addition to stoking xenophobia and white nationalism, Trump
ran for president on the promise of abolishing Common Core, time and again insisting it was
federal overreach without either acknowledging that states voluntarily opted into the program or
offering any suggestion of what standards-based systems could replace it. Despite no imminent
threat to the traditional structure of educational oversight, and despite the Every Student
Succeeds Act already rolling back the heavy-handed federal testing policies of No Child Left
Behind, the lip service paid to the idea that education must be under local control was enough for
Trump’s voting base. Several months into the administration, however, the question of how to
undo Common Core remains unanswered. Trump’s appointee for Secretary of Education, Betsy
DeVos—a billionaire who seems unable to comprehend fundamental concepts of contemporary
American educational policy such as “proficiency” and “growth”—has instead fashioned her
agenda around undermining federal protections for students piece by piece. For DeVos, the
entire federal educational apparatus must be refashioned wholesale as a platform for the
amorphous and fanciful notion of “choice,” a concept that has largely amounted thus far to
rolling back protections for students from minority and marginal communities.496 Steering the
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department away from investigating civil rights abuses doesn’t do a thing Common Core, of
course—but it does send a clear signal to Trump’s fans who the state is supposed to serve.
Last year, Americans found themselves at a fork in the educational road—with neither
turn particularly good. On one path was the familiar world, of accountability testing and
neoliberal centrist charter school systems, built upon Waiting for Superman and Michelle Rhee
and Arne Duncan. The other path—the one the United States seems to have chosen for the
moment—is far more chaotic, with potentially far fewer federal structures yet with no actual
sense that testing will go away. An educational landscape with far fewer standardized tests is
possible, but it requires adopting politics committed to investing more heavily in public school
funding and teacher salaries. This requires money. It also requires a commitment by Americans
themselves not to rely on private solutions where public ones could work. There is something
profoundly cowardly in Americans’ willingness to write off entire major urban districts to
charter school wizardry and Silicon Valley technocratic ‘disruption’ for the sake of lower taxes
in upper income brackets. To this end, standardized testing regimes never truly have to change,
so long as those in the white middle class feel that the state is not overstepping its bounds by
making its presence felt in their everyday lives. Rather than making choices that would undo the
ways the state uses standardized testing to govern our lives, Americans have chosen to
undermine the state and leave standardized testing to whoever can pick up the slack. For a
question with no right answers, Americans still made the wrong choice.
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